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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
WORKERS5 COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (hereinafter referred to as "WCF") is a
statutorily created quasi-public corporation which functions as a mutual insurance
company and sells workers' compensation insurance to Utah employers. WCF operates
as and is regulated like a private insurance company.
The theory advanced by Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Ellingsworth" or
"Appellant"), that WCF is a state agency subject to the Fourth Amendment, is of critical
concern to WCF as such a conclusion is contrary to WCF's enabling legislation and
would have consequences beyond the issues herein.
JURISDICTION STATEMENT
WCF agrees with and adopts Appellee's Statement of Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The only issue briefed by WCF is:
1.

Whether the district court properly found there was no violation of the

Fourth Amendment by WCF when it reviewed Apellant's medical records and provided
the records to law enforcement authorities. The standard of review is as follows:
The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, but the
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given
to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.
State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted).

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Statutes
Title 31 A, Chapter 33, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, with a cross
reference to 1994 provisions which are substantially the same, is provided in Appendix
A
Selected provisions of Title 34, Chapter 1, Labor Commission, and Chapter 2,
Workers Compensation Act, with a cross reference to 1994 provisions which are
substantially the same, are provided in Appendix B.
Rules
Labor Commission, Workers Compensation Rules - R612-2-22. Medical Records
(October, 1997) (Appendix C. provides a copy of this rule and the rule in effect in 1994 R568-2-21. Medical Records, which is substantially the same as rule R612-2-22.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WCF adopts the Statement of the Case in Appellee's Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
WCF adopts the Statement of the Facts in Appellee's Brief.

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted Appellant's medical records as evidence because
WCF actions are not government actions subject to the Fourth Amendment. WCF is a
privately owned insurance company which operates as and is regulated like any other
insurance company. Like other insurance companies, WCF's investigates claims for
possible fraud to protect its own interest and the interests its policyholders. Treating
WCF differently than other insurance companies violates its constitutional due process
and equal protection rights by limiting its ability to provide admissible evidence to law
enforcement agencies for investigation and prosecution of those who commit workers'
compensation insurance fraud against WCF and its policyholders.
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated because Appellant did not
meet her burden of proof that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to
medical records voluntarily provided to WCF to evaluate her eligibility for workers'
compensation benefits. WCF was entitled to receive her medical records to evaluate her
claim, including evaluation for potential fraud. WCF's actions did not exceed the the
scope of the medical release form signed by Appellant.1

1

All of these arguments bear on the Fourth Amendment issue raised and decided below
in the trial court, specifically whether WCF violated the Fourth Amendment. Although
not all of the analysis was part of the district court's ruling, "[it] is well accepted . . . that
without filing a cross-appeal... an appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the
record in support of the judgment below." Schwiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 585 (1982).
Our brief here supports appellee State of Utah and presents purely legal arguments based
on the existing record for supporting the judgment below by affirming the district court's
ruling on the Fourth Amendment issue. While we understand that many of our arguments
will track the thrust of arguments made here by the state, that is in no way required for
amicus briefs, particulary where (as here) the particular interest of the state and WCF

3

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO WCF BECAUSE ACTIONS TAKEN BY WCF ARE NOT
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS.
The district court properly refused to suppress Appellant's medical records

because the Fourth Amendment does not govern activities of WCF. The Fourth
Amendment applies only to government actions, not the independent acts of private
citizens. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988). "The protection of the Fourth
Amendment is a restraint only upon the activities of sovereign authority and is not
applicable to the searches and seizures by any persons other than government officers and
agents." State v. Newbold, 581 P.2d 991, 992 (Utah 1972). Employees of WCF who
examine medical records to verify the validity of a submitted workers' compensation
claim are not "government officers and agents" conducting "searches and seizures"
subject to the Fourth Amendment. The burden of establishing that the search was a
government search rests on the appellant. See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 .
Although the question of who qualifies as a "government officer or agent,"
Newbold, 581 P.2d at 992, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment has not been
extensively litigated, the available cases require that any alleged search "must be fairly
attributable to the state" and must "emanat[e] from the authority of the State."
Commonwealth v. Price, 672 A.3d 280, 283, 284 (Pa. 1996). Following this general

may differ somewhat. Indeed, the whole purpose of an amicus brief is to present new
(and hopefully helpful) analysis of an issue raised by the parties. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989).

4

approach, the cases have found governmental action in searches by police officers acting
under apparent governmental authority. On the other hand, the cases find no state action
in searches by private actors, even when they perform functions that might appear to
i

involve law enforcement functions.3 For Fourth Amendment purposes, public utilities,
although highly regulated by state government are considered to be private actors. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Cote, 444 N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. App. 1983), appeal denied, 448
2

See, e.g., id. at 284 (finding state action where FBI agent in unmarked government
vehicle used lights and sirens to stop suspect); State v. Graham, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash.
1996) (if off-duty police officer employed as private security guard conducts a search
"pursuant to his or her authority as a police officer, then officer would be acting on behalf
of the state and would, therefore, be required to comply with the constitution"); In re
Albert S., 664 A.2d 476, 484-85 (Md. App. 1995) (off-duty officer employed as security
guard must comply with Fourth Amendment when stopping and searching an automobile;
whether state action exists for purposes of constitution in a given case is not measured by
the primary occupation of actor, but by capacity in which he or she acts at the time in
question); State v. Wilkerson, 367 So.2d 319 (La. 1979) (deputy sheriff working as
security guard subject to the Fourth Amendment because, he "remains at all times a
member of the law enforcement agency, charged with greater knowledge and
responsibility in criminal affairs"); see also State v. State, 937 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (Salt Lake City police officer a "state actor" in investigation of child abuse
report); cf Goodwin v. State, 474 S.E.2d 84, 86 (Ga. App. 1996) (off-duty officer
working as a security guard at a hotel was not acting as police officer when, pursuant to
employer's instructions, he stopped each car driving on to the premises to ask whether the
occupants were hotel guests; herefore officer was not required to comply with
constitutional limitations).
3
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 673 A.2d 1149, 1152 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) cert, denied 675
A.2d 886 (Conn. 1996), cert, denied, Smith v. Connecticut, 117 S.Ct. 191, 136 L.Ed.2d
128 (1996) (court properly admitted evidence obtained by insurance company arson
investigator to prosecute arsonist); Davis v. States, 344 S.E.2d 730, 731 (Ga. App. 1986)
(evidence obtained by private fire insurance company investigators properly admitted in
arson prosecution); Commonwealth v. Corley, 491 A.2d 829 (Pa. 1985) (security guard
not a state actor); State v. Hutson, 649 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Term. Crim. App. 1982) (industrial
security guard not a state actor "unless the security guard has powers akin to that of a
regular police officer"); United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1994)
(security officer at bank not state actor); United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462

5

N.E.2d 766 (Fourth Amendment does not apply to search by employees of public utility
employed by municipality; "The mere fact of State regulation of a public utility does not
imply State action whenever the utility acts, in the absence of some relationship between
the State and the challenged action."); United States v. Cleveland, 38 F.3d 1092, 1093-94
(9th Cir. 1994) (Portland General Electric Company search of power meter on private
property, accomplished in conjunction with law enforcement officer, not subject to the
Fourth Amendment); Von Lusch v. State, 387 A.2d 306, 310 (Md. App. 1978) (illegal
installation of pen register by Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company not subject
to Fourth Amendment); State v. Hruska, 547 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Kan. 1976)
(Southwestern Bell Telephone Company could properly monitor telephone numbers
called and make them available to the police).
Moreover, a victim of a crime (like WCF in this matter) may undertake to
investigate that crime without becoming subject to the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,
State v. Smith, 673 A.2d 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) cert, denied 675 A.2d 886 (Conn.
1996), cert, denied, Smith v. Connecticut, 117 S.Ct. 191, 136 L.Ed.2d 128 (1996) (court
properly admitted evidence obtained by insurance company arson investigator to
prosecute arsonist); Ex parte Hilley, 484 So.2d 485, 490 (Ala. 1985) (court properly
admitted evidence obtained by sister of a murder victim where police had not instigate
the search); State v. Rice, 516 P.2d 1222 (Ariz. 1973) (evidence taken from defendant's
house by father of child abuse victims properly admitted).

(8th Cir. 1990) (police informant directed to participate in narcotic purchases discovered
marijuana while trespassing on private property; held to be a private search).

6

Even where a private actor is performing a public function, the Fourth
Amendment does not apply so long as the private actor has its own interests for
undertaking a search or seizure. For example, in People v. Houle, 13 Cal.App.3d 892
(1970), the court found that a bail bondsman had not engaged in state action in
apprehending a defendant who failed to appear in court. The bondsman was "acting to
protect his own private financial interest and not to vindicate the interest of the state." Id.
at 895. Similarly, in State v. Bryant, 325 So.2d 255 (La. 1975), police called a towing
company to impound a defendant's car. The towing company's inventory of the car was
a private search, the court concluded, because the station owner "testified that he
conducted the search for his own protection again liability which would arise if it were
claimed that articles in the car were missing while it was stored under his care." Id. at
259.
With the foregoing legal landscape in mind, WCF is clearly not a government
actor for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In making this determination, the court
might find useful doctrines in other areas of the law. For example, in determining
whether an entity is the "state" for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity from
federal suits, courts look at such factors as (1) how state law characterizes the entity; (2)
whether the entity is autonomous andfreefromthe control of the state; and (3) whether
the judgment against the entity would ultimately be paid by the state. Simon v. State
Compensation Ins. Auth., 946 P.2d 1298, 1305 (Colo. 1997).4 While doctrines for

The Eleventh Amendment "arm of the state" analysis is also used to determine whether
a state entity is a person under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §

7

determining a "state actor" in other areas of the law may be broader than Fourth
Amendment standards,5 even under this more sweeping standard WCF simply cannot be
considered part of the state. A review of WCF's corporate and legal status will show that
WCF is not a "government actor" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
A.

Utah Statutes and Case Law Demonstrate That WCF Is Not a Government
Actor.

To understand how state law characterizes WCF, several factors should be
considered: 1) WCF's enabling legislation, 2) Utah case law describing the status and
nature of WCF, and 3) the application of Utah law in general to WCF. Examination of
these factors will demonstrate that WCF is essentially a private insurance company
subject to the same Utah laws as other private insurance companies.
i.

WCF's Enabling Legislation

WCF's statutory status as a quasi-public corporation does not make it a
government actor subject to the Fourth Amendment. A brief review of WCF's legislative
history demonstrates a legislative intent to distance WCF from state government and limit
state control over WCF.6 From 1917 until 1988, WCF's legal status was that of an

1983). See Simon, 946 P.2d at 1302 (finding that the Colorado State Compensation
Insurance Fund was not an arm of the state and could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
5
There are situations, for example, where an entity might be a "state actor" but
nonetheless not covered by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., People v. McKendrick,
468 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) ("unlike the 'state actor' requirement of the
fourteenth amendment, the fourth amendment cannot be triggered simply because a
person is acting on behalf of the government. Instead, the fourth amendment will only
apply to governmental conduct that can reasonably be characterized as a "search" or a
seizure.")
6
Debate on Senate Bill 19, Senate, General Session of 47th Legislature, Day 11, 1/21/88.
Record #17 beginning at side #1 at 22, ending at side #2 at 6.

8

independent agency under various executive branch departments in state government.
However, in 1988, the Utah legislature passed S.B. 19 which changed WCF's legal status
to that of a "nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-public corporation

an independent state

agency and a body politic and corporate."8 Act of Feb. 4,1988, ch.56, 1988 Utah Laws
373, 374 § 4 (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3 (1988)). These legislative changes
were made after a 1987 study of WCF was completed in a follow-up to a governor's
study on the reorganization of the executive branch of government. One of two
alternative recommendations of the 1987 study was that WCF "be granted autonomy
from state controls and given the status of a quasi-public corporation, with a policyholder
board of directors holding fiduciary responsibility for [WCF] and its operations." Greg
Johnson, Research Analyst, Organizational Report Workers Compensation Fund p. 26
(Sept. 1987). (Appendix D). WCF's newly created board of directors was made trustee
of and given fiduciary duties over WCF's assets (the Injury Fund) however, the Injury
Fund was still referred to as an enterprise fund. 1988 Utah Laws at 374-376, §§ 4, 5, & 9

7

WCF was created in 1917, at the same time Utah enacted its first workers'
compensation laws.
o

The term "body politic and corporate" been applied to municipal corporations, school
districts, state, or nation associations. Black's Law Dictionary 107 (6th ed. 1990).

9

(codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-3-1, 35-3-2 & 35-3-6 (1988)).9 The State Treasurer
was no longer custodian of the Injury Fund. 1988 Utah Laws 373. 10
In 1990, additional changes were made to WCF's enabling legislation to further
clarify its status. The language referring to WCF as a "independent agency" and "a body
politic and corporate" was deleted, as was all reference to WCF's assets (the Injury Fund)
as an "enterprise fund." Act of Jan. 24, 1990, ch. 24, 1990 Utah Laws 132 (codified as
amended at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-101 et. al. (Supp. 1997)).11 WCF's statutory
status as a quasi-public corporation has remained unchanged since then.
A quasi-public corporation is not defined in Utah law. Quasi-public corporations
have been described as "private corporations which have accepted from the state the
grant of a franchise or contract involving the performance of public duties." 1 William
Meade Fletcher Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 63 (Charles
R.P Keating & Gail O'Gradney, 1990 Revised Volume). WCF is a private corporation
because it is not owned by the state but is owned by its policyholders.12 Its "public duty"

9

Prior to 1988, WCF was not under the control of a board of directors but was part of the
Department of Administrative Services, and the State Treasurer was custodian of the
Injury Fund. Utah Code §§ 35-3-1, 35-3-13. (1987). After 1988 WCF's assets continued
to be referred to as the Injury Fund in its enabling legislation although the Injury Fund
had no separate legal existence and consisted of the premiums paid to WCF, interest and
any other income.
10
Utah Code § 35-3-13 (1987) which stated "[t]he state treasurer shall be the custodian of
all money and other invested assets or the fund and shall provide investment services for
the fund, subject to the provisions of the State Money Management Act of 1974, Chapter
7, Title 51" was repealed.
11
WCF and the state severed many ties during this 1988-90 period, including removing
WCF employees from the state personnel system and ending the participation of WCF in
State Risk Management.
12
See Argument I.C.

10

is to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage for all Utah employers who
apply for coverage and also to be a competitive source of workers' compensation
insurance in Utah's workers' compensation system.

Thus, it satisfies the two

requirements for a quasi-public corporation.
ii.

Utah Case Law Describing WCF

The Utah Supreme Court has had several occasions to comment on WCF's status
and nature and has repeatedly characterized WCF as a mutual insurance company owned
by its policyholders. For example, in Chez v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 62 P.2d
549 (Utah 1936), the court was asked to address the proper means to dispose of an
indebtedness to the State Insurance Fund.14 In characterizing the State Insurance Fund,
the court stated:
[The State Insurance Fund] is no different than if the state and a number of private
employers agreed to establish their own fund. It was made easier by setting up a
skeleton Fund to begin with, giving the Industrial Commission the administration
of it and providing by law for rules and regulations to govern it. That reached
more quickly and more easily the same result as a mutual company would have
reached.... It was a venture by the state as an employer and certain private
employers who choose to come in, in which they pooled their premiums to create
a fund for the purpose of paying, not a State obligation or making expenditures on
behalf of the state, but of paying their own contingent compensation liability. Any
Employers in Utah must provide workers' compensation coverage by either 1)
purchasing insurance from a private carrier, 2) purchasing insurance from WCF, or 3)
self-insuring. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201(l) (1997). Because workers' compensation
coverage is mandatory, the state must provide a mechanism to ensure all employers can
get coverage. There are several mechanisms available. For example, some states have
assigned risk pools which cover employers who are unable to purchase insurance from
insurance carriers. All insurance carriers writing insurance in the state would share in the
premiums and losses of the assigned risk pool based on their market share in the state. In
Utah, WCF has been designated by statute as the carrier which will cover any employer
who applies for a policy. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1001 (1997).
14
Prior to 1986, WCF's name was the State Insurance Fund.
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indebtedness or obligation to such a fund, whether for premium payments, or
principle or interest on securities invested in, is not an indebtedness or obligation
or liability to the state as meant by section 27 art. 6 of our Constitution.... If the
Legislature decided to discontinue the State [Insurance] Fund, upon liquidation
anything not needed to pay contingencies would be returned to the contributing
employers.
Id. at 550-51.
Similarly, in State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297
(Utah 1978 the Utah Supreme Court held that the state's imposition of a special premium
tax on the State Insurance Fund was arbitrary and violated equal protection. The court
stated:
The assets of the Fund exist only to cover the identical obligations covered by
private insurers. The Fund has the same administrative costs as private insurers:
establishment of premium and hazard rates, procedures for analyzing claims and
making disbursements, reinsurance considerations. Fund investment decisions,
collection procedures, legal fees and policy issuance. These administrative costs
and other expenses are deducted from the Fund by legislative appropriations of
Fund money. The Fund has the same rights to sue and be sued and make contracts
that a private insurer has. The Fund enjoys no immunities not provided to private
insurers.
Id. at 1298-99.
Finally, in Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977) the Utah Supreme Court
held an unconstitutional certain legislative enactments appropriating monies from the
State Insurance Fund to pay for safety programs operated by the Industrial Commission.
The court stated:
The Insurance Fund is not an arm of the State to enforce requirements calling for
safe places of employment, safety devices, safeguards, work methods and
processes
The money in the Fund is not public money subject to appropriation to meet
expenses of the government. It is a trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of
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employers when an employee is entitled to compensation. If the appropriation
were to be made it would amount to a seizure of trust funds for State purposes
without due process of law.
Id. at 691-92. See also, Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Utah
1982) (concluding that the State Insurance Fund operates essentially as a private
insurance company and its funds are trust funds for an insurance program designed to
protect private persons.)
In summary, these cases characterize WCF as essentially a private mutual
insurance company that was publicly administered. It is important to note that these
cases were decided before 1988, when WCF's statutory status was that of an independent
state agency. Since the 1988-90 legislative changes, WCF is no longer a state agency,
but a quasi-public corporation, operated by a board of directors with its assets owned by
policyholders.
WCF's status as a quasi-public corporation does not, ipso facto, make the Fourth
Amendment applicable to its actions. The Appellant relies on Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto
Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 1997), which concluded that the Fourth Amendment
applied to the Puerto Rico Telephone Company (PRTC). However, that case did not
adjudicate the governmental actor issue, but simply applied binding circuit precedent
which had held that the PRTC was "an instrumentality of the Government of Puerto
Rico," a holding that in turn relied on a binding description of the Puerto Rican Supreme
Court. See Kauffmanv. PRTC, 841 F.2d 1169, 1170 (1st Cir. 1998) (relying on TorresPonce v. Jimenez, 113 P.R.Dec. 58 (1982) (official English translation: No. R-81-161,
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slip. op. (P.R. June 2, 1982)). Given the case law in Utah that takes a decidedly different
view of the status of WCF, Vega-Rodriguez has no application here.
While case law alone is enough to distinguish the case, it is also important to
emphasize that PRTC is not a "quasi-public corporation" by statute. PRTC is wholly
owned by the Puerto Rico Telephone Authority (PRTA) which is a "body corporate and
politic constituting a public corporation and government instrumentality of the
commonwealth of Puerto Rico

" P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 27 § 404 (1991). (See n. 9 for a

definition of a "public corporation.'9) PRTA is the sole shareholder of PRTC and as such
the PRTA board of directors is the board of directors for PRTC and PRTA's Executive
Director is the President of PRTC. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 27 § 405. PRTC is subject to
fiscal supervision of the Controller of Puerto Rico. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 27 § 409. PRTC
is exempt from property taxes. P.R. Laws Ann. 27 § 411. Although the court in VegaRodriguez chose to describe PRTC as a quasi-public corporation, PRTC is not the same
type of entity as WCF, and thus, Vega-Rodriguez is not relevant.
iii.

General Application Of Utah Law To WCF.

State statutes applying to governmental entities do not govern WCF's operations.
WCF's enabling legislation specifically exempts WCF from certain statutes. Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-33-104 (Supp. 1997) (exempting WCF from Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act, and Title 63 A, Utah Administrative
Services Code). However, WCF's operations are not governed by other statutes that
apply to state entities even though WCF's enabling legislation does not specifically
exempt it from these statutes. For example, WCF is not governed by Title 51, Public
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Funds and Accounts; Title 52, Public Officers; Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental
Immunity Act (discussed below); and Title 63 A, Chapter 4, Risk Management.
As a quasi-public corporation, WCF is not covered by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. The Governmental Immunity Act covers the state and its political
subdivisions. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3) (1997.) WCF is not a political subdivision
as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(7).15 WCF is not the "state" as defined in Utah
Code Ann § 63-30-2(9) as it is a corporation which has a separate legal identity, and can
sue and be sued in its own name.16 Since 1990, when the Utah legislature removed
language from WCF's enabling legislation which referred to WCF as "an independent
agency" and "a body politic and corporate" and referred to WCF's assets (the Injury
Fund) as an enterprise fund, WCF has notbeen covered by the Governmental Immunity
Act.
Contrary to the Appellant's assertion, Utah Code Ann § 35-3-8 (1994)
(renumbered § 31A-33-109) does not extend governmental immunity to good faith

"Public corporations" are included in the definition of political subdivisions in the
Government Immunity Act. However, a quasi-public corporation is not a "public
corporation." A "public corporation" has been described as follows: "Public support or
revenues and properties and public control are marks of a public corporation. The whole
interest must belong to the government or at least be subject to governmental control. If
the whole interest does not belong to the public or if the corporation is not created for the
administration of political or municipal powers, it is a private corporation." 1 William
Meade Fletcher Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 58, p.878
(Charles R.P Keating & Gail O'Gradney, 1990 Revised Volume).
16
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-103(l)(b) (1997) states that WCF is a "legal entity, that
may sue and be sued in its own name."
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actions of WCF's officers and employees.

If that was the legislature's intent, the

legislature could have plainly stated that WCF was covered by the Governmental
Immunity Act. Rather, the legislature was providing liability protection for WCF
officers, employees and directors which, to some extent, was also available to private
corporations under Utah corporate law.18
WCF is subject to the general laws of the state like any other private corporations.
WCF has Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws which have been filed with the
appropriate regulatory agencies. Like other workers' compensation insurance companies,
WCF is regulated by the Labor Commission and the Insurance Commission and is
subject to workers' compensation and insurance laws and regulations.19 WCF pays
premium taxes and other workers' compensation and insurance assessments, and pays
state property and sales taxes.
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has determined that the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution apply to
WCF. In Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690, 690 (Utah 1977) the court held that the
legislature's appropriation of WCF's assets was "a violation of the Due Process Clause of

The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Bingham v. Bd. of Education, 223 P.2d 432
(Utah 1950) is not relevant in this case. The court's discussion on whether school boards
had government immunity for nuisances focused on the distinction between municipal
corporations and quasi-municipal corporations. The court's quote of from the McQuillin
on Municipal Corporations regarding quasi-public corporations seems misplaced.
18
See generally, Utah Code Ann. § 16a-10a-840(4) and § 16a-10a-841 (1995).
19
See Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers Compensation Act and Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-l105 (1994).
20
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-9-10 et.al.
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the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution."21
Similarly, in State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298
(Utah 1978) the court held that imposing a tax on WCF and not other insurers violated
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 2 of the
Utah Constitution.22 The court also concluded that imposing the tax violated Article VI,
Section 26 of the Utah Constitution, stating "[b]ecause all companies furnishing
workmen's compensation insurance are of a single class,... a law operating exclusively
upon one member of that class is constitutionally invalid as a special law." Id. at 1299.23
B.

WCF Operates Autonomously From The State.

The State of Utah has no administrative, financial or operational control over
WCF. Management, fiscal, and operational control, and fiduciary responsibilities for
WCF's assets, are vested in its board of directors. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-107 (1997).
Although WCF's board of directors is appointed by the governor, this appointment
authority is not sufficient to conclude that the state "controls" WCF. WCF's board of
directors does not serve at the pleasure of the governor and can the directors only be
removed for cause. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106 (1997). The board's duties are
specified by statute; the only "duty" the board has to the state is to "develop and publish

21

Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."
22
Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution states "All political power is inherent in
the people; and all free governments are found on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the
public welfare may require."
3
Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution states "No private or special law shall
be enacted where a general law can be applicable."
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an annual report to policyholders, the governor, the legislature, and interested parties that
describes [WCFs] financial condition

" Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-107. The board

has fiduciary responsibilities for WCF's assets (the Injury Fund). Utah Code Ann. §
31A-33-107(1 )(e). As WCF's assets are owned by its policyholders, the board's
fiduciary responsibilities and duties are to WCF policyholders, not the State of Utah.
The fact that an entity's board of directors is appointed by a government official,
does not necessarily mean that the entity is a government entity. In Metropolitan Tickets,
Inc.v. City of St. Louis, 849 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), the court reversed a trial
court's decision that two corporations were municipal entities because the Mayor of St.
Louis appointed most of the board of directors of the corporations. In concluding that the
corporations were not municipal entities, the court stated:
Neither corporation is supported by tax money, neither has the power to govern, to
legislate, or to regulate and administer the local and internal affairs of the
community. Of critical importance in determining that they are not governmental
entities subject to the restrictions of the Missouri Constitution is the fact that
neither corporation has the power to levy, collect, or to receive taxes.
Id. at 55 (citation omitted). Like the entities in Metropolitan Tickets, WCF is not
supported by tax money, has no power to govern, to legislate, or to regulate or administer
any laws, and it does not have the power to levy, collect or to receive taxes.
In addition to the governor's appointment of the board of directors, the Utah
Legislature does have some control over WCF through its legislative powers. However,
as discussed previously, the Utah Supreme Court has held that legislative powers over
WCF are limited by the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2 and 7, of the
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Utah Constitution; and the prohibition of special laws provided in Article VI, Section 26
of the Utah Constitution. Thus, WCF has a high degree of autonomy from the state.24
C.

The State of Utah Does Not Own WCF's Assets And Is Not Responsible
For WCFs Liabilities.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, like any mutual insurance
company, WCF's assets are owned by its policyholders and not the State of Utah. See,
Chez v. Ind. Comm'n., 62 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah 1936), (the fund belongs, not to the state
but to contributing employers for their mutual benefit and upon liquidation anything not
needed to pay contingencies would be returned to the contributing employers); Gronning
v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah 1977) (the money in the fund is not public money
subject to appropriation to meet expenses of government); Hansen v. Utah State
Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Utah 1982 (the moneys paid into the fund do not
belong to the state but to contributing employers). This is consistent with WCF's
enabling legislation which states that the state may not use WCF's assets for any
purposes. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-105(2) (Supp. 1997).
The state is also not responsible for WCF's liabilities. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33105(2) (1997) provides that the "[t]he state is not liable for the expenses, liabilities or
debts of [WCF]...." To cover certain liabilities, WCF purchases insurance coverage
(for example, property insurance, general liability insurance, and directors and officers

As discussed in Part A. iii. of this Argument, WCF is a regulated by both the Labor
Commission and the Insurance Department. This regulatory authority is no different than
the states authority to regulate other workers' compensation insurance companies and
thus not relevant to determine WCF's autonomy from the state.
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insurance) from private insurance companies.

Any judgment against WCF would not

be paid by the state nor would the judgment be paid with public money. Judgments
against WCF would be paid out of WCF9s assets, which is not public money.
The 1988-90 changes made to WCF's enabling legislation, discussed previously,
were meant to distance WCF from the state for the purpose of shielding the state from
liability.

In addition, in 1993, the Utah Insurance Code was amended to clearly indicate

that WCF, like other insurance carriers, was subject to the jurisdiction of the Insurance
Commission. Act of Mar. 2, 1993, ch. 305, 1993 Utah Laws 1606 § 1 (codified as
amended in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-105 (1994)). Thus, WCF applied for and received
a certificate of authority to conduct insurance business in Utah.

As a licensed insurance

company, WCF is mandated by statute to participate in Utah's Property Casualty
Guarantee Association. See, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-101 (1997). If WCF (or any
other insurance company) is unable to meet its insurance obligations, these obligations
would be paid by the Property Casualty Guarantee Association through an assessment of
licensed insurance companies.

WCF is not covered by Title 63 a, Chapter 4, State Risk Management.
Debate of Senate Bill 3, Senate, General Session of 48th Legislature, Day 8, 1/15/90.
Tape #9, beginning at 1332, ending at 3779; Debate of Senate Bill 19, House of
Representatives, General Session of 47th Legislature, Day 25, 2/4/88. Record #1, starting
at 26, ending at record #2 at 6.
27
WCF's Certificate of Authority number is 84394 which was effective April 6, 1994.
WCF is authorized to transact workers' compensation insurance.
26
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WCF receives no tax subsidy or other state subsidy of any kind and, in fact, has
never received any subsidy from the state.28 As previously noted, WCF pays state sales
taxes, property taxes, and premium taxes, and all insurance and workers' compensation
assessments required of other insurance companies.
To summarize, the Fourth Amendment is not applicable to WCF's actions because
there is not a sufficient connection between WCF and the state to implicate WCF actions
as governmental actions. WCF is essentially a private insurance company. It is not
subject to or covered by state law which generally apply to state entities but rather is
subject state law like any other private insurance company. WCF is not owned or
controlled by the state and the state is not liable for WCF's debts. WCF's actions are
taken in furtherance of its own interest as an insurance company, not any governmental
interest. It has no government power or authority. Therefore, WCF is not a government
actor subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE HAS NO
APPLICATION TO ACTIVITIES OF WCF BECAUSE NO DETERRENT
PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY EXCLUDING INFORMATION
COLLECTED BY WCF FROM CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
The preceding section established that WCF cannot be viewed as a governmental

actor for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and, accordingly, that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to its activities. An alternative analysis leading to precisely
the same conclusion is that it would make no sense to apply the Fourth Amendment
When WCF was created in 1917 the state appropriated $40,000 from the state treasury
for initial capital, however, this amount was to returned to the state when it was
financially able to do so. See Compiled Laws of Utah § 49-3163 (1921). This money was
paid back in the early 1920's. Other than the initial $40,000, WCF has not received any
loan, subsidy, tax revenue or other form of financial assistance from the State of Utah.
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exclusionary rule to activities of the WCF. "The question whether the exclusionary rule's
remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded as an issue separate
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke
the rule were violated by police conduct." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983);
see, e.g., State in interest of A.R., 937 P.2d 1037 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (declining to
apply exclusionary rule to child protection proceedings), cert, granted, 945 P.2d 1118
(Utah 1997).
Courts have long recognized that no purpose is served by applying the
exclusionary rule to searches by private persons. Private persons will not be deterred
from conducting searches where their aim is not obtaining evidence for a criminal
prosecution, but rather their own private ends. See Gajdos v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1017,
1021 (Ind. 1984) ("the exclusionary rule would serve no useful purpose as to private
persons"). As the California Supreme Court has thoughtfully explained:
except in unusual cases, we cannot assume that private citizens will be
aware of an exclusionary rule, that they will be under any disciplinary
compulsion to obey such a rule, nor that they will not be motivated in their
conduct by reasons apart from, or in addition to, a desire to assist in
securing a criminal conviction. The result of applying an exclusionary rule
to cases such as the one at Bench would be to free a guilty man without any
assurance that there would result any counterbalancing restraint of similar
conduct in the future.
Dyas v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 522 P.2d 674, 676 (Cal. 1974) (quoting
People v. Botts, 250 Cal.App.2d 478, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1967)). Courts have frequently
noted that private persons are typically focused on their own interests, not the
government's interest in obtaining criminal convictions. See, ej*., United States v.
Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1994) (bank security personnel "were pursuing
legitimate private ends unrelated to the pursuit of a criminal conviction," as indicated by
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fact their investigation resulted in discharge of embezzling employee); Akins v. United
States, 679 A.2d 1017 (D.C. App. 1996) (bail bondsman not "bound by the constraints of
the Fourth Amendment," as the exclusionary rule "will not deter a bondsman from
achieving his goal or, for that matter, from taking things that are not related to it").
Indeed, the Supreme Court has been quite reluctant to extend the exclusionary rule even
to admitted government agents when that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
will not be served. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 n. 3 (1985) (while
extending Fourth Amendment to searches to by school authorities, specifically cautioning
that its holding did "not implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule applies to the
fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S.
1, 15 (1995) (declining to extend the exclusionary rule to court clerks because "[t]he
threat of exclusion of evidence could not be expected to deter such individuals).
Here WCF had its own purposes for collecting Ellingsworth's medical records
entirely apart from any criminal protection.

Ellingsworth seems to misunderstand this

point in asserting that WCF employees "like IRS employees, usually are involved in
determining civil obligations but may also get involved in criminal investigations."
Appt's Br. at 25. This simply is not true. WCF employees do not determine any civil
obligations. Like employees of other workers' compensation insurance companies, WCF
personnel determine whether employees filing for workers' compensation benefits under
their employers' workers' compensation insurance policy are entitled to benefits under
29

. In fact, the Appellant must provide her medical records to meet her burden of proof
that she is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. See Argument III.
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the policy. It is the Labor Commission, a state agency, which determines the "civil
obligation" i.e. the obligation of the employer (or if the employer is insured, the
employer's insurance carrier) to pay workers' compensation benefits as required by
workers' compensation laws. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-103 (1997).
Furthermore, WCF personnel do not conduct "criminal" investigations. Like
employees of other workers' compensation insurance companies, they investigate claims
to determine if the claims are valid and also if there is potential fraud. If the fraud is
potentially criminal, they provide this information to the Utah Insurance Department's
Special Investigations Unit for further investigation.
WCF personnel are not acting on behalf of the state when they investigate
workers' compensation claims. WCF's actions at issue are 1) requesting Ellingsworth's
medical records for purposes of evaluating her workers' compensation claim, 2)
evaluating her claim to determine whether Ellingsworth was eligible for workers'
compensation benefits, and then determining that the claim may be fraudulent and 3)
turning the information over to the Special Investigations Unit of the Utah Insurance
Department. WCF does not take these actions on behalf of the state or under the
direction of the state; these actions are part of WCF's claims handling procedures. They
are the same procedures followed by any insurance company in adjusting a workers'
compensation claim. WCF follows these procedures to protect employers from
fraudulent claims by employees and in general, to protect all policyholders from the
increased costs of workers' compensation resulting from fraud.
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WCF actions at issue are, in part, based on its contractual rights and obligations
provided for in its workers' compensation insurance policy. WCF's insurance contract
with employers provides that WCF "has the right to investigate and settle [workers'
compensation] claims, proceedings or suits." This contract is based on a model contract
created by National Council of Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI) and utilized by the
workers' compensation industry on a national basis. The contract ennunciates an
obligation to its policyholders to investigate employee claims and deny payment of these
claims when an employee is not entitled to payment under workers' compensation laws.30
When WCF's investigation of a claim suggests possible criminal activity, it acts as a
good corporate citizen and turns that information over to the state for criminal
investigation and possible prosecution.
Because WCF had its own independent motivation for collecting the medical
records at issue, any application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to their
activities would be misguided and inappropriate. "The threat of exclusion of evidence"
in a subsequent criminal trial could not be expected to change WCF's behavior, much
less serve the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule. See Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 4 (1995) (refusing to apply exclusionary rule to actions of court clerks for this
reason). WCF will continue to get medical records to evaluate employees' eligibility for
in

An employer's premium for a workers' compensation policy is partially depended on
its claims experience, so payment of invalid claims generally would cause the employer's
premium to increase.
1
Even if WCF's motive simply to have the Appellant arrested, that would not change
the relevant analysis. See State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474, 447 (Utah App. 1991) (even
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workers' compensation benefits provided under the insurance policies it sells to
employers. WCF will continue to investigate fraudulent claims submitted to it, regardless
of how those claims are treated in subsequent criminal prosecution.32
Courts have recognized that information gathered by insurance company
investigators9 are not subject to the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Smith, 673 A.2d
1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) cert, denied 675 A.2d 886 (Conn. 1996), cert, denied, Smith
v. Connecticut, 117 S.Ct. 191, 136 L.Ed.2d 128 (1996) the court held that evidence
gathered by an insurance company arson investigator which was provided to police and
subsequently suppressed by the trial court should have been admitted. The court
concluded that insurance investigators investigating fraudulent claims were not agents of
the state because insurance investigators have a legitimate independent motive to
investigate. Id. at 1157. See also, Davis v. States, 344 S.E.2d 730, 731 (Ga. App. 1986)
(admitting evidence obtained by private fire insurance company investigators in arson
prosecution because "[t]he investigation and collection of evidence by the appellant's
insurer's agent was a private contractual right under the insurance policy issued by State
Farm . . . . " ) . Similarly, WCF's investigations are done for its own private purposes and
should not be subject to the Fourth Amendment.
Indeed, it is hard to understand how WCF could change its behavior. A natural
consequence of the argument advanced by Appellant is that WCF should be forced to

motive to have defendant arrested is insufficient to convert a private citizen to a
government actor for Fourth Amendment purposes).
2
WCF's fraud investigations result in reductions in liability/losses reserves for claims
determined to be fraudulent and also civil fraud action to recover unjustified payments.
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obtained search warrants before investigating workers' compensation claims.

If WCF

is truly subject to the "strictures of the fourth amendment" (Appt.'s Br. at 15), one of
those strictures is the warrant requirement. However, as WCF has no governmental
power or authority, it can not obtain a search warrant. Appellant's argument thus leads to
the absurd consequence that WCF must comply with "strictures" of the Fourth
Amendment and yet not have any way of satisfying those strictures.
In sum, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cannot be applied to WCF's
actions which are the actions of an insurance company protecting its assets. As WCF has
its own independent purpose for investigatingfraudulentclaims, no deterrent purpose is
served by excluding information collected by WCF form criminal proceedings
III.

ONCE APPELLANT FILED A COMPENSATION CLAIM, SHE HAD NO
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN UNDERLYING MEDICAL
RECORDS.
Appellant has failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the medical

records underlying her workers' compensation claim. This provides an additional,
independent basis for this Court to affirm the district court's dismissal of the motion to
suppress.
To trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny, Appellant bears the burden of establishing
(1) an actual (i.e., subjective) expectation of privacy that (2) society is prepared to
recognize as objectively reasonable. See State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 550 n.3 (Utah
App. 1997), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Ellingsworth cannot

33

Limiting WCF ability to get medical records for workers5 compensation claims would
unnecessarily delay providing workers' compensation benefits to injured workers.
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meet these requirements for two reasons. First, once she filed her claim, she was required
to provide medical records to those with a legitimate interest in its validity. Indeed, the
medical records were not "her" own records, but rather were the records of health care
providers involved in her treatment. Accordingly, society is not prepared to recognize as
reasonable any expectation of privacy in such records. Second, Ellingsworth signed a
medical release form explicitly authorizing the release of the medical records to WCF.
This form gave WCF the right to review the records and, upon discovering evidence of a
criminal fraud, to forward the materials to the proper authorities, particularly in light of
strong public policy encouraging person to report criminal activity.
A.

Society Is Not Prepared To Recognize As Reasonable An Expectation Of
Privacy In Medical Records Underlying A Workers Compensation Claim.

The workers compensation process involves close scrutiny of claims of injury.
Ellingsworth's efforts to use that process to gain compensation benefits while
simultaneously maintaining an expectation of privacy in medical records underlying her
claim is not one that society would endorse as reasonable.
In general, employees injured on the job have a legal right to workers'
compensation benefits. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 (1997).34 To collect these
benefits employees must report their injuries to their employers, who in turn file notice of
the claim with their workers' compensation insurance company and also with the Labor
Commission. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-407. Once a notice of claim is filed, the

Effective July 1, 1997, the statutes governing the labor commission were moved from Title
35 to new Title 34A. While in this brief we will cite the currently-effective statutes,
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employee, employer and the employer's insurance carrier are all subject to the continuing
jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner and their subsequent actions regarding that claim
are governed by workers' compensation statutes and regulations. See generally Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 & § 34A-2-420. An employee bears the burden of establishing
that any injuries are work-related. See Wall v. Industrial Comm'n., 857 P.2d 964 (Utah
App. 1993).
Part of the process for evaluating a workers' compensation claim for a workrelated injury involves, scrutinizing the injury to see whether it is actually work-related.
Because of the legitimate need for scrutiny, a diminished expectation of privacy exists for
workers filing such claims. For example, as part of the evaluation process, the Labor
Commission can actually "require[] any employee "to submit himself for medical
examination at any time, and from time to time

" Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-602

(1997). Moreover, health care providers must make available to the Commission their
records on workers who have filed compensation claims upon a request from the
Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(8) ("all physicians, surgeons, and other
health providers attending injured employees shall

make reports to the Commission

at any and all times as required as to the condition and treatment of an injured employee
or as to any other matter concerning industrial cases they are treating").
It is of particular interest that the Labor Commissioner has promulgated rules
authorizing the release of underlying medical records once a claim as been filed. As

substantively indistinguishable provisions were in place at the time appellant submitted her
fraudulent claim.
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provided in Workers' Compensation Rule R612-2-22(B) (emphasis added), those
interested in the claim are entitled to the records as follows:
Those person or entities who are entitled to copies of medical
records involving an industrial case are:
1. The injured employee or his/her dependents,
2. The employer of the injured worker,
3. The employers' workers' compensation insurance carrier,
4. The Uninsured Employers' Fund,
5. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
6. The Commission,35 and
7. Any attorney representing any of the above in any injury
or occupation disease claim. 6
From these rules and statutes, it is readily apparent that society is not prepared to
recognize as reasonable any expectation of privacy in medical records relating to an
injury for which a workers' compensation claims has been submitted. Indeed, the

The Commission refers to the Labor Commission, which prior to 1997 was known as
the Industrial Commission.
36
See Appendix C for a copy of this regulation. The relevant provision has not changed
since 1994 however a copy of the regulation effective in at that time is also provided in
Appendix C. The rule also provides in the following paragraph that "[n]o other person or
entity would be entitled to medical records unless ordered by a Court or provided with a
notarized release executed by the injured worker." Rule R612-2-22(C). This rule would
not be read as preventing WCF from disclosing records to the Attorney General's Office.
The natural construction of the provision would be to regard the Attorney General as an
"attorney representing any of the above [Le^ the Labor Commission]." Rule R612-222(B). By statute, the Attorney General represents the Labor Commission in various
legal actions, including proceedings, "for the enforcement of any order of the commission
or of any of the provisions of [Title 34A]." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-401. Reading the
provision as allowing disclosure to the Attorney General is also the only construction
consistent with the strong public policy favoring the reporting of criminal activity. See,
e.g., Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997) (discussed in
more detail below). However, regardless of how this rule is ultimately construed, the
only issue before this Court today is the Fourth Amendment issue. As the above-quoted
list makes clear, at least seven authorized persons and entities are "entitled" to review
medical records in workers' compensation proceedings, which is more than enough to
establish that there is no Fourth Amendment "expectation of privacy" in these records.
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evidence could not be clearer on this point. Through its elected and appointed
representatives, society has specifically said that health care providers "shall make
reports" when requested and further that those who have a legitimate interest in
evaluating a claim are affirmatively "entitled" to examine underlying records.
Accordingly, any expectation of privacy Ellingsworth may have had in the records
disappeared with the filing of her claim. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316
(1972) (permitting inspection of license gun dealer's storeroom in part because "a dealer
[who] chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal
license,... does so with the knowledge that this business records, firearms and
ammunition willfte subject to effective inspection"); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 335 (1973) ("there can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to
an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information therein is
required in an income tax return").
In addition, Ellingsworth implies that the medical records in this case were "her"
records, when in fact the records belonged to various health care providers. "[H]ospital
records are typically the property of the hospital rather than a patient," Young v. Murphy,
90 F.3d 1225, 1236 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to seizure of
a patient's records on this grounds). "Generally, before a defendant has standing to
challenge the admission of evidence seized in a search, he or she must demonstrate some
right of ownership or possession of the premises searched or the items seized."
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487,492 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 463-64 (Utah 1990); State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27

31

(Utah 1987)). It is hard to understand what sort of possessory interest appellant had in
records maintained by others.
Various state courts have reached similar conclusions. In People v. Perlos, 462
N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1990), for example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected an effort to
suppress records of a hospital blood test, explaining that no expectation of privacy
existed. "At the very least, various hospital employees become aware of the test results
in the normal course of their work." Id. at 320. Similarly, in State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d
370, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (internal quotation omitted), the court concluded that
"[t]he defendant enjoyed no Fourth Amendment protections of his medical records in
possession of and owned by the health center. The Fourth Amendment does not
guarantee to a person security against search, reasonable or unreasonable, in papers
which are not that person's property and are not in his possession." Other cases suggest a
similar approach. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977) (rejecting a Fourth
Amendment challenge to N. Y. statute requiring doctors to report those to whom
dangerous prescription drugs prescribed because "[w]e have never carried the Fourth
Amendment's interest in privacy as far"); Pollard v. State, 439 N.E.2d 117, 183 (Ind.
App. 1982) (admitting evidence of blood test because "it must be borne in mind that there
was no search of Pollard, and nothing was taken from him by the police. The
unprivileged blood sample was taken from the hospital").
In view of the foregoing, it is clear society is not prepared to recognize any
expectation of privacy in the medical records at issue here — that is, there is no objective
expectation of privacy. But these foregoing facts also raise the serious question of what
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Appellant's subjective expectation was about the records. Workers generally understand
that, by submitting a workers' compensation claim, their relevant medical history will be
examined and that medical records may be disclosed by health care providers. In
addition, workers are made aware that workers' compensation fraud is crime. Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-110 (1997). In fact, EUingsworth received such a warning. Prior to signing
the medical release form she received several temporary total disability checks and
endorsed these checks directly under the fraud warning on the back.

R. 215/572-577'.

The burden is on the party challenging an alleged "search" to establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy. See State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1057 (Utah App.
1992) ("the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy must be established by the
party challenging the police conduct"). The simple fact is that Appellant has failed to
meet her burden on this point. She never testified as to what she expected to have happen
to her records after she filed her claim or to whether the hospital records were shielded
from scrutiny while at the hospital.38 R. 534-591,EUingsworth's entire testimony.

The warning stated "Workers' compensation insurance fraud is a crime punishable by
Utah law. Do not endorse or attempt to cash this check unless you are entitled to
payment for the goods, services, disability benefits or health care services represented
herein."
Perhaps Appellant might now belatedly claim to have such an expectation of privacy
based on the notion of doctor-patient privilege. But that privilege gives way in
circumstances like those at issue here. See Utah R. Evid. 506 (no doctor/patient privilege
as to "communications relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any
claim or defense"). The intent behind this exception appears to be, in no small part, to
prevent the privilege from being used to block disclosures that could "defeat dishonest
claims or defenses." See generally Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 275, 300 (1962). Moreover, as noted above, medical records for those with
workers' compensation claims must be made available to the Labor Commission. See
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Perhaps she hoped that her fraud would not be discovered, but this hardly establishes an
expectation of privacy. See State v. Lee, 633 P.3d 48, 51 (Utah 1981) ("A desire to avoid
detection of criminal activity does not ipso facto give rise to a protectable privacy
interest"). For all these reasons, appellant has failed to establish a Fourth Amendment
expectation of privacy — either objective or subjective — in the medical records
underlying her workers' compensation claim.
B.

WCF Did Not Exceed The Scope Of The Medical Release Form By
Providing Appellant's Medical Records To The Insurance Department For
Criminal Investigation And Prosecution.

Appellant also lacked an expectation of privacy in the records because she
specifically signed a form authorizing their release, thereby knowingly exposing them to
view. Curiously, Appellant seeks to use this form to her advantage. While the form was
plainly designed to facilitate the release of records,39 Appellant claims that it should
actually to construed to hinder their release by creating some sort of agreement by WCF
not to provide the records to law enforcement. Whatever sort of claim this is, it is not a
Fourth Amendment claim that would be relevant to this criminal proceeding. In any
event, WCF fully complied with the terms of the release.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(8). It seems unlikely that, even were she to try, that
Appellant could establish that she truly expected to be able to keep her medical records
from release having placed her physical condition at issue by making a workers'
compensation claim.
39
The purpose of the release is not to give WCF permission to look at workers'
compensation claimant's medical records. When employees file a workers'
compensation claim, WCF as the employer's insurer is entitled to employee medical
records. In spite of the specific statutory authorization for release of medical records
discussed above, many medical providers will not provide medical records without a
signed release because of liability concerns.
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Ellingsworth signed a medical release form authorizing medical providers to
release medical records to be used "for the sole purpose of evaluating [her] claim for
workers' compensation benefits." WCF did what the release said it would to -WCF did
not use Ellingsworth's records for any purpose other then to evaluate her workers'
compensation claim. WCF's evaluation of her claim raised suspicion that Ellingsworth
was perpetuating workers' compensation fraud. WCF then reported the suspected
criminal activity to the Insurance Department and provided information lawfully obtained
by WCF to support their suspicion.
The nature of the Workers' Compensation Act supports the conclusion that the
scope of the consent includes using medical records to prosecute those who commit
workers' compensation fraud. The criminal workers' compensation fraud provisions are
found in the Workers' Compensation Act.40 The legislature has given the Labor
Commission comprehensive authority over employees, employers, and employer's
insurance carriers, involved in the workers compensation system. See Utah Code Ann. §
34A-1-301 (1997) (commission has duty and full power, authority and duty to determine
facts and apply law in any title/chapter it administers); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-401
(1997) (if requested by the commission, the attorney general shall prosecute the
necessary actions for the enforcement of any provision of this title); Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-112 (1997) (the commission has jurisdiction over every workplace in the state and
may administer the Workers Compensation Act and rules issued under the act to ensure
that every employee has a safe workplace which employers have secured payment of
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workers' compensation benefits for their employees). Thus, once an employee comes
into the workers' compensation system, the employee is subject to all workers'
compensation statutes and regulations including the fraud provisions. Employees can not
chose which provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act apply to their claim.
Therefore, the scope of the medical release form included by the language "evaluate
claim for workers' compensation benefits" must include the Workers' Compensation Act
in its entirety, mandating the consideration of workers' compensation insurance fraud.
Any question regarding the scope of the medical release must be decided in favor
of the strong public policy encouraging persons to report criminal activity to public
authorities. In Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997) the
Utah Supreme Court articulated this public policy in a wrongful termination action:
The public policies embedded in criminal laws have long been deemed of such
importance that the law also encourages persons to report criminal activity to
public authorities. [The court then footnotes "Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-705 which
expressly requires persons having knowledge of computer crimes specified in
section 76-6-703 to report such crimes to public authorities."] . . . [Courts]
recognize the long-established proposition that public policy encourages citizens
to report crimes. (Citations omitted.) Effective implementation of that policy
requires the cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge thereof. (Citations
Omitted.)
Courts have supported this public policy even when there was an expectation that
information provided as evidence of criminal activity would remain confidential. For
example, in Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Company, 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir.
1972) the court upheld a district courts decision that a party reporting criminal activity
which was discovered while surveying under contract for the defendant did not breach
40

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-110 (1997).
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the non-disclosure clause of the contract. The court stated: "[i]t is the public policy in
Oklahoma and everywhere to encourage the disclosure of criminal activity." Id. at 853.
Further support for disclosure of criminal activity can be found in People v.
Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1990), where the court rejected an effort to suppress
hospital records regarding defendants blood alcohol tests taken after an automobile
accident. The court considered the problem of drunk driving and the public interest in
curtailing drunk driving in determining that a statutory provision allowing hospital blood
alcohol samples taken at hospitals for medical treatment to be used in criminal
proceedings was constitutional. Id. at 320. The court also found the statutory provision
supported the public interest of getting drivers injured in auto accidents prompt medical
attention rather than be detained by police for criminal investigation. Id.
Here Ellingsworth voluntarily submitted herself to Utah's workers' compensation
system by filing a claim for benefits. As discussed above, the system requires disclosure
of her medical records. If Ellingsworth, in fact, has any expectation of privacy in her
medical record, it is a diminished expectation because of the workers' compensation
statutory scheme and the fact that she was warned that workers' compensation fraud was
a crime.41 These facts, along with the strong public policy encouraging disclosure of
criminal activity, support the conclusion that WCF acted within the scope of the medical
release when it reported Ellingsworth's suspected criminal activity to the Insurance
Department and provided information lawfully obtained by WCF to support its suspicion.

See R. 215/572-577 and n. 36
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IV.

APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO WCF VIOLATES PUBLIC
POLICY SUPPORTING STRONG INSURANCE FRAUD PREVENTION
EFFORTS AND UNFAIRLY DISCRIMINATES AGAINST WCF AND ITS
POLICYHOLDERS.
A.

Public Policy Supports Insurance Companies' Efforts In Insurance Fraud
Prevention To Protect Their Policyholders And Hold Down The Cost of
Insurance.

Public policy mandates that insurance companies investigate fraudulent claims
because of the impact fraud has on the cost of insurance. One source estimated workers'
compensation insurers' losses from fraudulent claims over the period of 1985-1994 was
$60 billion. Reprint of the Stephen Blakely, Fighting Fraud in Workers' Comp, Nation's
Business, April 1988 at 14. (Appendix I ) . In fact, the fraud level for workers'
compensation claims has been estimated at nearly 25%. Id. at 16. States and insurance
companies have the duty to the public to take steps to combat fraud. For example, many
states passed stronger state laws during this period which classified insurance fraud as a
felony.42 Id. States also have established special anti-fraud units to investigate and
prosecute insurance fraud.43 Id. Many private insurance companies have also formed
special claims investigation units to investigate fraud. Id. Public policy supports strong

The Utah Legislature also has recognized the seriousness of insurance fraud and passed
legislation addressing fraud. In 1993, it enacted a workers' compensation fraud
prevention act prescribing the elements of and for penalties for workers' compensation
insurance fraud. Act of Mar. 3, 1993, ch. 190, 1993 Utah Laws 717 (codified as amended
at Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-110 (1997)). The following year, the Utah Legislature enacted
a general insurance fraud statute. Insurance Fraud Act, ch. 243, 1994 Utah Laws 1094
(codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. 31A-31-101 et. al. (1997)).
43
In 1995, the Utah Insurance Department established a fraud division to investigate
insurance and prosecute insurance fraud. Thirty-two percent of the fraud divisions
investigations were workers' compensation fraud in 1995. 1995Utah State Insurance
Department Annual Report, p.28. (Appendix J )
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and more importantly, Utah employers. WCF's fraud costs would increase, requiring
WCF to raise its workers' compensation insurance rates. This would affect the insurance
costs for many employers in Utah as WCF writes a majority of the workers'
compensation insurance in Utah.45
B.

Subjecting WCF To The Strictures Of The Fourth Amendment Unfairly
Discriminates Against WCF And WCF Policyholders.

Applying the Fourth Amendment to WCF's claims investigations would unfairly
discriminate against WCF. No other insurance carrier is required to satisfy Fourth
Amendment requirements in handling claims submitted to them; nor are they limited in
the kinds of admissible evidence that they can collect and provide to the Insurance
Department for criminal investigations and prosecutions of those perpetrating frauds
against them. Utah Supreme Court precedent does not permit discrimination against
WCF in favor of other workers' compensation providers. For instance, in State Tax
Comm'n. v. Dept. of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978) the court flatly rejected
the argument that "the Fund is different and therefore may be treated differently from
other insurers." The court held that imposing a tax on WCF and not other insurers
violated equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section
2 of the Utah Constitution. Id. The court explained that WCF was substantively
indistinguishable from other workers' compensation providers:
The assets of the Fund exist only to cover the identical obligations covered
by private insurers. The Fund has the same administrative costs as private
44

See generally, Title 31 A, Chapter 19, Part IV, Workers' Compensation Rate-making.
* In 1995, WCF's market share was 54%. 1995 Utah State Insurance Department
Annual Report, p. 50.
4
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keep down the costs of insurance for its policyholders.. The theory of the Fourth
Amendment that Appellant proposes would make it more difficult for WCF to protect its
assets than for other private insurers to protect their assets. Cf. Hansen, 652 P.2d at 1341
(moneys paid into the Fund "are in effect held as trust funds for an insurance problem
which is deigned to protect private persons").
Finally, a ruling that WCF is a state actor subject to the Fourth Amendment would
have significant ramifications to WCF's business activities. WCF operates its business
and is treated by regulators as a private corporate entity, not a state entity. Such a ruling
would, for example, raise issues such as government immunity and state liability for
WCF, and would could seriously undermine WCF's contractual relationships as well as
the operation of its subsidiary companies in Utah and other states.
CONCLUSION
This court should deny Ellingsworth's appeal of her conviction of workers'
compensation fraud. WCF did not violate Ellingsworth's Fourth Amendment rights by
investigating her claim and turning information WCF lawfully obtained over to the state
for investigation and prosecution. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to WCF's
actions, and furthermore, Appellant has not met her burden to show that she had any
expectation of privacy in medical records voluntarily provided to WCF.
DATED this l^^day of

«i ^

^

, 1998.

DENNIS V. LLOYD
Q
Attorney for Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
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CHAPTER 33
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
Section
31A-33-101. Definitions.
31A-33-102. Establishment of the Workers' c o m p e n s a t k m rui. =
. .
31A-33-103. Legal nature of Workers1 Compensation Fund.
31A-33-103.5. Powers of Fund - Limitations.
31A-33-104. Workers' Compensation Fund exempted.
31 A-33-105. Price of insurance - Liability of state.
31A-33-106. Board of directors.
31A-33-107. Duties of board - Creation of subsidiaries.
31 A-33-108. Powers and duties of chief executive officer.
31A-33-109. Liability limited.
31A-33-110. Audits and examinations required.
31 A-33-111. Adoption of rates.
31 A-33-112. Withdrawal of policyholders.
31A-3 3-113. Cancellation of policies.
31 A-33-114. Premium assessment.
31 A-33-115. Interest and costs of collecting delinquent premium.
31A-33-116. Dividends.
31 A-33-117. Availability of employers' i i poi ts
31 A-33-118. Scope of chapter.
31A-33-101. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Board" means the board of directors of the Workers' Compensation Fund.
(2) "Chief executive officer" means the chief executive officer appointed by the board.
(3) "Director" means a member of the board.
(4) "Fund" and "Workers' Compensation Fund" mean the nonprofit, quasi-public corporation
established by this chapter.
(5) "Injury Fund" means the premiums, reserves, investment income, cu. ..
administered by the Workers' Compensation Fund as provided in this chapter.
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 20.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 279 rep e* iled a former § 35-3-1, as enacted by
Laws 1985, ch. 242, § 58, relating to the State Insurance Fund, effective Jt tly 1 1986, and enacted
another § 35-3-1. See notes under § 31 A-33-102.
Laws 1988, ch. 56, § 4 repeals former § 35-3-1, as enact* M il I } Il JWS 1986, • : I i. 204, § 279, listii ig
definitions used in this chapter, effective July 1, 1988, and enacts til i = •$ i esei it se' :: tic i i.
\ m e n d m e n t Notes. - T h e 1996 amendment, effective July Ill, Ill997, renumbered this sectioi i, i Il i : J i
formerly appeared as § 35-3-1
Cross-References - Contribution by state to fund, § 34A-2-203.

31A-33-102. Establishment of the Workers' Compensation Fund and the Injury Fund.
i' i) (a) There is created a nonprofit, quasi-public corporation to be known as the Workers'
(

>-:< *. I EX! 8 I aw Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Compensation Fund of Utah.
(b) The purpose of the fund is to:
(i) insure Utah employers against liability for compensation based on job-related accidental
injuries and occupational diseases; and
(ii) assure payment of this compensation to Utah employees who are entitled to it under Title
34A, Chapters 29 Workers' Compensation Act, and 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(2) (a) There is created an Injury Fund, which shall be maintained by the Workers'
Compensation Fund.
(b) The Injury Fund shall consist of all assets acquired from premiums and penalties paid into
the Injury Fund and interest and dividends earned on those assets.
(c) The Injury Fund is the sole source of monies to:
(i) pay losses sustained on account of the insurance provided; and
(ii) pay salaries and other expenses of the Workers' Compensation Fund in accordance with
this chapter.
History: C. 1953,35-3-2, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 204, § 279; 1988, ch. 56, § 5; 1990, ch. 24, §
2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 21; 1997, ch. 375, § 22.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 279 repealed former Title 35, Chapter 3 (§§
35-3-1 to 35-3-28), as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 242, § 58, relating to the State Insurance Fund, effective
July 1, 1986, and enacted §§ 35-3-1 through 35-3-17. Sections 35-3-1, 35-3-3 and 35-3-5 to 35-3-13 were
again repealed and reenacted by Laws 1988, ch. 56. The chapter was renumbered in 1996.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-3-2, and updated references to Title 35A.
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapters 2, Workers'
Compensation Act, and 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" for "Title 35A, Chapters 3 and 3a" in
Subsection (1)(b)(2).
Cross-References. - Workers' Compensation Fund exempt from Money Management Act, § 51-7-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
Nature of funds.
Purpose of funds.
Nature of funds.
Indebtedness to the State Insurance Fund (Workers' Compensation Fund) is not indebtedness to the
state. Chez v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549, 108 A.LR. 365 (1936).
Moneys paid into the State Insurance Fund (Workers' Compensation Fund) belong not to the state,
but to contributing employers as a common fund for their mutual benefit; therefore, appropriation of fund
moneys over to Industrial Commission was an unconstitutional seizure of property without due process of
law. Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977).
Purpose of funds.
The State Insurance Fund (Workers' Compensation Fund) was created for the purpose of insuring
employers by the state against liability for compensation under the act, which fund is applicable to the
payment of loss sustained on account of such insurance and to the payment of compensation. Utah
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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31A-33-103. Legal nature o f W o r k e r s ' Compc nsiiliim IIMIIIIIIII1

l, j The Workers' Compensation Fund is:
(a) a nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-public corporation; and
(b) a legal entity, that may sue and be sued in its own name.
(2) All of the business and affairs of the corporation shall be conducted in the name of the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah or if conducted through a subsidiary, such other corporate
names that comply with state law.
History: C. 1953, 35-3-3, enacted by L. I I'll ill
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 22; 1997, ch. 204, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effectivi
formerly appeared as § 35-3-3.

}

Ill II Ill "Ill j

Im! II II I i

Ill

Il I

lenumbered this section, which

The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, added "or if conducted through a subsidiary..." to the
end of Subsection (2) and made a stylistic change.
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1997, ch. 204, § 7, as amended by Laws 1997 (2nd S.S.), ch. I, § I,
establishes the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, effective May 5,
1997 to November 30, 1997. The commission is to review and make recommendations on "(a)
privatization of the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah; (b) how to serve the residual market; (c) the
granting of new insurance authority to the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah for competitive reasons;
and (d) any related issue."
Cross-References

d ml i i

i uinpuiisdlinii I iiiiiiiiiil

31 A-33-103.5. Powers of Fuml

I i

i ii(iiii|il III iiiii I lliiiiiiii

I I iiiii IKIJI nit nil »i II

II

\

i I Il

(1) T h e fund m a y II11mm11 mi m i|iin
iiiii m III iiiin * In accordance with Section 31A-33-107
m v p t as limited by Subsections {2) IIIII 1 I " l.
I }) (a) Subject to applicable in i i k rales in Il ! iiliiil
ihe Workers' Compensation Fund
MI I III ni I ni or its subsidiaries, m a y i III m mil.
mlii
i iii[i in iiiii in IIIII in nice products and
services in Utah a n d other states uiiiil die L i mi I iilniii
III in il I m I nil in iin addressing the
recommendations of a legislatively authorized stum ill i I il I in I in in ill m m m 1 I i nil if any, to offer
insurance products or services other than workers i IIIIIIIIIIL in ill in in IIIII muniee products or services
either directly, through a subsidiary, or through a j(
(b) A subsidiary of t h e Workers' Compeii iiliiiin I in IN 1 of Utah m a y offer worln i
compensation insurance coverage only in a state ot 11»i 1111111 111, i i i
(3) There is a moratorium until July 1, 2000, *
icnsation Fund of Utah's
authority, if any, to offer health insurance servic
I, surgical, hospital, and
other ancillary medical expenses, by any means uu linliii" iliifi ih\ through a subsidiary, or
through a joint venture.
H i s t o r y : C, 1953, 31A-33-103.5, enacted by L. 1W /, c!i. 204, * 2.
Coordination clause. - Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 329(6), effective July 1, 1997, provides that the
enactment of section in Laws 1997, ch. 204, § 2 supersedes the enactment in ch 375
Effective Dates.-1.riws \Wi

<.h ?04 .f 10 makes this section effective on Inly I I Hi

31A-33-104. Workers 1 Compensation Fund exempted.
I The Workers' Compensation Fund is exempt from the provisions of:
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(a) Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act; and
(b) Title 63 A, Utah Administrative Services Code.
(2) The board may specifically exempt the Workers' Compensation Fund from any
provisions of:
(a) Title 67, Chapter 19, Utah State Personnel Management Act; and
(b) Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code.
(3) The provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, do not govern
the initial determination of any person's eligibility for benefits under Title 34A, Chapter 2,
Workers' Compensation Act, and Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
History: C. 1953,35-3-18, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 21; 1991, ch. 259, § 6; 1995, ch. 20, §
81a; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 23; 1997, ch. 375, § 24.
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Title 63A, Utah
Administrative Services Code" for "Title 63, Chapter 1, Parts 1 through 9, Utah Administrative Services
Act" in Subsection (1)(b) and substituted "Utah Occupational Disease Act" for "Occupational Disease
Disability Compensation" at the end of Subsection (3).
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
35-3-18, and updated references to Title 35A.
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapters 2, Workers'
Compensation Act, and 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" for "Title 35A, Chapter 3, Workers'
Compensation, and Chapter 3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act" in Subsection (3) and made stylistic
changes.

31A-33-105. Price of insurance - Liability of state.
(1) The Workers1 Compensation Fund shall provide workers' compensation insurance at an
actuarially sound price, which the board shall determine.
(2) The state is not liable for the expenses, liabilities, or debts of the Workers' Compensation
Fund, and may not use any assets of the Injury Fund for any purpose.
History: C. 1953,35-3-4, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 204, § 279; 1988, ch. 56, § 7; 1990, ch. 24, §
4; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 24.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-3-4.

31A-33-106. Board of directors.
(1) There is created a board of directors of the Workers' Compensation Fund.
(2) The board shall consist of seven directors.
(3) One of the directors shall be the executive director of the Department of Administrative
Services or his designee.
(4) One of the directors shall be the chief executive officer of the fund.
(5) The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint:
(a) three directors who are owners, officers, or employees of policyholders other than the
state that have been insured by the Workers' Compensation Fund for at least one year before their
appointment; and
(b) two directors from the public in general.
(6) No two directors may represent the same policyholder.
(7) At least four directors appointed by the governor shall have had previous experience in
investments, risk management, occupational safety, casualty insurance, or law.
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(8) Any director who represents a policyholder that fails to maintain workers" com pensation
insurance through the Workers' Compensation Fund shall immediately resign from the board.
(9) A person may not be a director if he:
(a) has any interest as a stockholder, employee, attorney, or contractor of a competing
insurance carrier providing workers' compensation insurance in Utah;
(b) fails to meet or comply with the conflict of interest policies established by the board; or
(c) is not bondable.
(10) After notice and a hearing, the govvrnm niii'i uMnu1 r iinv director for neglect of duty,
inefficiency, or malfeasance.
(11) (a) Except as required by Subsection (ll)(b), the ^
• : f th ^ directors
appointed by the governor shall be four years, beginning July 1 o >
f: : intn I : nt
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (1 l)(a), t
i 11. at th = • time of
appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that
: t = • i r is • : f I: : z i I
members are staggered so that approximately half of the board is appointed e\ ei j t s > o ) eai s.
(12) Each director shall hold office until his successor is appointed and q u i I
(13) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be
appointed for the unexpired term.
(14) The board shall annually elect a chair and other officers as needed from its membership.
(15) The board shall meet at least quarterly at a time and place designated by the chair.
(16) The chair may call board meetings more frequently than quarterly and sha11
additional board meetings if requested to do so by a majority of the board.
(17) Four directors are a quorum for the purpose of transacting all business of the board.
'18) Each decision of the board requires the affirmative vote of at least four directors IQI
• val.

(19) (a) Members shall receive no compensation or benefits for their services, but may
receive per diem and expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the
rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their service.
(20) The fund shall pay the per diem allowance and expenses from the Injury Fund upon
vouchers drawn in the same manner as the Workers' Compensation Fund pays its normal
operating expenses.
(21) The executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, oi his designee,
and the chief executive officer of the Workers' Compensation Fund shall serve on the board
without a per diem allowance.
History: C. 1953, 35-3-5, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 8; 1990, ch. 24, § 5; 1992, eh. 201, § 1;
1993, ch. 212, § 19; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 25; 1996, ch. 243, § 80
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "established by the
director of the Division of Finance" and substituted "63A-3-106" for "63-1-14.5" in Subsection (20)(b).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 243, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote Subsections (11) and (13), revising
provisions relating to terms of members and filling vacancies; deleted former Subsections (15) and (20),
relating to members' compensation and expenses; added Subsection (19); and made appropriate
redesignations of subsections and stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment ch. 240, effective J«.j ., ,J97, renumbered this section, whicf i foi n lei ly
appeared as § 35-3-5.
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
Coordination clause. - Laws 1996, ch. 240, which renumbered this section effective July 1, 1997,
"tes in § 379 that the amendments by that act be merged with amendments by any other acts if they
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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can be merged without conflict, except that references to the Industrial Commission shall be replaced with
"department."
Cross-References. - Appointment of executive director of Department of Administrative Services, §
63A-1-105.

31A-33-107. Duties of board - Creation of subsidiaries.
(1) The board shall:
(a) appoint a chief executive officer to administer the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(b) receive and act upon financial, management, and actuarial reports covering the operations
of the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(c) ensure that the Workers1 Compensation Fund is administered according to law;
(d) examine and approve an annual operating budget for the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(e) serve as investment trustees and fiduciaries of the Injury Fund;
(f) receive and act upon recommendations of the chief executive officer;
(g) develop broad policy for the long-term operation of the Workers' Compensation Fund,
consistent with its mission and fiduciary responsibility;
(h) subject to Sections 31A-19-401 through 31 A-19-420, approve any rating plans that would
modify a policyholder's premium;
(i) subject to Sections 31 A-19-401 through 31 A-19-420, approve the amount of deviation, if
any, from standard insurance rates;
t
(j) approve the amount of the dividends, if any, to be returned to policyholders;
(k) adopt a procurement policy consistent with the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah
Procurement Code;
(1) develop and publish an annual report to policyholders, the governor, the Legislature, and
interested parties that describes the financial condition of the Injury Fund, including a statement
of expenses and income and what measures were taken or will be necessary to keep the Injury
Fund actuarially sound;
(m) establish a fiscal year;
(n) determine and establish an actuarially sound price for insurance offered by the fund;
(0) establish conflict of interest requirements that govern the board, officers, and employees;
and
(p) perform all other acts necessary for the policymaking and oversight of the Workers'
Compensation Fund.
(2) Subject to board review and its responsibilities under Subsection (l)(e), the board may
delegate authority to make daily investment decisions.
(3) The fund may form or acquire a subsidiary under Section 31A-33-103.5 only if that
action is approved by the board.
History: C. 1953, 35-3-6, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 9; 1990, ch. 24, § 6; 1992, ch. 205, §
19; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 26; 1997, ch. 204, § 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-3-6.
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1,1997, added Subsection (3).

31A-33-108. Powers and duties of chief executive officer.
(1) The chief executive officer shall:
(a) administer all operations of the Workers' Compensation Fund under the direction of the
board;
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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(b) recommend to the board any necessary or desirable changes in tli :: 01 1! ::c '"" • * • i cnsatioii
law;
(c) recommend to the board an annual administrative budget covering the o,
as of the
Workers' Compensation Fund and, upon approval, submit the administrative budget, financial
status, and actuarial condition of the fund to the governor and the Legislature for their
examination;
(d) direct and control all expenditures of the approved budget;
(e) from time to time, upon the recommendation of a consulting actuary, recommend to the
board rating plans, the amount of deviation, if any, from standard rates, and the amount of
dividends, if any, to be returned to policyholders;
(f) invest the Injury Fund's assets under the guidance of the board and in accordance ^ ; t h
Chapter 18;
(g) recommend general policies and procedures to the board to guide the operations ^
fund;
(h) formulate and administer a s) silt an :>f personnel administration and ei:i!| • 1 oyee
compensation that uses merit principles of personnel management, includes employee benefits
and grievance procedures consistent with those applicable to state agencies, and includes
inservice training programs;
(i) prepare and administer fiscal, payroll, accounting, data processing, and procurement
procedures for the operation of the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(J) conduct studies of the workers' compensation insurance business, :i ncluding the
preparation of recommendations and reports;
(k) develop uniform procedures for the management of the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(1) maintain contacts with governmental and other public or private groups having an interest
in workers' compensation insurance;
(m) within the limitations of the budget, employ necessary staff personnel and consultants,
including actuaries, attorneys, medical examiners, adjusters, investment counselors, accountants,
and clerical and other assistants to accomplish the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Fund;
(n) maintain appropriate levels of property, casualty, and liability insurance as approved by
the board to protect the fund, its directors, officers, employees, and assets; and
(o) develop self-insurance programs as approved by the board to protect the fund, its
directors, officers, employees, and assets to supersede or supplement insurance maintained under
Subsection (l)(n).
(2) The chief executive officer may:
(a) enter into contracts of workers' compensation and occupational disease insurance, which
may include employer's liability insurance to cover the exposure of a policyholder to his Utah
employees and their dependents for liability claims, including the cost of defense in the event of
suit, for claims based upon bodily injury to the policyholder's Utah employees;
(b) reinsure any risk or part of any risk;
(c) cause to be inspected and audited the payrolls of policyholders or employers applying to
the Workers' Compensation Fund for insurance;
(d) establish procedures for adjusting claims against the Workers 1 Compensation Fund that
comply with Title 34A, Chapters 2 and 3, and determine the persons to whom and through whom
the payments of compensation are to be made;
(e) contract with physicians, surgeons, hospitals, and other health care providers for medical
and surgical treatment and the care and nursing of injured persons entitled to benefits from the
Workers' Compensation Fund;
(f) require policyholders to maintain an adequate deposit to provide security for periods of
coverage for which premiums have not been paid;
(g) contract with self-insured entities for the adminisii
, , r *. •• . .,<.
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and safety consultation services; and
(h) with the approval of the board, adopt the calendar year or any other reporting period to
report claims and payments made or reserves established on claims that are necessary to
accommodate the reporting requirements of the Labor Commission, Insurance Commission,
State Tax Commission, or National Council on Compensation Insurance.
History: C. 1953, 35-3-7, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 10; 1990, ch. 24, § 7; renumbered by
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 27; 1997, ch. 375, § 25.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-3-7, in Subsection (1)(f) deleted "the provisions of Title 31 A", added " 1 " in
Subsection (1)(o), updated references in Subsection (2)(d), and added "Department of Workforce
Services" and deleted "Industnal Commission" in Subsection (2)(h).
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapters 2 and 3" for "Title 35A,
Chapters 3 and 3a" in Subsection (2)(d) and "Labor Commission" for "Department of Workforce Services"
in Subsection (2)(h)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Right to appoint attorneys.
The attorney general does not have exclusive constitutional authonty to act as legal adviser to the
fund, therefore, the provision of this section authorizing the appointment of attorneys does not violate Utah
Const, Art VII, Sec 16, furthermore, this section provides an exception to the general authority of the
attorney general to perform legal services for any agency of state government. Hansen v Utah State
Retirement Bd , 652 P 2d 1332 (Utah 1982)

31A-33-109. Liability limited.
(1) No officer or employee of the Workers' Compensation Fund is liable in a private capacity
for any act performed or obligation entered into when done in good faith, without intent to
defraud, and in an official capacity in connection with the administration, management, or
conduct of the Workers' Compensation Fund or affairs relating to it.
(2) Subject to the director's fiduciary responsibility as established by Section 31A-33-106,
no director of the Workers' Compensation Fund is liable in a private capacity for any act
performed or obligation entered into when done in good faith, without intent to defraud, and in
an official capacity in connection with the administration, management, or conduct of the
Workers' Compensation Fund or affairs relating to it.
History: C. 1953, 35-3-8, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 11; 1990, ch. 24, § 8; renumbered by
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 28.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-3-8, and in Subsection (2) substituted "31A-33-106" for "35-3-5 "

31A-33-110. Audits and examinations required.
(1) (a) The Workers' Compensation Fund shall annually obtain an audit:
(i) conducted in accordance with:
(A) generally accepted auditing standards; and
(B) government auditing standards; and
(ii) by a national firm of certified public accountants.
(b) The fund shall provide the audit performed under Subsection (l)(a) to the state auditor
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within 30 days of its completion.
(2) (a) The insurance commissioner shall examine the Injury Fund according to the purposes
and procedures provided in Sections 31A-2-203 through 31A-2-205 at least once every five
years.
(b) I he chief execi iti 3 officer shall p a;; th z necessary expense o f this examination from t h e
Injury Fund.
History: C. 1953,35-3-10, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, §
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 29; 1997, eh. 204, § 4.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendrnei _, . formerly appeared as § 35-3-10

* ^ v , V«. ^4, § 9; renumbered by

y

renumbered this section, whic! i

The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, subdivided Subsection (1), making a stylistic change,
and added Subsections (1)(a)(i) to (1)(b), deleting a requirement that the audit be performed by the state
auditor

31A-33-111. Adoption, of rates
The Workers' Compensation Fund shall adopt the rates approved by the insurance
commissioner under Chapter 19, Part IV. The chief executive officer, with the approval o f the
board, may file with the insurance commissioner a resolution to deviate from the rates approved
by the insurance commissioner in order to provide workers' compensation insurance at the lowest
possible cost to policyholders consistent with maintaining the actuarial soundness of the Injury
Fund.
§30,
• Arnei icli i lei it Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July I, 1997 , i ei IUI nbered this section i,
formerly appeared as § 35-3-11, and deleted "Title 31 A" from the citation in the first sentence.

I iii ::::! m
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31! "I 33 1,12. !; I ithdraw all, of policyholders.
Any policyholder may, upon complying with Section 31A-22-1002, withdraw from the
Workers' Compensation Fund by providing an advance written notice of his intent to cancel. The
policyholder shall remain liable for any unpaid premium for periods of coverage prior to
cancellation.
History: C . 1953, 35-3-12, enacted b> I-. 1 I'll 18, Ui. M>, § 15; reniunl n ill li I I.. 19%, ch. J! ill,
§31
Amendment Notes. - I he iw«',
formerly appeared as § 35-3-12.

31A-33-113. Cancellation of policies.
r_

~ only:
(1) (a) by agreeing to the cancellation with the polk;; h : I. i 3i ; and
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(b) sending notice of the cancellation to the Labor Commission;
(2) for nonpayment of premium, after 30 days' notice to:
(a) the Labor Commission; and
(b) the policyholder; or
(3) for failure on the part of the policyholder to comply with the contractual provisions of the
policy, after 30 days' notice to:
(a) the Labor Commission; and
(b) the policyholder.
History: C. 1953,35-3-13, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 16; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240,
§ 32; 1997, ch. 375, § 26.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-3-13, and, in Subsections (1), (2), and (3), substituted "Department of
Workforce Services" for "Industrial Commission."
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Labor Commission" for "Department of
Workforce Services" in three places and made stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cancellation of policy.
The fund is not prohibited from canceling workers' compensation policies for nonpayment of
premiums. State Ins. Fund v. E-Z Way Constr., Inc., 620 P.2d 69 (Utah 1980) (decided under prior law).

31A-33-114. Premium assessment.
The Workers' Compensation Fund is liable for the premium assessment provided by
Subsection 59-9-101(2) to the same extent as private workers' compensation insurance
companies.
History: C. 1953, 35-3-14, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 204, § 279; 1987, ch. 2, § 36; 1988, ch. 56,
§ 17; 1994, ch. 266, § 6; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 33.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "assessment" for
"tax."
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
35-3-14.

31A-33-115. Interest and costs of collecting delinquent premium.
If the Workers' Compensation Fund commences a legal action for collection of delinquent
premium, it is entitled, in addition to the unpaid premium, to interest on the unpaid premium at
the same rate as is then being charged by the United States Internal Revenue Service for
delinquent taxes from the due date of the unpaid premium, and for all costs of collection
including reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. The remedies of the Workers' Compensation
Fund under this section do not affect or diminish, and may be exercised in addition to, its right to
cancel policies under Sections 31A-33-112 and 31A-33-113.
History: C. 1953, 35-3-15, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 204, § 279; 1988, ch. 56, § 18;
renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 34.
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective Ji...
/. renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-3-15, and substituted "3^-33-112" for "35-3-12" and "3^-33-113" for
"35-3-13."

31A-3J-1 lb. Dividends.
The board may declare a dividend to policyholders if it determines that a surplus exists in the
Injury Fund at the end of a fiscal period after the payment of all claims, administrative costs, and
the establishment of appropriate reserves for future liabilities. In making this determination, the
board shall require a certified audit and actuarial report of the financial condition of the Injury
Fund. The board shall establish uniform eligibility requirements for such dividends. In
determining the amount of dividend to be paid to policyholders, the board may establish a
procedure which takes into consideration the claims loss experience of policyholders as an
incentive to encourage safe working conditions for employees. The Workers' Compensation
Fund may use dividends to offset amounts due or owing by policyholders or former
policyholders.
History: C, 1953, 35-3-16, enacted by I
renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 35

1986, ch. 204,. § 279; 1988, cl i 56, § 19;

Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1 ^ "
formerly appeared as § 35-3-16.

ibered this section, which

31 A-33-117, Availability of emplo) ei sf i epoi ts.
The Labor Commission shall make the employers' annual reports provided for in Section
34A-2-206 available to the Workers' Compensation Fund, to the same extent the reports would
be available to private insurers.
History: C. 1953, 35-3-i
renumbered by L. 1996, ch..

-* - —
-.. 204 § 2 1 9; 1988, ch. 56, § 20;
; 1997, ch. 375, § 27.

Amendment Notes. - The 1996
ent, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-3-17, and substituted "Workforce Services" for "Employment Security"
"35A-3-206" for "35-1-41."
I he 1997 amendment, effective July I, 199 7 , substituted "Labor Commission" for "Department of
Workforce Services" and "34A-2-206" for "35A-3-206," and made a stylistic change.

31A-33-118. Scope of chapter.
The placement of this chapter in this title may not be construed to:
(1) change the Workers' Compensation Fund's legal nature or pi irpose.as set forth in this
chapter; or
(2) change the Workers' Compensation Fund's obligation to write workers' compensation
insurance pursuant to Section 31A-22-1001.
History: C. 1953,31A-33-118, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 37.
El fective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 240, § 378 makes the act effective on July ,

<

APPENDIX B

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROVISIONS
The following table outlines the impact of S.B. 166 on workers' compensation statutes found in Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2 of the
Utah Code. The table is arranged sequentially according to the citations of current statutory sections that would be affected. The
action taken for each citation is listed by a code according to the following legend:

A=amends
1 New Section
34A-1-101
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SELECTED PROVISIONS OF

1

TITLE 34A
UTAH LABOR CODE

CHAPTER 1
LABOR COMMISSION ACT
34A-1-103. Labor Commission - Creation - Seal.
(1) There is created the Labor Commission, that has all of the policymaking functions,
regulatory and enforcement powers, rights, duties, and responsibilities outlined in:
(a) this title; and
(b) unless otherwise specified, Title 34, Labor in General.
(2) The commission may sue and be sued.
(b) A court in this state shall take judicial notice of the seal of the commission.
History: C. 1953,34A-1-103, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 55.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 328 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.
34A-1-301. Commission jurisdiction and power.

The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the
facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers.
History: C. 1953,35A-3-801, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 181; renumbered by L. 1997, ch.
375, § 64.
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority
for the following administrative rule(s): R602-2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section which
formerly appeared as 35A-3-801, and substituted "commission" for "department."
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 240, § 378 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

34A-1-401. Attorney general and county attorneys - Duties.
If requested by the commission, the attorney general or any county or district attorney shall:
(1) institute and prosecute the necessary actions or proceedings for the enforcement of any
order of the commission or of any of the provisions of this title; or
(2) defend any suit, action, or proceeding brought against the commission.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 96; C.L. 1917, § 3157; R.S. 1933, 42-1-93; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1;
1941 (1st S.S.), ch. 15, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-93; L. 1971, ch. 75, § 1; 1979, ch. 138, § 8; C. 1953,
35-1-101; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 114; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 74.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-1-101, substituted "department" for "commission," and deleted "or the
members thereof in their official capacity" at the end.
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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35A-3-110; substituted "commission" for "department" throughout; inserted "or district" in the introductory
phrase; substituted "title" for "chapter" in Subsection (1); and made stylistic changes.

CHAPTER 2
WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT
1

34A-2-110. Workers' compensation insurance fraud - Elements - Penalties - Notice.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-201(3).
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-103(1).
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-103(2).
(d) "Person" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-1-601(8).
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-103(3).
(2) (a) Any person is guilty of workers' compensation insurance fraud if that person
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly:
(i) devises any scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage,
disability compensation, medical benefits, goods, professional services, fees for professional
services, or anything of value under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions; and
(ii) communicates or causes a communication with another in furtherance of the scheme or
artifice.
(b) Workers' compensation insurance fraud under Subsection (2)(a) is punishable in the
manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud.
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of workers' compensation insurance
fraud under the same conditions as those set forth in Section 76-2-204.
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (2) shall be measured
by the total value of all property, money, or other things obtained or sought to be obtained by the
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (2), except as provided in Subsection
76-10-1801(l)(e).
(5) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described in
Subsection (2).
(6) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (2) t a
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or anything of value is not a necessary
element of this offense.
(7) An insurer or self-insured employer giving written notice in accordance with Subsection
(10) that workers' compensation insurance fraud is a crime is not a necessary element of the
offense described in Subsection (2).
(8) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage includes any
scheme or artifice to make or cause to be made any false written or oral statement or business
reorganization, incorporation, or change in ownership intended to obtain insurance coverage as
mandated by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at rates that do not reflect
the risk, industry, employer, or class codes actually covered by the policy.
(9) A scheme or artifice to obtain disability compensation includes a scheme or artifice to
collect or make a claim for temporary disability compensation as provided in Section 34A-2-410
while working for gain.
(10) (a) Each insurer or self-insured employer who, in connection with this chapter or
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, prints, reproduces, or furnishes a form to any person
upon which that person applies for insurance coverage, reports payroll, makes a claim by reason
of accident, injury, death, disease, or other claimed loss, or otherwise reports or gives notice to
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. AH Rights Reserved.
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the insurer or self-insured employer, shall cause to be printed or displayed in comparative
prominence with other content the statement: "Any person who knowingly presents false or
fraudulent underwriting information, files or causes to be filed a false or fraudulent claim for
disability compensation or medical benefits, or submits a false orfraudulentreport or billing for
health care fees or other professional services is guilty of a crime and may be subject to fines and
confinement in state prison."
(b) Each insurer or self-insured employer who issues a check, warrant, or other financial
instrument in payment of compensation issued under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, shall cause to be printed or displayed in comparative prominence
above the area for endorsement the statement: "Workers' compensation insurancefraudis a crime
punishable by Utah law."
(c) (i) The provisions of Subsections (10)(a) and (b) apply only to the legal obligations of an
insurer or a self-insured employer.
(ii) A person who violates Subsection (2) is guilty of workers' compensation insurance fraud,
and the failure of an insurer or a self-insured employer to fully comply with the provisions of
Subsections (10)(a) and (b) may not be:
(A) a defense to violating Subsection (2); or
(B) grounds for suppressing evidence.
(11) In the absence of malice, a person, employer, insurer, or governmental entity that
reports a suspected fraudulent act relating to a workers' compensation insurance policy or claim
is not subject to any civil liability for libel, slander, or any other relevant cause of action.
(12) In any action involving workers' compensation, this section supersedes Title 31 A,
Chapter 31, Insurance Fraud Act.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-109, enacted by L. 1993, ch. 190, § 1; 1994, ch. 243, § 11; 1995, ch.
20, § 80; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 118; 1997, ch. 185, § 19; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 375, § 92.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, added Subsection (12).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Subsection 76-2-103(1)" for "Subsection
76-2-103(2)" in Subsection (1)(b).
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
35-1-109; deleted "or Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act" after "this chapter" in Subsections (2),
(7), (9), and (10); substituted "Subsection (2)" for "Subsection (1)" in Subsections (4) through (6); and
substituted "35A-3-410" for "35-1-65" in Subsection (8).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 185, effective July 1, 1997, added Subsection (7), redesignating
Subsections (7) to (11) as Subsections (8) to (12); added Subsection (10)(c); and made stylistic changes.
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 35A-3-114; inserted references t o " Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" throughout;
substituted "34A-2-410" for "35A-3-410" in Subsection (8); and made stylistic changes.
This section has been set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 190 became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to Utah Const.,
Art. VI, Sec. 25.

34A-2-112. Administration of this chapter and Chapter 3.
(1) Administration of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, is vested
in the commission to be administered through the division, the Division of Adjudication, and for
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administrative appeals through the commissioner and the Appeals Board.
(2) The commission:
(a) has jurisdiction over every workplace in the state and may administer this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, and any rule or order issued under these chapters, to
ensure that every employee in this state has a safe workplace in which employers have secured
the payment of workers' compensation benefits for their employees in accordance with this
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act;
(b) through the division under the supervision of the director, has the duty and full authority
to take any administrative action authorized under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act; and
(c) through the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, and Appeals Board, provide for the
adjudication and review of an administrative action, decision, or order of the commission in
accordance with this title.
History: C. 1953,34A-2-112, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 94.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 328 makes the act effective on July 1,1997.

34A-2-201. Employers to secure workers' compensation benefits for employees Methods - Self insured status.
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, and school districts, shall secure the
payment of workers' compensation benefits for their employees:
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the Workers1
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any final
award by the commission;
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any stock
corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation
insurance in this state, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any final award by
the commission; or
(c) by furnishing annually to the division satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct
compensation in the amount, in the manner, and when due as provided for in this chapter or
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, which payments shall commence within 30 days after
any final award by the commission.
(2) (a) If an employer secures payment of workers' compensation benefits under Subsection
(l)(c), the division may:
(i) require the deposit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of
compensation liabilities as they are incurred; and
(ii) at any time change or modify the requirement to deposit acceptable security, indemnity,
or bond, if in its judgment this action is necessary or desirable to secure or assure a strict
compliance with ail the provisions of law relating to the payment of compensation and the
furnishing of medical, nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and burial expenses to injured
employees and to the dependents of killed employees.
(b) (i) The division may in proper cases revoke any employer's privilege as a self-insurer.
(ii) The revocation under Subsection (2)(b)(i) becomes a final order of the commission
effective 30 days from the date the division revokes the privilege, unless within the 30 days the
employer files an application for hearing in accordance with Part 8, Adjudication.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 53; C.L. 1917, § 3114; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; 1923, ch. 64, § 1;
1925, ch. 80, § 1; R.S. 1933,42-1-44; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943,42-1-44; L. 1945, ch. 65, §
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1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 3; 1986, ch. 204, § 271; 1986, ch. 211, §
5; 1989, ch. 183, § 1; C. 1953, 35-1-46; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 122; renumbered
by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 95.
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority
for the following administrative rule(s): R612-3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-1-46; substituted "department" for "commission" throughout and "chapter" for
"title" in Subsection (1)(c); designated the former second and third sentences of Subsection (1)(c) as
Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b); redesignating former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (3) and (4);
and made stylistic changes.
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
35A-3-201; substituted "commission" for "department" in Subsections (1)(a), (1)(c), and (1)(b) and
"division" for "department" in Subsections (1)(c), (2)(a), and (2)(b); redesignated former Subsection (2)(b)
as Subsection (2)(b)(i); deleted former Subsections (3) and (4), relating to authority of the department to
bring suit for noncompliance; added Subsection (2)(b)(ii); and made stylistic changes.

34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the dependents of
each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted,
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, and such amount
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of
funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter.
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52a; C.L. 1917, § 3113; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-43; L. 1984, ch. 75, § 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 1; C. 1953, 35-1-45; renumbered by L.
1996, ch. 240, § 144; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 109.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-1-45; added the subsection designations; and substituted "described" for
"mentioned" and "35A-3-104" for "35-1-43" in Subsection (1).
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
35A-3-401, and, in Subsection (1), substituted "34A-2-104" for "35A-3-104" and made a stylistic change.

34A-2-407. Reporting of industrial injuries - Regulation of health care providers.
(1) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out of and in the course of employment shall
provide notification to the employee's employer promptly of the injury. If the employee is unable
to provide notification, the employee's next-of-kin or attorney may provide notification of the
injury to the employee's employer.
(2) Any employee who fails to notify the employee's employer or the division within 180
days of an injury is barred for any claim of benefits arising from the injury.
(3) The following constitute notification of injury:
(a) an employer's or physician's injury report filed with the division, employer, or insurance
carrier; or
(b) the payment of any medical or disability benefits by the employer or the employer's
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insurance carrier.
(4) (a) In the form prescribed by the division, each employer shall file a report with the
division of any:
(i) work-related fatality; or
(ii) work-related injury resulting in:
(A) medical treatment;
(B) loss of consciousness;
(C) loss of work;
(D) restriction of work; or
(E) transfer to another job.
(b) The employer shall file the report required by Subsection
(4)(a) within seven days
after:
(i) the occurrence of a fatality or injury;
(ii) the employer's first knowledge of the fatality or injury; or
(iii) the employee's notification of the fatality or injury.
(c) Each employer shall file a subsequent report with the division of any previously reported
injury that later resulted in death. The subsequent report shall be filed with the division within
seven days following:
(i) the death; or
(ii) the employer's first knowledge or notification of the death.
(d) A report is not required for minor injuries, such as cuts or scratches that require first-aid
treatment only, unless a treating physician files, or is required to file, the Physician's Initial
Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease with the division.
(5) Each employer shall provide the employee with:
(a) a copy of the report submitted to the division; and
(b) a statement, as prepared by the division, of the employee's rights and responsibilities
related to the industrial injury.
(6) Each employer shall maintain a record in a manner prescribed by the division of all:
(a) work-related fatalities; or
(b) work-related injuries resulting in:
(i) medical treatment;
(ii) loss of consciousness;
(iii) loss of work;
(iv) restriction of work; or
(v) transfer to another job.
(7) Any employer who refuses or neglects to make reports, to maintain records, or to file
reports with the division as required by this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor and
subject to citation under Section 34A-6-302 and a civil assessment as provided under Section
34A-6-307, unless the division finds that the employer has shown good cause for submitting a
report later than required by this section.
(8) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (8)(c) all physicians, surgeons, and other health
providers attending injured employees shall:
(i) comply with all the rules, including the schedule of fees, for their services as adopted by
the commission; and
(ii) make reports to the division at any and all times as required as to the condition and
treatment of an injured employee or as to any other matter concerning industrial cases they are
treating.
(b) A physician, as defined in Subsection 34A-2-lll(2), who is associated with, employed
by, or bills through a hospital is subject to Subsection (8)(a).
(c) A hospital is not subject to the requirements of Subsection
(8)(a).
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(d) The commission's schedule of fees may reasonably differentiate remuneration to be paid
to providers of health services based on:
(i) the severity of the employee's condition;
(ii) the nature of the treatment necessary; and
(iii) the facilities or equipment specially required to deliver that treatment.
(e) Subsection (8) does not modify contracts with providers of health services relating to the
pricing of goods and services existing on May 1,1995.
(f) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, a physician,
surgeon, or other health provider may file with the Division of Adjudication an application for
hearing to appeal a decision or final order to the extent it concerns the fees charged by the
physician, surgeon, or other health provider in accordance with this section.
(9) A copy of the physician's initial report shall be furnished to:
(a) the division;
(b) the employee; and
(c) the employer or its insurance carrier.
(10) Any physician, surgeon, or other health provider, excluding any hospital, who refuses or
neglects to make any report or comply with this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor for
each offense, unless the division finds that there is good cause for submitting a late report.
(11) (a) Subject to appellate review under Section 34A-1-303, the commission has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the treatment or services rendered to employees by
physicians, surgeons, or other health providers are:
(i) reasonably related to industrial injuries or occupational diseases; and
(ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (ll)(a), Subsection 34A-2-211(7), or Section
34A-2-212, a person may not maintain a cause of action in any forum within this state other than
the commission for collection or payment of a physician's, surgeon's, or other health provider's
billing for treatment or services that are compensable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-97, enacted by L. 1990, ch. 69, § 5; 1994, ch. 224, § 11; 1995, ch. 308,
§ 1; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 150; 1997, ch. 205, § 1; renumbered by L. 1997, ch.
375, §115.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1990, ch. 69, § 5 repeals former § 35-1-97, as last amended by
Laws 1967, ch. 66, § 1, relating to records and reports of accidents, and enacts the present section,
effective April 23, 1990.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, subdivided Subsection (4) and
inserted "or by methods" in Subsection (4)(a).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsection (4)(a), making extensive stylistic
changes and adding subsection designations; subdivided Subsection (8) into (8)(a), (8)(a)(i), and (ii) and
made related changes, added the proviso at the beginning and deleted "excluding hospitals" after "health
providers" in Subsection (8)(a), and added Subsections (8)(b) through (e); and made minor stylistic
changes in Subsections (1), (3), and (5).
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
35-1-97; substituted "department" for "commission" throughout; and substituted "35A-6-302" for "35-9-9"
and "35A-6-307" for "35-9-307" in Subsection (7) and "35A-3-117" for "35-1-108" in Subsection (8)(b).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 205, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided Subsections (5), (6), (8)(d), and
(9); made stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and (5)(a); and added Subsection (11).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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appeared as § 35A-3-407; substituted "division" for "department," throughout, "34A-6-302" for "35A-6-302"
and "34A-6-307" for "35A-6-307" in Subsection (7), "commission" and "commission's"
for "department"
and "department's" in Subsections (8)(a)(i) and (8)(d), and "34A-2-111(2)H for "35A-3-117(2)M in
Subsection (8)(b); added Subsection (8)(f); and made stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
Coordination clause. - Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 329(8), effective July 1, 1997, directs that Subsection
(11) be amended
to substitute "commission" for "department," "34A-1-103" for "35A-1-302,"
"34A-2-211(7)M for "35A-3-204(7)," "Chapter 2" for "Chapter 3," "Chapter 3" for "Chapter 3a," and
"34A-2-212" for "35A-3-211."

34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdiction of commission - No authority to change statutes of
limitation - Authority to destroy records - Interest on award - Authority to approve final
settlement claims.
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing.
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board
in accordance with Part 8, Adjudication, may from time to time modify or change a former
finding or order of the commission.
(c) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(d) The commission may not in any respect change the statutes of limitation referred to in
Subsection (l)(c).
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than
cases of .total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section
34A-2-417, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(3) Awards made by a final order of the commission shall include interest at the rate of 8%
per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and
payable.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 34A-2-108, an administrative law judge
shall review and may approve the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final:
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit
entitlements under this chapter or Chapter 3 by means of a lump sum payment, structured
settlement, or other appropriate payout.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 83; C.L. 1917, § 3144; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-72; L. 1961,
ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1981, ch. 287, § 5; 1988, ch. 116, § 8; 1990, ch.
69, § 4; 1994, ch. 224, § 8; 1995, ch. 306, § 1; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 163;
renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 128.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, corrected references in
Subsection (3).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection (5), redesignated the third sentence
in Subsection (1) as Subsection (2), redesignated Subsection (2) as (3) and deleted "Industrial" before
"commission," redesignated Subsection (3) as (4), deleted "Title 35" before "Chapter 2" and the name of
the act after "Chapter 2" in Subsection (4)(a), substituted "(4)" for "(3)" in Subsection (4)(b), and made
stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
35-1-78; substituted "department" for "commission" throughout; substituted "35A-3-417" for "35-1-98" in
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Subsection (2) and "35A-3-108" for "35-1-90" in Subsection (5); and substituted "this chapter or Chapter
3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act" for "Chapters 1 or 2" in Subsection (4)(a); and made similar
substitutions in Subsection (5).
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
35A-3-420; substituted "commission" or "administrative law judge" for "department" where the terms
appear; substituted 'Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board in accordance with Part 8,
Adjudication" for "department" in Subsection (1)(b); substituted "34A-2-417" for "35A-3-417" and
"34A-2-108" for "35A-3-108" in Subsections (2) and (4), respectively; and made stylistic changes.

34A-2-602. Physical examinations.
(1) The division or an administrative law judge may require an employee claiming the right
to receive compensation under this chapter to submit to a medical examination at any time, and
from time to time, at a place reasonably convenient for the employee, and as may be provided by
the rules of the commission.
(2) If an employee refuses to submit to an examination under Subsection (1), or obstructs the
examination, the employee's right to have the employee's claim for compensation considered, if
the employee's claim is pending before an administrative law judge, commissioner, or Appeals
Board, or to receive any payments for compensation theretofore granted by a final order of the
commission, shall be suspended during the period of the refusal or obstruction.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 91; C.L. 1917, § 3152; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R,S. 1933 & C. 1943,
42-1-85; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 174; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 139.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which
formerly appeared as § 35-1-91, and substituted "department" for "commission."
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as §
35A-3-602; substituted "division or administrative law judge" for "department, or its medical examiner"
and "commission" for "department" in Subsection (1); substituted "an administrative law judge,
commissioner, or Appeals Board" for "department" and inserted "by a final order of the commission" in
Subsection (2); and made stylistic changes.

(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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LABOR COMMISSION
WORKERS' COMPENSATION RULES
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R612-2-22. Medical Records.
A. When any medical practitioner provides copies of medical records to the parties of an
industrial case, the following charges are presumed reasonable:
1. A search fee of $15,
2. Copies at $0.50 per page including copies of microfilm, and
3. Actual costs of postage.
B. Those persons or entities who are entitled to copies of medical records involving an industrial
case are:
1. The injured employee or his/her dependents,
2. The employer of the injured worker,
3. The employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier,
4. The Uninsured Employers' Fund,
5. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
6. The Commission, and
7. Any attorney representing any of the above in an industrial injury or occupational disease
claim.
C. No other person or entity is entitled to medical records unless ordered by a Court or
provided with a notarized release executed by the injured worker.
D. The Commission will operate in the release of its records to the parties/entities as specified
above unless the information is classified as confidential under the Utah Privacy Act.
E. No fee shall be charged when the Commission's Relative Value Schedule (RVS) requires
specific documentation for a procedure or when physicians and surgeons are required to report by statute
or rule.
F. An injured worker may obtain one of each of the following records related to the industrial
injury or occupational disease, at no cost, when the injured worker or his/her dependents ha ve a signed
form by the division to substantiate his/her industrial injury/illness claim:
1. History and physical,
2. Operative reports of surgeries,
3. Discharge summary, and
4. Emergency room records,
5. Radiological reports,
6. Specialized testing results,
7. Physician SOAP notes, progress notes or specialized reports.
(a) Alternatively, a summary of the patient's record may be made available to the claimant at
the discretion of the physician.
8. And such other records as may be requested by the Commission in order to make a
determination of liability.
R612-2-23. Adjusting Relative Value Schedule (RVS) CodesA. When adjusting any medical provider's bill who has billed per the Commission's RVS the
adjusting entity shall provide one or more of the following explanations as applies to the down coding
when payment is made to the medical provider:
1. Code 99202, 99203, 99204 or 99205 - the submitted documentation for a new patient did
not meet the three key components lacking in the level of history for the code billed.
2. Code 99202, 99203, 99204 or 99205 - the submitted documentation for a new patient did not
meet the three key components lacking in the level of examination for the code billed.
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modes above the state's travel reimbursement rates as may be required due to the nature of
the disability.
B. ITiis rule applies to all travel to and from medical care with the following
restrictions:
1. The carrier is not required to reimburse the injured employee more often than
every three months, unless:
(a) More than $100 is involved, or
(b) The case is about to be closed.
2. All travel must be by the most direct route and to the nearest location where
adequate treatment is reasonably available.
3. Travel may not be required between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.,
unless approved by the Commission.
4. Requests for travel reimbursement must be submitted to the carrier for payment
within one year of the authorized medical care.
5. Travel allowance shall not include picking up prescriptions unless documentation
is provided substantiating a claim that prescriptions cannot be obtained locally within the
injured worker's community
6. The Industrial Commission shall have jurisdiction to resolve all disputes.
R568-2-20. Notice to Health Care Providers.
Any notice from a carrier denying further liability must be mailed to the Commission
and the patient on the same day as it is mailed to the health care provider. Where it can be
shown, in fact, that a medical care provider and the injured employee have received a denial
of further care by the insurance carrier or self-insured employer, farther treatment may be
performed at the expense of the employee. Any future ratification of the denial by the
Commission will not be considered a retroactive denial but will serve to uphold the force and
effect of the previous denial notice.
R568-2-21. Medical Records, (effective December 16, 1992)
A. When any medical practitioner provides copies of medical records to the parties
of an industrial case, the following charges are presumed reasonable:
1. A search fee of $15,
2. Copies at $0.50 per page including copies of microfilm, and
3. Actual costs of postage.
B. Those persons or entities who are entitled to copies of medical records involving
an industrial case are:
1. The injured employee or his/her dependents,
2. The employer of the injured worker,
3. The employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier,
4. The Uninsured Employers' Fund,
5. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
6. The Industrial Commission of Utah, and
7. Any attorney representing any of the above in an industrial injury or occupational
disease claim.
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C. No other person or entity would be entitled to medical records unless ordered by
a Court or provided with a notarized release executed by the injured worker.
D. The Industrial Commission will operate in the release of its records to the
parties/entities as specified above unless the information is classified as confidential under the
Utah Privacy Act.
E. No fee shall be charged when the Industrial Commission's Relative Value
Schedule (RVS) requires specific documentation for a procedure or when physicians and
surgeons are required to report by statute or rule.
F. An injured worker may obtain one of each of the following records related to the
industrial injury or occupational disease, at no cost, when the injured worker or his/her
dependents have a signed form by the Industrial Commission to substantiate his/her industrial
injury/illness claim:
1. History-and physical,
2. Operative reports of surgeries,
3. Discharge summary, and
4. Emergency room records,
5. Radiological reports,
6. Specialized testing results,
7. Physician SOAP notes, progress notes or specialized reports.
(a) Alternatively, a summary of the patient's record may be made available to the
claimant at the discretion of the physician.
8. And such other records as may be requested by the Industrial Commission in
order to make a determination of liability.
KEY: workers' compensation, fees, employees' rights, physicians, medical records,
1994
35-1-1 et seq
35-2-1 et seq
35-10
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REC0MMEN0ATIONS
RECOMMENDATION 1
Based upon the advantages and disadvantages developed above, 1t is recommended
that the Workers 1 Compensation Fund be separated from the Department of
Administrative Services and formed into a separate unit of state government
with a board of directors established as the governing body for the Fund. Jhe
Fund is not a support service and it does not mesh with the support services
provided by the Department. The missions, activities, customers, and funding
sources are all different. These differences may not allow either agency to
fully achieve their respective missions. This recommendation would provide
the opportunity for both agencies to pursue their divergent missions without
artificial
impediment, yet still be accountable
in their
respective
environments.
The recommendation to establish a part-time board
policyholders would improve the accountability
operations and programs. This improvement would
business it is and allow it to become more responsive
the insurance market in general.

of directors composed of
and oversight of Fund
treat the Fund like the
to its policyholders and

The alternative for placing the Fund in another department of state government
has been considered. However, it creates more problems for both the Fund and
the receiving department than it solves and should not be adopted.
One issue remaining concerns the amount of autonomy the Fund should be granted
as a separate unit of state government. Alternative 3 would establish the
Fund as an independent department but still subject to the normal controls of
state government - fiscal, budget, personnel, purchasing, data processing,
etc. There would be some additional expense to implement this alternative due
to the need for staff to perform personnel, accounting and budget work now
done by the Department. This should be minimal due to the semi-independent
nature of the Fund currently.
The Fund could still be limited 1n the pursuit of its mission by state
controls.
For example, since the Fund would still be subject to state
personnel classifications and salaries, the hiring of professionals such as
actuaries, investment managers, consulting physicians and attorneys would be
limited. The state is not competitive with the private sector for many of
these positions.
Claims adjuster positions are filled by recruits with
limited or no experience in claims adjusting and this is due to the low
salaries given for this work compared with the private sector. This means
there may be a long lead time before an adjuster is fully trained and
proficient in the work. These examples illustrate the limitations which would
restrict the Fund in fully accomplishing its mission of serving the business
community of the state.
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Alternative 4 would loosen state controls and give the Fund a more autonomous
position relative to state governmentThe Fund would have more flexibility
to respond to the market as decided by the board of directors.
The board
would be the governing body and, under this option, would become the fiduciary
body for investments as well. There would be more expense involved in this
alternative due to the need to establish an investment function at the Fund.
This could be offset, however, with the greater control and flexibility gained
over the investment function, and result in additional revenue. This function
would be similar to that of the State Retirement Board which has in-house
managers who monitor the private investment managers actually making the
investments.
RECOMMENDATION 2
To provide the opportunity for the Fund to achieve its long term mission to
the business community of the state, it is recommended that the Fund be
granted autonomy from state controls and given the status of a quasi-public
corporation, wi th a policyholder board of directors holding
fiduciary
responsibility for the Fund and its operations. At the same time autonomy is
granted, it is imperative the Fund establish internal policies for purchasing,
data processing, accounting and personnel which reflect state experience yet
allow flexibility where it is needed.
If it were not feasible to grant complete autonomy at the present time,
independence from the Department should be granted and a board of directors
established to act as the fiduciary body for the Fund. Under this option some
or all state controls could still be maintained.
IMPACT ON GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE
Although organizational autonomy for the Fund may improve accountability and
productivity for both the Fund and the Department of Administrative Services,
the impact on the rest of state government should also be considered.
The
alternatives should be examined specifically for their impact on the Governor
and the Legislature.
It is contended here that there will be no adverse
impact.
Elevating the Fund to autonomous status could affect the Governor in several
ways.
First, the Governor's span of control will not be enlarged with the
addition of another autonomous agency, for the Governor will not be the
governing body nor the fiduciary agent for the Fund.
This will be the
responsibility of the board of directors.
The Governor would have some influence on the policies and operations of the
Fund through the appointments he makes to the board of directors. This would
be a regular annual event for there could be one director each year whose term
expires.
This would be an opportunity for a reappointment of a current
director or a new appointment.

Workers1 Compensation Fund Organizational Report
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The Impact on the Legislature of autonomous status for the Fund could be less
than that for the Governor. With the passage of Senate Bill 104 (1986 General
Session), the Legislature already reviews separately the budget of the Fund
and exercises limited authority to alter It.
If the Fund were granted autonomous status, there would likely be more
legislative scrutiny and oversight than at present due to the Increased
visibility. The Senate would have to consent to appointments by the Governor
for the Fund's board of directors. This would allow for a measure of
oversight to occur by the Senate.
Since the primary program of the Fund 1s workers' compensation, there is
little involvement with any other part of state government, aside from the
regulators noted earlier - the Industrial Commission and the Department of
Insurance. No change would occur In these relationships.
The impact on other departments will be negligible. The State Treasurer has
indicated the removal of the Fund's assets from his management control would
have little impact on his workload or on the remaining state assets. State
agencies which hold policies through the Fund would not be affected except
they would now have a voice on policy issues through the board of directors.
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279, 167 P. 951; State v. Spillman, 110
MOFFAT and EriIRAIM HANSON, J J „
Wash. 662, 183 P. 915; State v. Wynn, dissenting.
125 Wash. 398, 216 P. S72."
[2] Appellant makes some contention
concerning the order of proof adopted in
the trial of the case. That is immaterial,
the corpus delicti being ultimately shown.
State v. Marselle, 43 Wash. 273, 86 P.
5S6.
There was enough competent testimony
to establish the corpus delicti and to support the verdict and judgment in all respects.
Affirmed
MILLARD, C. J., and TOLMAX, HOLCOMB, and BEALS, JJ., concur.
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C H E Z , Atty. Gen., v. I N D U S T R I A L COMMfSSfON O F UT/tH et af.
No. 5731.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec 1, 1936.
1. States <§=»109
Indebtedness to state Insurance fund,
consisting of premiums and penalties paid by
employers, maintained for purpose of insuring employers against liability for compensation and of assuring the compensation, provided by compensation statute to persons entitled thereto, held not "indebtedness to state
or any municipality thereof within Constitution prohibiting Legislature from releasing
or extinguishing indebtedness of any corporation or person to state, or to any municipality
thereof (Rev.SU933, 42-2-1; Const, art. 6, 5
27).i
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"Indebted; Indebtedness," see Words &
Phrases.]

Appeal from Original Proceeding in this
Court.
Original prohibition proceeding by Joseph
Chez, Attorney General of Utah, against the
Industrial Commission of Utah and others.
Writ made permanent.
S. D. Huffaker, of Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
Grover A. Giles and F. A. Trottier, both
of Salt Lake City, for defendants.
WOLFE, Justice.
This is an application to prohibit the Industrial Commission from accepting from
the town of Scipio the sum of $7,200 in
consideration of the surrender and cancellation of seven of said town's $1,000 bonds
together _wilh matured interest of $517.40.
One bond,., due June 1, 1934, and another
due June 1, 1935, are in default. The other five bonds had not matured when this
writ was sued out. The petition alleges
that the present value of all the bonds is
S7.200. The action is really to procure an
interpretation of section 27, art. 6, of our
State Constitution, which reads as follows:
' T h e Legislature shall have no power to
release or extinguish, in whole or in part,
the indebtedness, liability or obligation of
any corporation or person to the State, or
to any municipal corporation therein.''
It was rather presumed that the decision
in this case would be of guidance to all officers, boards, departments, and commissions as to their right to compromise or
take less than the amount owing on or
amount paid for bonds held by such orncer, board, department, and commission.
As will be seen by what is set out hereunder, this decision rests on its special
facts and can form no such general rule
of guidance.

[1] We do not believe section 27, art. 6.
applies to the facts of this case, because an
indebtedness to the "State Insurance Fund"
is not an indebtedness to the. state or any
municipality thereof as meant by said sec2. Master and servant <S=>383
tion 27. It must be kept in mind throughIndustrial Commission Is without au- out the ensuing discussion that the question
thority to sell bonds held by the state insur- is not whether the State Insurance Fund
ance fund without approval of board of ex- is a "public fund" in the sense that it is
aminers (Rev.SU933, 42-2-14).
publicly administered, but whether a debt or
i American Fuel Co. of Utah r. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah, 4S3, 1ST P. 633, S A.L.
R. 1342.
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ohlisation owing to it is an obligation or so much to accomplish this end as to asliability to the state as mean: by section sure its accomplishment, ^the Legislature
27. art. 6. We shall examine the nature required the compensation risk to be in«>f the State Insurance Fund and see what sured. It provided in cases of financially
:
: really is. Section 42-2-1. R.5.1933, re- able employers for self-insurance. Those
d a c t i n g the original section contained in not obtaining the privilege of self-insurthe 1917 laws, sets up the State Insurance ance could either insure in a private carrier
Fund. It states: "There shall be maintain- or in a fund which the Legislature proed a fund * * * for the purpose of vided for, consisting of employers' contriinsuring employers against liability for the butions or premiums. Forty thousand dolcompensation, and of assuring to the per- lars was given to start it off, and premiums
sons entitled thereto the compensation, pro- are paid into it by the state for its own
rided by this title. Such fund shall consist employees like any private employer. But
[1] of all premiums and penalties received basically it is no different than if the state'
and paid into the fund, [2] of property and and a^number of private empJoy,ers : agr«d_
securities acquired by and through the use to establish their own fund. It was madeof moneys belonging to the fund, and [3] easier by" setting tip a .skeleton fund to beof interest earned upon money belonging gin with, giving the Industrial Commission
to the fund and deposited or invested as the administration of it and providing by
herein provided.'* (Italics supplied.) It law for rules and regulations to govern it.
will be noted that the basic source of the That reached more quickly and more easily
fund is the premiums and penalties—noth- * the same result as a mutual company woulding else. Originally the state contributed have reached. If served .to give employers;
:r40.000 to-start the fund,-but this-was to who were forced to insure, a means to g^t
initiate it, and as a contribution towards the insurance practically for the "cost of .the
its establishment—a benevolence. True, if compensation without charges for profits
the state has not been paid back on liquida- or acquisition and in addition gave it a pubtion it would probably have a claim for its lic aspect and made its administration and
advancement. But such <$dvancerr.cnt in no management subject to public audit, inspecwise changed the nature of the fund. i. e., tion, and responsibility. But it did not
one derived from premiums and penalties change the essential nature of the venture.
payable by employers. And what is it ex- It was a venture by the state as an empended for? It is paid on account of the ployer and certain private employers who
employer for compensation for zihich he is choose to come in, in which they pooled
primarily liable. See American Fuel Co. of their„premiums to create a fund for the purUtah v. Industrial C~mrn., 55 Utah. 4S3. 187 pose oi paying, not a state obligation or
P. 633, S A.L.R. 13-2. The employer real- making expenditures on behalf of the state,
ly pools his premiums in the S:ate Fund but of paying their own contingent compento create a fund for the payment of an sation liabilities. Any indebtedness or obliobligation for which it is liable. It is a gation to such a fund, whether for premium
common fund belonging to the participat- payments, or principal or interest on s*eing employers. It is therefore not derived __curities invested in. is not an indebtedness
from anything owing to the stare nor paid or obligation or liability to the state as
out on behalf of any state obligation. The meant by section 27, art. 6, of our Consticoming into the fund is voluntary. If em- tution. Should the state at some time esployers band together and form their own tablish a means whereby counties, cities,
fund with a management selected by them, school districts, etc., could pay bond prewhich fund would pay their compensation miums into a fund and obtain faithful perliability, there would be no question as to formance bonds from the body required by
the nature of the fund. It would not then law to administer the fund, the state itself
even be public moneys in the sense that it bonding its officers therein, and should make
was in custody of and managed by a pub- any profits payable to those contributing
lic body or held by a public omcial. Change to the fund and should start it on by an
the situation somewhat. The Legislature advancement of $40,000. it would not be
provides for workmen's compensation, a contended that such fund operated by the
social and a public purpose. The end it state purely for the benefit of the particidesired to accomplish was to see that work- pants made, an indebtedness to the fund an
men incapacitated by industrial accidents indebtedness to the state.
or their dependents in case of an industrial
This theory is amply borne out by other
death were paid something to live on. Not
sections of the Code. The cost of the audit
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{s paid out of the fund, not by the state
out of an appropriation. Section 42-2-2.
•'There shall be no liability on the part of
the s* ate beyond the amount of such fund."
Section 42-2-1. Thus, the state in efFcct
5 ays: "We will create, establish, manage,
-ollect and administer through the Industrial Commission but as an agent and trustee only for the contributing employers."
The commission may reinsure risks. Section 42-2-9. By section 42-2-10, subsecs. (3)
and (4), balances earned and not needed as
reserves are turned where? Not to the
state, but back to the contributing employers. If the Legislature decided to discontinue the State Fund, upon liquidation any_rhin°" not needed to pay contingencies would
he returned to the contributing employers.
The fund is publicly administered, but its
debtors are not debtors to the state. It
. belongs, not to the state, but to the contributing employers for their mutual benent. It constitutes a pooling of risks under
the auspices of the-state. See 71 C J . 9G0,
§ 62S; State ex rel. Stearns v. Olson, 43 N.
b 619, 175 N.W. 714; State v. Padgett, 54
N\D. 211, 209 N.W. 338; Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Stong, 77 Colo. 590,
239 P. 12. Section 3096, aComp.Laws Utah
1917, provided that the commission was
vested with full authority over said fund,
and may do all things necessary or convenient in the administration thereof, or
in connection with the insurance business to
MJ carried on by it under the provisions of
.hat title. This section recognized it as an
•insurance business.'' It is an insurance
' business for the benefit and accommodation
ui the contributing employers. It provides
,i means for meeting an obligation placed
..p. them by the Legislature which at the
sime time is useful in holding down the
charges of the private stock companies.
The Legislature gave the commission "full
authority'' over the fund.
Owing to the fact that we have concluded that the State Insurance Fund, while a
public fund in the sense of being administered by a public body, is not public money
in the sense that it is money of the state
to be used for and on behalf of the state
for a state expenditure, and therefore money owing to it is not an obligation to the
state as meant by section 27, art. 6, of the
Constitution, it is unnecessary for us in this
opinion to discuss or decide the question
of whether section 27, art. 6, is a prohibition only against the Legislature as such or
whether it extends to administrative or
{)r
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executive bodies or commissions created by
the Legislature. Nor is it necessary for
us to decide whether debts owing to the
State Land Board, or other departments,
commissions, or boards, may be compromised by such bodies. Cases involving the
right to compromise by such bodies will
have to be decided on their facts when and
as they arise.
[2] We have decided the question presented in this case without determining
whether there was not by injunction a
speedy and adequate remedy at law. Having now decided the legal question presented, we are compelled nevertheless.to make
the writ permanent because the Industrial
Commission is without authority to sell the
bonds without the approval of the Board
of Examiners. The Chief Justice has called our attention to section 42-2-14, R.S.
1933, reading as "follows: '-The commission
may invest any of the surplus or reserve
belonging to the state insurance fund^in
bonds of the United States or federal land
banks,- of this state, or of any county, city,
town or school district of this state, at current market prices for such bonds; or in
first mortgages on real estate at not to exceed forty per cent of the cash value thereof; provided, that such purchase or investment is authorized by a resolution adopted
by the commission and approved by the
state board of examiners. * * * The
state treasurer shall honor and pay all
vouchers drawn on the state insurance fund
for the purchase of such bonds when signed
by any two members of the commission upon delivery of said bonds to him when there
is attached to such voucher a certified copy
of such approved resolution of the commission authorizing the purchase of such bonds:
and the commission may sell any of such
bonds upon like resolution, and the proceeds
thereof shall be paid by the purchaser to
the state treasurer."
The words "like resolution," in the last
three lines of this section, we think, refer
to "approved resolution."
Since it does not appear that the Industrial Commission has obtained the approval
of the Board of Examiners to the proposed
sale, the writ must be made permanent.
Such is the order.
E L I A S HANSEN,
LAND, J., concur.

C

J., and FOL-

M O F F A T , Justice (dissenting).
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I dissent. The petition alleges that petitioner is the Attorney General of the State
of Utah, a property owner and taxpayer of
the state. That the Industrial Commission
is a body corporate oi the state and the
individual defendants are the duly appointed, qualified, and acting' members of the
Industrial Commission of Utah. That the
town of Scipio is a municipal corporation
of the state of Utah, organized and existing by virtue of the laws thereof. That
about June, 1925, the town of Scipio issued and sold, and the State Insurance
Fund by and through the Industrial Commission purchased, seven $1,000 bonds,
which bonds were general obligations of
the town and the full faith and credit and
all taxable property within the town limits were pledged for the punctual payment
of the principal and interest thereof.
That one of said bonds so purchased became due and payable June 1,-1934, another
June 1, 1935, and one each year thereafter until June 1, 1940. A copy of one of
the bonds is made a part of the petition.
The defendants purchased the said seven
bonds for and on behalf of the State Insurance Fund. The purchase price thereof was paid out o*£ and belonged to said
fund. The bonds were deposited with the
State Treasurer, and ever since their purchase have been and now are in his custody and under the administration and in
the control of the defendants as provided
by law. The bonds maturing June 1, 1934,
and June 1, 1935, have not been-paid. There
is accrued interest due and unpaid in the
sum of $517.40.
It is *hen alleged that the town of Scipio
is ottering to the defendants, the Industrial
Commission and the members thereof in
their official capacity, the sum of $7,200 for
the cancellation of an obligation of $7,717.40, and in consideration of the offered
payment requests the surrender, cancellation, and release of all claim and obligation on the said bonds held as aforesaid
against the town of Scipio. It is also alleged that the present market value of the
said bonds, including the interest, is the
sum of $7,200, the amount alleged to be offered for the surrender and relinquishment
thereof. It is further alleged that the defendants have threatened to and will accept
the offer of payment of $7,200 and will
surrender and return to the town of Scipio
the said bonds, and will release it from all
obligations arising by virtue of the bonds,
unless prohibited by order of this court,

and that the defendants will ask and receive the consent of any other state officers or departments whose consent may be
thought necessary to brini^ about a surrender, release, and cancellation ot said bonds.
PlaintilY makes the usual allegation that he
has no plain, speedy, r.nd ?Ac ;u:ite remedy
in the ordinary course of law. and prays
for the writ aforesaid restraining and prohibiting defendants and each ox them from
relinquishing, canceling, or returning the
said bon Is to the town of Scipio for any
sum less than the principal thereof with the
full amount of the accrued interest thereon,
and for general relief.
There are not many cases bearing directly upon the question as submitted in the
briefs and arguments presented to the court.
The briefs and arguments stress the-twentyseventh section of article 6 of the Constitution of Utah. Before quoting the section or
•discussing the matter, wc desire to say there
is involved,, in the view we take of the
case, more than the construction* and applicability of the section of the Constitution
referred to. Section 27 of article 6 reads:
"The Legislature shall have no power to
release or extinguish, in whole or in part,
the indebtedness, liability or obligation of
any corporation or person to the State, or
to any municipal corporation therein."
Does a bond purchased with the surplus
or reserve funds of the "State Insurance
Fund'' bring into existence an indebtedness,
liability,..or obligation to the state? We
think it does. It is to be observed that
the questions under consideration relate to
an indebtedness, liability, or obligation upon an investment in and disposition of
bonds only. Under the provisions of the
statute, ' T h e commission may invest any
of the surplus or reserve belonging to the
state insurance fund in bonds of the United States or federal land banks [bonds], of
this state, or of any county, city, town
or school district of this state, at current
market prices for such bonds." R.S.Utah
1933, 42-2-14. Under the provisions of section 42-2-3, R.S.1933, "The commission shall
administer the state insurance
fund
* * * agreeably to the provisions of this
title."
It has been held that the State Insurance
Fund has no corporate existence. It has
no power to claim or assert an indebtedness
or an obligation to it as such. The question of the status of the State Insurance
Fund was set forth in the case of Baa &
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"moneys belonging to a government, or any
department of it, in the hands of a public
official." Webster's New Int. Diet., 1005.
"After the premiums are paid into the fund
by the employer under the act, the fund becomes the property of the state, and is held
in trust for the payment of compensation to
such injured employees as the state may designate." (Italics added.) State ex rel. Williams v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 116
Ohio St. 45, 156 N.E. 101, 103. The State
Insurance Fund being a public fund, as distinguished from private funds, the bonds in
question being a part of that fund, the obligation to pay such bonds as long as they
remain a part of that fund is an obligation,
indebtedness, or liability to the state, to be
The State Insurance Fund, as such, may held, collected, or recovered by the properly
neither contract nor be contracted with. It designated state agencies.
i r : . v not incur an indebtedness nor obligaNo-statute or authority is cited giving the
t ; n nor-claim the right to collect if such
Industrial Commission or any other state
Wwre claimed. The Scipio bonds proposed
t 0 be surrendered or canceled are* riot an agency or officer authority or power to re• .Miration,, indebtedness, or liability to the lease or extinguish,' in whole or in part,
S^ce Insurance Fund, though required to the indebtedness, liability, or obligation to
be deposited therein when purchased and re- the state, and such power being denied the
ceived. The Scipio bonds, or any other Legislature, it follows that the Industrial
[.;nd or obligation, indebtedness, or liabil- Commission may not do what it is not aui;v arising out oi the investment by the thorized to do, nor what the Legislature
Industrial Commission, do not create an in- may neither do nor authorize to be done.
debtedness, liability, or obligation to the InSection 1, art. 12, of the State Constitudustrial Commission, as such, or to the tion provides: "Corporations may be formmembers thereof, individually or collective- ed under general laws, but shall not be crely. To argue so would be equivalent to ar- ated by special acts. All laws relating to
cuir.g that school funds invested by the corporations may be altered, amended or
<;ate Land Board in bonds or other obligarepealed by the Legislature, and all corpotions become obligations due to the Land
rations doing business in this State, may, as
P.oard. or the members thereof. Because
to such business, be regulated, limited or
the State Treasurer is the custodian of the
restrained by law."
Srate Insurance Fund and is required to colThe State Insurance Fund, under the limlect the principal and interest on the bonds
and deposit such collections in the fund itations imposed by the above provision. .
does not make the obligation or the fund could not, by the Legislature, be created or
run to the State Treasurer. Section 42-2-14, made a private corporation. Nor could the
R.S.1933, provides: "All such securities so Legislature make the Industrial Commission
purchased shall be placed forthwith in the a private corporation. Both the State Inhands of the state treasurer, who is hereby surance Fund and the State Industrial Comdesignated as custodian thereof, and it shall mission were created by special acts of the
be his duty to collect the interest thereon Legislature, and whatever status either of
as the same becomes due and payable, and them may occupy in the administrative
also the principal thereof, and to place the economy of the state, it must be that of an
iuine when collected to the credit of the arm of the state and function as such. Neither the Industrial Commission or the State
state insurance fund/'
Insurance Fund can be a municipal corpoThat the "State Insurance Fund" is a ration. Section 5, art. 11, of our Constitupublic fund, a fund the state by its agen- tion provides, among other things, that,
cies is administering for the state and be- "Corporations for municipal purposes shall
longs to the state, without indulging in re- not be created by special laws." The Infinements as to the nature of ownership, dustrial Commission, therefore, could not,
seems beyond question. Public funds are under the special law creating it, obtain the
62 P.(2d)—35#
tr i r iva Co. v. Industrial Commission of
Utah/67 Utah, 301, 247 P. 490, 492. It is
there said: "We have endeavored to point
o u t that the Legislature has in no way at•Jnirred to make, nor has it made, the state
insurance fund an independent entity disassociated from the Industrial Commission.
The fund *s n o t £P v e n an >' °* ^ i e powers
usualH' provided or deemed necessary for
In
tho functioning of a body corporate.
o : ; K r words, the state insurance fr.r.d as a
Ic^al entity has no existence." There is a
vJrv ?wd reason for the Supreme Court to
Sn \:c\df as will appear from a later reference to the State Constitution relating to
th.- matter.
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stains of a municipal corporation. The
same is likewise true of the State Insurance
Fund. May the State Legislature by special
act create a state agency to do private business, or develop two state agencies into a
private business for the purpose of carrying on an industrial insurance business, or
set up a municipal agency to accomplish the
same purpose? The provisions of the Constitution forbid. State agencies are for the
purpose of doing state business. If the
Legislature may create some floating entity
without ancestry, set it going as an orphan
institution under the administration of a
state-created board, agency, commission, or
what not, acting for and on bqhalf of the
state, and that agency may do things under a* legislative enactment which the Legislature is prohibited from enacting under
the limitations of the Constitution, the constitutional limitations or prohibitions or
mandates become easy of evasion and their:
existence a mere matter of words to be ignored or disregarded whenever the desire to
accomplish a given purpose may suggest a
convenient procedure.
The State Insurance Fund is a special
trust fund, appropriated by the Legislature
and built up by a direct appropriation of
State Funds, with a provision for repayment, with further provisions relative to the
amount required to be accumulated by the
payment of premiums into that'fund, the'
consideration for which is" insurance for employees of employers so paying. The administration thereof as provided by law does
not remove the fund from the effect of the
constitutional limitation safeguarding that
fund from depletion in the manner specified.
Words and phrases are difficult of exact
definition. When we use the phrase "public
fund," we convert the word "public/* originally and commonly used as a noun, into an
adjective. It is a convertible term, difficult
if not impossible of definition and used variously, depending upon the subjects to
which it is applied. See 50 C J . 44. The
word "fund" is likewise a word with a variety of meanings. Constructions differ,
and the classification of a fund must depend
upon and be gathered from the context.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in
the case of Tandsetter v. Oscarson, 56 N.D.
392, 217 N.W. 660, referred to the Workmen's Compensation Fund as a public fund.
Chie'f Justice Budge, speaking for the Idaho
Supreme Court in the case of Parsons v.
Diefendorf. 53 Idaho. 219, 23 P. (2d) 236.

239. in discussing the proposed sale of certain securities purchased with school funds
(while neither the constitutional provision
nor the statute is identical with ours, the
situation is sufficiently analogous to be of
interest), says: "The trust created by the
Constitution and laws of this state is a fixed
trust, in no sense a speculative trust or a
trust that can be used for speculative purposes, however advantageous a change in
investments may appear,"
Under the Utah statute, the Industrial
Commission is authorized to sell the bonds
and mortgages referred to in the section,
yet the fund is in no sense a speculative
fund. The type of securities in which the
surplus and reserve may be invested clearly indicates its character. The law requires
the investment of the surplus and reserve
of the State Insurance* Fund in such securities as will preclude all reasonable possibility of loss or depletion by release, cancellation, or sale so long as the ordinary processes of government are operating and
maintained. This surplus fund investment
is designed as a security, not to be released
except upon payment in full of the obligation in which the fund is invested.
The last clause of section 42-2-14, R.S.
1933, provides: "The commission may sell
any of such bonds upon like resolution, and
the proceeds thereof shall be paid by the
purchaser to the state treasurer."
Defendants cite and rely upon Burr v.
City of Carbondale, 76 111. 455. In that
case the question was only indirectly involved. Certain bonds had been issued for
the construction of certain school and other buildings. The state later took over the
project and became possessed of bonds formerly issued. The Legislature had authorized the issuance of a smaller amount of
bonds and the cancellation of the larger
and former issue of bonds upon sale of the
subsequent bonds and payment of an amount
considerably less than the amount of bonds
held by the Governor. Numerous questions
were presented including the validity of
both the original and refunding issue of the
bonds. The section of the Illinois Constitution (art. 4, § 23) is practically the same
as section 27, art. 6, of our Constitution.
Without argument or discussion and by a
divided court the Illinois court on this point
said:
"But they contend, if the original issue
was legal, then they insist that the resolution of the General Assembly of 1S71, au-
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thorizi'nc the Go\ernor to sell them to the
c ;tv i^u*ng them, is an infraction of section 23. of article 4. oi the present constitution. That section is as follows: T h e
Gcneial Assembly shall have no power to
release or extinguish, in whole or in part,
the indebtedness, liability or obligation of
any corporation or md:\ idual to this State/
"We can not suppose this pro\ision was
designed to embrace a case like this. If it
vices, then the original issue being held valid,
those bonds are still binding upon the city,
and they must pay them. But we do not
think this section of article 4 was intended
to embrace a release of claims doubtful or
hacaidous, which the State might hold
against a municipal or other corporation or
individual. On the face-of those bonds the
State was not named as the obligee. They
do not purport to be an undertaking in
which f he State is a party. They had become the property of the State, which the
Governor, under the resolution, was authorized to sell to the obligors for less than- onethird of their nominal value." (Italics
ours.)
The case of Burr v. Carbondale, supra,
was briefly referred to an£ commented upon in the case of State ex rel. Wilson v.
Young, 44 Wyo. 6, 7 ?.(2d) 216, 221, to the
effect that: "That decision goes too far,
perhaps, and we are not at this time prepared to follow it to its full extent, but it
indicates, nevertheless, the rule that should
»^ applied in this case."
In addition to what was sa.d by the Wyoming court as to the Illinois case going too
far, it appears to us that the basis upon
which the case is put as to whether or not
the constitutional provision is applicable is
untenable.
When a claim is "doubtful or hazardous"
and realization thereof becomes a matter
for judicial determination, a different situation is presented than canceling an obligation by an administrative body, no matter
how honest the intention or capable the personnel of such agency. If the power were
to be left to the Legislature or any administrative agency set up by it to determine
whether a claim, indebtedness, or obligation
were "doubtful or hazaidous" and releases
made upon such determination as a purely
administrative matter, aside from any question of good or bad faith, no standard or
measure of determining such question could
be made controlling The Constitution was
intended to prevent preferential negotiations from being made.

The statute makes it the duty oi the State*
Treasurer to collect. If a contest or questicn of value, hacaid, or doubtful recovery
is presented when the matter gets before the
courts, the question then ceases to be one
of release from indebtedness or liability.
It becomes one of what may reasonably
be recovered, as disclosed by the evidence.
Bankruptcy, corporate dissolution, ability
to realize upon taxes properly levied, catastrophes, droughts, or other factors may.
when the question is submitted to the courts,
be properly there for consideration. The
constitutional inhibition runs against the
Legislature, not the courts.
Under the authority to sell bonds upon
proper resolution of the Industrial Commission, as is authorized by section 42-2-14, R.
S. 1933. such sale must be one in good faith
to a good-faith purchaser, and must not be
for tess than market value. No facts arcalleged from which a market value may be
inferred or determined. It is not alleged
that the bonds had been offered for sale
either publicly or privately. There are no
allegations indicating any necessity for a
sale. Nor is there any showing that the
obligor on the bonds is not able to pay according to the contract contained in the
bonds themselves. By the contract obligation of the bonds, the "full faith and credr
and all taxable property within the town ol
Scipio * * * are and shall continue to
be pledged to the punctual pa\ment of the
principal and interest" of the bonds here
proposed to be canceled for less than there
is due there.on. From the offer made. Scipio must be soh ent. Under such a show ing.
notwithstanding the allegation and, by demurrer, the admission, it would amount to
a legal fraud upon the state and the State
Insurance Fund to permit a cancellation of
the bonds for less than the amount due and
the State Insurance Fund would be depleted
to the extent of the difference without air
consideration therefor, and if it should *K
shown that full payment could be made cancellation for less would be a fraud upon thv
state, and a dereliction of duty for which
officers should be personally responsible.
Aiide from any constitutional inhibition, it
would be legal fraud to sell the bonds for
less than the amount due thereon, until a
showing should be made indicating a reasonable necessity therefor, and a legal order
obtained therefor. No showing is made that
the Insurance Fund must have the cash to
carry on, nor is it intimated that the town
of Scipio is unable to pay in full. An excellent credit standing is indicated from the
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allegation that Scipio is offering to pay the
major part of the bonds before maturity.
No doubt the upstanding citizenry of Scipio
would resent an imputation that its credit
was not good, that the faith pledged when
the bonds were issued had been blighted and
-should now be held for naught, that the
town was bankrupt, or that by the ordinary
processes of taxation the necessary funds
could not be raised to meet the bonds in
question.
The statute makes it the duty of the State
Treasurer to collect the interest on the
bonds in which the surplus and reserve of
the Insurance Fund may be invested as the
same becomes due and also the principal.
R.S.Utah 1933, § 42-2-14. It is alleged that
two of the bonds are past due and that there
is unpaid interest. No suggestion is made
as to why the Industrial Commission, in
'pursuance of its'duty, has not called upon
the State Treasurer to do his duty in this
regard as required by the statute nor why
he should not be requested to do so before
the commission proposes to accept less than
is due, upon an apparently sound obligation, and thus bring discredit to a good-faith
obligation involving the integrity of a municipality of the state without exhausting
the remedy provided by law.
It does not appear that a demand has
been made by the treasurer or any one else
•for payment of a just and apparently sound
obligation, worth all that is due thereon.
Should demand be made for payment and
refused for any reason, then it would be
the duty cf the State Treasurer to discharge
the duty imposed upon him and proceed by
law to enforce payment. It would be time
enough to consider compromise, if compromise were proposed, when a showing had
been made in court that a state of bankruptcy existed or that the obligation was
hazardous or doubtful or recovery in full
could not be had. The question would then
be one for the court upon the issues and
the evidence to determine, not that the liability, indebtedness, or obligation should be
released in whole or in part, but on the contested or conceded issues, how much or
what could be recovered as shown by the
evidence or as to what could be realized
upon a judgment. If the authority vested
and power conferred to levy ta^ces upon the
property may not result in raising funds
to pay the obligation in full, a state of
bankruptcy may be found to exist and* the
treasurer would no doubt be compelled to

be content with such recovery as was possible.
Such procedure is the intent of the statute. The surplus and reserve of the State
Insurance Fund may be invested only in
bonds of the United States or federal land
banks, or bonds of this state, or bonds of
any county, city, town, or school district, or
first mortgages on real estate at not to exceed 40 per cent of the cash value thereof.
It may be observed that the bond investments are limited to those issued by the
United States, the state, or municipal arms
of the state endowed with a general taxing power equal to that provided for the
.support of government itself."
No want of good faith on the pan of the
Industrial Commission, the State Treasurer,
or other state agency is alleged or imputed,
and nothing indicating such want of good
faith is suggested nor remotely imputed
'from what is said in this opinion.
The question of the market value is not
an issue. The amount for which the proposed cancellation is to be made is said to
be the market value. This is a conclusion.
The law has provided for the investment of
the funds in securities of such character
as to eliminate questions of market value
and such as to remove any necessity for a
cancellation, release, or extinguishment of
the debt, in whole or in part. The indebtedness, liability, or obligation evidenced by
the bonds proposed to be released and cancelled for less than the contract obligation
would seem to require no sacrifice.
In the case of Industrial Commission v.
Stong, 77 Colo. 590, 239 P. 12, 14, the State
Treasurer was directed by the Industrial
Commission to invest certain of the state
compensation insurance funds, of which he
was custodian, in government bonds. The
treasurer disregarded the direction given
him and otherwise invested the fund until
a loss was suffered when he complied. Suit
in mandamus and for damages was instituted. The court said: "Plaintiff and Stong
were in effect, if not technically, trustees
of a public trust. They were obliged to
invest this insurance fund as provided by
law and in that way obtain an income from
it for the benefit of dependents under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. That duty
they could not neglect without responsibility, nor could they distribute gratis the fund
thus intrusted to their care. * * * Certainly the commission could no more consent that he fail in that duty than it could
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consent that he appropriate the fund to his
own use."
In principle, the commission can no more
consent to cancellation or release of the
obligation or indebtedness due from the investment of the insurance fund in the Scipio bonds than it could consent to appropriate the difference in amount due and the
amount proposed to be paid to the construction of a monument to an honored citizen,
who in his heart might say, "The humble
shall see this and be glad.''
It is more important to maintain the honesty and commercial integrity of people,
cities, towns, and the state than to consider
small losses or gains. 'To do justice and
judgment is more acceptable to the Lord
than Sacrifice." Prow 21:2, 3. "He that
oppresseth the poor :o increase his riches,
and he that giveth to the rich, shall surely
come to want." Prow 22:16. If the State
"Treasurer should find, in the orderly process of collection, that the obligor has nothing or not enough with which to pay and
such showing be made, let justice be done.
The peremptory writ of prohibition heretofore issued should be made permanent.
EPHRAIM HANSON, Justice.
I concur in the views expressed in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice MOFFAT.

Utah

557

2. Municipal corporations 0=57, 59
Municipalities have only those powers
which are given in express words necessarily
or fairly impliable in or incident to power
specifically granted or essential to accomplishment of declared objects and purposes of
municipality.!
3. Municipal corporations 0=870
City held not authorized to use city funds
to buy unsoline for sale, under statutory authority to deal in commodities if for convenience, comfort, and prosperity of inhabitants, since such authority is limited by provisions which specify particular purposes for
which ordinances may be passed (Rev.St.1933,
15-8-2).*
4. Municipal corporations @=>57
City has no power to deal in fuel, food,
and other necessities to prevent exploitation
of inhabitants'by monopolies and combinations designed to keep up prices inordinately,
in absence of express legislative grant, assuming that Legislature has constitutional
authority to confer such power.

Original proceeding on the application
of the American Petroleum Company and
others for a permanent writ of prohibition
against Ogden City and others, a temporary writ having been granted.
Writ made absolute,

<rv*St;jrsTW>

AMERICAN PETROLEUM CO. et al. V,
OGDEN CITY et ai.

No. 5776.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nor. 28, 1936.
f. Prohibition <3=>28
Supreme Court would consider, on oil
companies' application for permanent writ of
prohibition, whether city acted in excess of
its jurisdiction in using city funds to buy gasoline for sale, where city did not raise question that injunction furnished speedy and
adequate remedy.
i Salt Lake City v. Sutter, SI Utah, 533,
'216 P. 234; American Fork City v. Robinson, 7? Utah, 16$, 292 P. 249; Utah

J. Quill Nebeker, of Ogden, for plaintiffs.
George S. Barker, of Ogden, for defendants.
WOLFE, Justice.
Application for a permanent writ of
prohibition.
Temporary writ granted.
The allegations material to this opinion
contained in the petition are as follows:
That the commissioners of Ogden City
were using city funds "and city credit with
which to purchase gasoline for sale, and
were selling gasoline and other products
to the customers of these plaintiffs for
their private use, and in direct competition
with the plaintiffs, and for the purpose of
compelling the plaintiffs to reduce the
price of their commodities, and that the
plaintiffs would thereby be caused to beRapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City (Utah)
58 P.(2d) 1.
2 Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah, 533,
216 P. 234.
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STATE TAX COMMISSION of Utah, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 14658.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 14, 1978.
State Tax Commission brought action against State
Department of Finance, as administrator of State
Insurance Fund, seeking payment of tax imposed upon
State Insurance Fund. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., entered summary
judgment declaring tax to be unconstitutional, and Tax
Commission appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J.,
held that tax of one percent of total premiums
received, imposed, from among all employers'
workmen's compensation insurers, only upon State
Insurance Fund, which held assets only to cover
identical obligations covered by private insurers,
which had same administrative costs as private
insurers, which had same rights to sue and be sued
and to make contracts as private insurers, and which
enjoyed no immunities not provided to private
insurers, was arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited
as violation of equal protection.
Affirmed.
[1] WORKERS' COMPENSATION kll
413kll
Purposes of Workmen's Compensation Act are to
assure injured employee and his family an income
during period of his total disability as well as
compensation for any resulting permanent disability,
to eliminate expense, delay and uncertainty of
employee having to prove employer's negligence, and
to place burden of industrial injuries on industry.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 etseq.
[2] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k211(l)
92k211(l)
Equal protection protects against discrimination within
a class; Legislature has considerable discretion in
designation of classifications but court must determine
whether such classifications operate equally on all
persons similarly situated.
Const, art. 1, § 2;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

[2] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k211(2)
92*211©
Equal protection protects against discrimination within
a class; Legislature has considerable discretion in
designation of classifications but court must determine
whether such classifications operate equally on all
persons similarly situated.
Const, art. 1, § 2;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
[3] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k228.5
92k228.5
Tax of one percent of total premiums received,
imposed, from among all employers' workmen's
compensation insurers, only upon State Insurance
Fund, which held assets only to cover identical
obligations covered by private insurers, which had
same administrative costs as private insurers, which
had same rights to sue and be sued and to make
contracts as private insurers, and which enjoyed no
immunities not provided to private insurers, was
arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited as violation of
equal protection. Const, art. 1, § 2; U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 14; U.C.A.1953, 31-14-4(l)(b).
[3] WORKERS' COMPENSATION k35
413k35
Tax of one percent of total premiums received,
imposed, from among all employers' workmen's
compensation insurers, only upon State Insurance
Fund, which held assets only to cover identical
obligations covered by private insurers, which had
same administrative costs as private insurers, which
had same rights to sue and be sued and to make
contracts as private insurers, and which enjoyed no
immunities not provided to private insurers, was
arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited as violation of
equal protection. Const, art. 1, § 2; U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 14; U.C.A.1953, 3l-14-4(l)(b).
[4] STATUTES k81
361k81
Because all companies furnishing workmen's
compensation insurance are of a single class, law
operating exclusively upon one member of that class
is constitutionally invalid as a special law. Const, art.
6, § 26.
•1298 Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., G. Blaine
Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Joseph P. McCarthy,
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Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant and
respondent.
HALL, Justice:
Appeal from a summary judgment declaring a tax
levied against the State Insurance Fund under U.C.A.,
1953, 31-14-4(l)(b) to be unconstitutional.
We
affirm.
[1] Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act [FN1] was
first enacted in 1917 largely as a consequence of the
hazards associated with die growth of industry. The
purposes of the Act are to assure the injured employee
and his family an income during the period of his total
disability as well as compensation for any resulting
permanent disability, to eliminate the expense, delay
and uncertainty of the employee having to prove the
employer's negligence, and to place the burden of
industrial injuries on industry.[FN2] To assure the
availability of funds when such injury occurs,
employers are required by law [FN3] to secure
compensation through one of three ways: (1) the State
Insurance Fund; (2) private insurance carriers; or (3)
self-insurance. Participation in the State Insurance
Fund is therefore voluntary, and although publicly
administered, it is a private trust fund to be used to
meet liabilities of various employers when an
employee is entitled to compensation. [FN4]
FN1. U.C.A., 1953, Title 35, Chapter 1.
FN2. Wilstead v. Industrial Comm., 17 Utah 2d
214, 407 P.2d 692 (1965).
FN3. U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-46.
FN4. Gronning v. Smart, Utah, 561 P.2d 690
(1977); Chez v. Industrial Comm., 90 Utah 447,
62 P.2d 549 (1936).
Every company providing workmen's compensation
insurance in Utah, (including the State Insurance
Fund), is required to pay a tax of 31/4 percent of the
total premiums received. [FN5] This tax is not in
issue on this appeal. In addition to this, the State
Insurance Fund is required to pay a tax of 1 percent of
the total premiums it receives.[FN6] This tax law was
passed in 1971 and applies only to the State Insurance
Fund. As administrator of the Fund, the Department
of Finance, respondent herein, refused to pay this

additional tax, and the State Tax Commission,
appellant herein, sued to compel payment. The
district court found the statute unconstitutional and
excused the respondent from payment of die additional
tax. The Tax Commission now appeals, challenging
the constitutional aspects of the decision as well as the
propriety of granting a summary judgment.
FN5. U.C.A., 1953, 31-14-4(3).
FN6. U.C.A., 1953, 31-14-4(l)(b).
[2][3] The thrust of the Tax Commission's claim is
that die Fund is different and dierefore may be treated
differendy from other insurers. Equal protection
[FN7] protects against discrimination within a
class. [FN8]
The legislature has considerable
discretion in the designation of classifications but the
court must determine whether such classifications
operate equally on all persons similarly situated. [FN9]
The State Insurance Fund has been singled out from
among a larger class of insurers to pay a tax imposed
upon no one else which must be considered to be
arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited. Examples of
the similarities between the Fund and others within its
class include the following. The assets of die Fund
exist only to cover the identical obligations covered by
private insurers.
The Fund has the same
administrative costs as private insurers: establishment
of premium and hazard rates, procedures for
analyzing claims and *1299 making disbursements,
reinsurance
considerations,
Fund
investment
decisions, collection procedures, legal fees and policy
issuance. These administrative costs, and other
expenses are deducted from die Fund by legislative
appropriations of Fund money.[FN 10] The Fund has
the same rights to sue and be sued and make contracts
that a private insurer has. The Fund enjoys no
immunities not provided to private insurers. The only
distinguishable feature is diat the Fund is administered
by a State agency, the cost therefor being paid from
the premiums. This feature is not a rational basis to
treat the Fund as a distinct classification. The Tax
Commission implies that the tax is to pay for die cost
of administration. It is represented by appellant on this
appeal that the Commissioner of Finance and his
Department provide many services to the Fund as
does die State Treasurer, Attorney General, and State
Auditor. If such be the case it would appear that the
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 35-3-1 would apply and
that a legislative appropriation from the Fund should
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be made available ro pay for these services. To
permit otherwise would be to grant preferential
treatment in favor of the Fund, a situation as offensive
to the equal protection provisions as the one alleged in
this appeal.
FN7. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 2;
United
States
Constitution,
Fourteenth
Amendment.
FN8. Carter v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah
96, 96 P.2d 727 (1939).
FN9. Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206
P.2d 153 (1949).
FN10. U.C.A., 1953,35-3-1.
[4] An argument closely related to that of equal
protection involves the constitutional provision

precluding enactment of a special law where a general
law can apply.[FN 11]
Because all companies
furnishing workmen's compensation insurance are of a
single class, as explained supra, a law operating
exclusively upon one member of that class is
constitutionally invalid as a special law.
FN11. Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 26.
Appellant's final claim of error is that summary
judgment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P., was improper
because genuine issues of fact remained to be
resolved. We are convinced that what is involved is
strictly a law question and we therefore affirm the
lower court's judgment.
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and
WILKINS,JJ., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Carlyie F. GRONNING, in his official capacity as
Chairman, Commissioner of the
Industrial Commission of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Herbert F. SMART, in his official capacity as
Director of Finance, Department
of Finance, State of Utah, and Administrator of the
State Insurance Fund, et
al., Defendants and Appellants.
No. 14846.
Supreme-Court of Utah.
March 8, 1977.
On appeal from a declaratory judgment of the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson,
Sr., J., which held as constitutional certain legislative
enactments appropriating funds from the State
Insurance Fund to the Industrial Commission, the
Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that the aforesaid
enactments are unconstitutional as violative of due
process, since money in the Fund is not public money
subject to appropriation to meet expenses of
government, but is a trust fund to be used to meet
liabilities of employers when an employee is entitled
to compensation.
Reversed.
[1] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k301(4)
92k301(4)
Formerly 92k301
Legislative enactments appropriating funds from the
State Insurance Fund to the Industrial Commission are
unconstitutional as violative of due process, as money
in the Fund is not public money subject to
appropriation to meet expenses of government, but is
a trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of employers
when an employee is entitled to compensation.
U.C.A.1953, 34-19-1 et seq., 35- 1-1 et seq., 35-3-1
et seq.; Const, art. 1, § 7; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.
14.
[1] WORKERS' COMPENSATION k35
413k35
Legislative enactments appropriating funds from the
State Insurance Fund to the Industrial Commission are
unconstitutional as violative of due process, as money
in the Fund is not public money subject to

appropriation to meet expenses of government, but is
a trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of employers
when an employee is entitled to compensation.
U.C.A.1953, 34-19-1 et seq., 35- 1-1 et seq., 35-3-1
et seq.; Const, art. 1, § 7; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.
14.
[2] WORKERS' COMPENSATION kl075
413kl075
The State Insurance Fund is not an arm of the state to
enforce requirements calling for safe places of
employment, safety devices, safeguards, work
methods and processes; these are clearly functions of
the Industrial Commission and such exist entirely
independent of the provisions of law assuring
recovery of monies due to injured workmen.
U.C.A.1953, 34-19-1 et seq., 35-1-1 et seq., 35-3-1 et
seq.; Const, art. 1, § 7; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.
14.
*691 Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Joseph P.
McCarthy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellants.
A. Wally Sandack, Roger D. Sandack, Special Asst.
Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
respondent.
HALL, Justice:
[1] Appeal from a declaratory judgment which held
as constitutional certain legislative enactments
appropriating funds from the State Insurance Fund to
the Industrial Commission. Such an appropriation of
trust funds by the Legislature is a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and the
decision below is reversed.
The Industrial Commission is a state agency which
exercises the police power of the State as it applies to
employment entiretly without reference to the State
Insurance Fund and its duties and responsibilities are
specifically enumerated in Titles 34 and 35,
U.C.A.1953.
[2] The Insurance Fund is a state administered mutual
insurance program established by the Legislature for
the purpose of insuring employers against liability for
compensation and assuring to the persons entitled
thereto the compensation provided by law and its
purposes and functions are set forth in Title 35,
Chapter 3, U.C.A.1953. The Insurance Fund is not
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an arm of the State to enforce requirements calling fc
safe places of employment, safety devices, safeguards,
work methods and processes. These are clearly
functions of the Industrial Commission and such exist
entirely independent of the provisions of law assuring
recovery of monies due to injured workmen. [FN 1]
FN1. American Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 55
Utah 483, 187 P. 633.
Respondent's position is that since in the
administration of the Insurance Fund it is authorized
to employ 'inspectors' that it necessarily follows that
safety inspectors hired by the Industrial Commission
should be panially supported by appropriation of
monies from the Insurance Fund. This is an untenable
position since the conduct of a safety program
requiring such inspectors is a general duty of the
Industrial Commission and is not carried on at the
request of or for the particular benefit of the Insurance
Fund. Also, a distinction is clearly necessary between
the 'inspectors' the statute allows the Insurance Fund
to appoint and the 'safety inspectors' that are
absolutely required to conduct the safety program
statutorily imposed upon the Industrial Commission
which only incidentally affects the Insurance Fund.
The previous announcement of this court in Chez v.
Industrial Commission,[FN2] is dispositive of this
appeal and the cases cited by respondent in no way
alter the holding therein. In that case we were
directly faced with a determination of the specific
nature of the Fund. The Fund had purchased bonds
issued by the Town of Scipio which sought to
compromise the obligation owing thereon by a
payment over to the Induatrial Commission. The
question then becomes whether a debt or obligation
owing to the Fund was an obligation or liability to the
State. We held that a debt owing the Fund was not an
obligation due the State, and in doing so determined
the status or nature of the funds received from
employers, stating:

FN2. 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549.
*692 . . . The employer really pools his premiums
in the State Fund to create a fund for the payment of
an obligation for which it is liable. It is a common
fund belonging to the participating employers. It is
therefore not derived from anything owing to the
state nor paid out on behalf of any state obligation.
. . . The fund is publicly administered, but its
debtors are not debtors to the state. It belongs, not
to the state, but to the contributing employers for
their mutual benefit. . . .
. . . while a public fund in the sense of being
administered by a public body is not public money
in the sense that it is money of the state to be used
for and on behalf of the state for a state expenditure.
. . . (Emphasis added.)
The Chez case, supra, was recently followed by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in interpreting the status
of a very similar State Insurance Fund created
there.[FN3]
FN3. Moran v. State ex rel. Deny berry, Okl.,
534 P.2d 1282 (1975).
The money in the Fund is not public money subject to
appropriation to meet expenses of government. It is a
trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of employers
when an employee is entitled to compensation. If the
appropriation were to be made it would amount to a
seizure of trust funds for State purposes without due
process of law.[FN4]
FN4. Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 Utah 2d
310, 437 P.2d 442 (1968).
ELLETT, C.J., and CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and
WILKINS,JJ., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Robert B. HANSEN, Attorney General, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD and Utah
State Retirement Fund, et al., Defendants
and Respondents.
Robert B. HANSEN, Attorney General, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
UTAH STATE RETIREiMENT BOARD and Utah
State Retirement Fund; Utah State
Industrial Commission and Utah State Insurance
Fund; University of Utah, for
and in behalf of the University of Utah Hospital for
the University Medical
Center; University Medical Center Trust Fund,
First Security Bank of Utah,
Trustee, Defendants and ResDondents.
Nos. 16714,16560 and 16851.
Supreme Court of Utah.

Compensation Fund did not require the Court to hold
unconstitutional those statutes authorizing the
employment of independent counsel for the benefit of
those entities.
Affirmed.
Crockett, Retired Justice, filed a concurring opinion.
[1] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW kl2
92kl2
Utah constitutional provision which, on its face, was
intended only to provide for launching the new state
government by specifying those "state officers" who
were initially to stand for election was not intended to
define the term "state officers" wherever it appears in
the Constitution; to construe the provision to define
the term "state officers" as used in other constitutional
provisions and in entirely different contexts would
violate basic rules of constitutional interpretation and
would produce anomalous consequences violative of
such basic principles as the doctrine of separation of
powers. Const. An. 24, § 12.

Aug. 27, 1982.
Utah Attorney General filed suit seeking a judgment
declaring that the Utah Constitution has conferred
exclusive authority on him to act as legal adviser to
state defendants, and an injunction prohibiting
defendants from employing counsel pursuant to
various statutory provisions. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Christine M. Durham, J.,
entered summary judgment for defendants, and
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that: (1) constitutional authority of Attorney
General is to act as legal adviser to constitutional
executive officers referred to in Article VII and to
other state executive offices referred to in Article VII,
insofar as the officers act within the scope of duties of
such office, and (2) Industrial Commission, State
Retirement Board, funds it administers, State
Insurance Fund, and University of Utah are not
executive department agencies and, therefore,
Attorney General does not have exclusive authority to
act as their legal adviser; however, it is within his
constitutional power to act as legal adviser to director
of Department of Administrative Services and to State
Treasurer when those officers perform executive
department functions; nevertheless, the functions
performed by the director and Treasurer with respect
to Insurance Fund and by the Treasurer with respect
to
Retirement
Board
and
Unemployment

[2] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6
46k6
Although the constitutional power of the Utah
Attorney General is to act as "legal adviser" to "state
officers," the text of the constitutional provision does
not permit the term "state officers" to be read in its
most expansive meaning to include all employees of
state government. Const. Art. 7, § 16.
[3] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6
46k6
Since the office of Attorney General is, by virtue of
specific constitutional language, an executive
department office, it naturally follows that its
constitutional duties should be limited to rendering
advice to executive department officials. Const. Art.
7, § 16.
[4] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6
46k6
Although the constitutional power of the Utah
Attorney General is to act as "legal adviser" to "state
officers," to interpret the phrase "state officers" to
vest plenary authority in the Attorney General to act
as legal adviser to all state officers and agencies
would effectively nullify the power conferred by the
Constitution on the Legislature to add to and shape the
powers of the Attorney General. Const. Art. 7, § 16.
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[5] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6
46k6
Constitutional authority of the Utah Attorney General
is to act as legal adviser to the constitutional executive
officers referred to in Article VII, i.e., the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, and the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, the departments
over which they have direct supervisory control, and
to the other state executive offices referred to in
Article VII, insofar as the officers act within the scope
of the duties of such office. Const. Art. 7, § 16.
[6] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6
46k6
In addition to constitutional and statutory authority,
the Utah Attorney General has common-law powers;
however, those powers are not constitutionally rooted
and therefore do not expand the power conferred by
Article VILConst. An. 7, § 16.
[7] STATUTES k222
361k222
Where a conflict arises between the common law and
a statute or constitutional law, the common law must
yield. U.C.A. 1953, 68-3-2.
[8] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6
46k6
Industrial Commission, State Retirement Board, funds
it administers, State Insurance Fund, and University
of Utah are not executive department agencies and,
therefore, Attorney General does not have exclusive
authority toact as their legal adviser; however, it is
within his power to act as legal adviser to Director of
Department of Administrative Services and State
Treasurer when those officers perform executive
department functions;
nevertheless, functions
performed by Director and Treasurer with respect to
Insurance Fund and by Treasurer with respect to
Retirement Board and Unemployment Compensation
Fund did not require the Court to hold
unconstitutional those statutes authorizing employment
of independent counsel for those entities' benefit.
U.C.A.1953, 35- 1-32, 35-3-1, 35-4-11, 49-9-4,
62-5-3, 63-30-28, 67-5-5; Const. Art. 7, § 16.
*1334 Bernard M. Tanner, William G. Gibbs,
Richard L. Dewsnup, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellant.
William T. Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for Univ. of Utah.

Frank V. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for Industrial Com'n.
Mark A. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for Retirement Bd.
James R. Black & Robert Moore, Salt Lake City, for
State Ins. Fund.
Merlin Lybbert, Salt Lake City, for Medical Center.
STEWART, Justice:
The Utah Attorney General filed this suit seeking 1) a
declaratory judgment that the Utah Constitution has
conferred excli»ve authority on him to act as legal
adviser to the defendants, and 2) an injunction
prohibiting defendants from employing counsel
pursuant to various statutory provisions.
The
complaint alleges that the defendants are state
agencies, state funds, quasi-state agencies, and trust
and insurance funds. The Attorney General appeals
adverse summary judgments.
The complaint characterizes the defendants as
follows: Utah State Retirement Board, an independent
state agency; Utah State Retirement Fund, a quasistate agency fund;
the Utah State Industrial
Commission, a state agency; Utah State Insurance
Fund, a quasi-state agency fund; the University of
Utah Hospital, a state agency that established the
Medical Center Trust Fund, which is administered by
First Security Bank as Trustee, to provide medical
malpractice insurance.
The Attorney General contends that he has exclusive
constitutional authority to act as legal adviser to the
defendants. The defendants contend to the contrary
and assert that the Legislature has constitutionally
authorized each agency to hire its own counsel. In
addition, the Retirement Fund, Insurance Fund, and
Medical Center Trust Fund affirmatively contend that
they are in effect private trusts administering private
trust funds, not public monies.
The basic issue to be resolved on this appeal is the
meaning of the term "state officers" as used in
Article VII, § 16.
I. THE POWERS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
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At statehood the office of Attorney General was
established as an office within the executive branch of
government by Article VII, § 1 of the Constitution.
Meyers v. Second Judicial District Court, 108 Utah
32, 156 P.2d 711 (1945). As originally written,
Article VII, § 1 stated: "The Executive Department
shall consist of Governor, Secretary of State, State
Auditor, State Treasurer, and Attorney General ...."
[FN1]
FN1. Article VII, § 1 as amended in 1980, now
states:
The elective constitutional officers of the Executive
Department shall consist of Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer, and
Attorney General.... They shall perform such
duties as are prescribed by this Constitution and as
provided by law.
The executive article. Article VII, was drafted to give
effect to the fundamental principle that the organic law
establishing the basic framework of government for
this State should provide sufficient flexibility and
latitude, within the limitations of certain fundamental
restrictions, so that government could be organized to
cope with the inevitable and unforeseeable exigencies
that would arise. In part, the powers conferred on the
constitutional executive officials were constitutionally
based. However, the framers also conferred on the
Legislature broad authority to shape the powers and
authority of those officials as the needs of the times
dictated.
The 1980 amendments *1335 to the
executive article reaffirmed, and to some extent
extended, the same general principle setting forth the
powers and duties of the constitutionally established
executive officers. [FN2]
FN2. A constitutional amendment substantially
revising the executive article of the Constitution
was ratified in 1980. In addition to other changes
the office of Secretary of State was changed to the
office of Lieutenant Governor. Prior to the
amendment, Article VII, § IS established the
powers of the Attorney General. The pertinent
provision is now Article VII, § 16. See Senate
Joint Resolution No. 7, 1979 Utah Laws 1318.
Thus, except for the powers of the Governor, [FN3]
the executive article tersely states in one section
certain basic or core duties of each constitutional
officer, and in addition, provides that the Legislature
may add thereto certain powers and responsibilities.

See, e.g., § 14, specifying the duties of the Lieutenant
Governor; [FN4] § 15, specifying the duties of the
Auditor and Treasurer; [FN5] and § 17, specifying
the duties of the Superintendent of Public Instruction.
[FN6] Section 16 establishes the powers of the
Attorney General in the following language:
FN3. Throughout Article VII various powers and
responsibilities are conferred on the Governor.
See, e.g., §§ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.
Because the "executive power" of the State is
vested in the Governor, § 5, his powers and.
responsibilities are dealt with somewhat differently
than the other constitutional executive officers.
FN4. Article VII, § 14 provides: The Lieutenant
Governor shall serve on all boards and
commissions in lieu of the Governor whenever so
designated by the Governor, shall perform such
duties as may be delegated by the Governor, and
shall perform such other duties as may be provided
by law.
FN5. Article VII, § 15 provides:
The State Auditor shall perform financial post
audits of Public Accounts, except as otherwise
provided by this Constitution, and the State
Treasurer shall be the custodian of public moneys;
and each shall perform such other duties as
provided by law.
FN6. Article VII. § 17 provides:
The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
perform such duties as provided by law.
The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of
the State officers, except as otherwise provided by
this Constitution, and shall perform such other
duties as provided by law.
The Attorney General contends that the term "state
officers" as used in § 16 encompasses all state
employees. The defendants rely on Hansen v. Legal
Services Committee of the Utah State Legislature, 19
Utah 2d 231, 429 P.2d 979 (1967), in support of the
argument that the term "state officers" should be
narrowly construed.
In Hansen the Court held that the Legislature, by
appointing its own legal adviser to assist in the
performance of the Legislature's constitutional duties,
had invaded the constitutional authority of the
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Attorney General. The Court defined the term "state
officers" as used in Article VII, § 16 (then Article
VII, § 18) to mean the same as it means in Article
XXIV, § 12 of the Constitution. [FN7] The Court
therefore held that since Senate and House members
are referred to in Article XXIV, § 12 as Mstate
officers," the Attorney General had exclusive
constitutional power under Article VII, § 16 to act as
legal adviser to the Legislature.
FN7. See supra, note 2.
[1] After a careful reanalysis, we are of the view that
Hansen does not provide a sound basis for defining
the term "state officers." Article XXIV, § 12, the
lynchpin of the Hansen opinion, provides:
The State Officers to be voted for at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution, shall be a Governor,
Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer,
Attorney General, Superintendent of Public
Instruction, Members of the Senate and House of
Representatives, three Supreme Judges, nine District
Judges, and a Representative to Congress.
Clearly, Article XXTV, § 12 was not intended to
define the term "state officers" wherever it appeared
in the Constitution. On its face, Article XXIV, § 12
was intended only to provide for launching the new
state government by specifying those "state officers"
who were initially to stand for election. To construe
Article XXIV, § 12 to *1336 define the term "state
officers" as used in other constitutional provisions and
in entirely different contexts would violate basic rules
of constitutional interpretation and would produce
anomalous consequences violative of such basic
principles as the doctrine of separation of powers.
See Article V, § 1. Clearly, it is as impermissible for
the Attorney General to act as legal adviser to the
judiciary in the performance of the judicial function,
[FN8] as it is for him to act as legal adviser to the
Legislature. Furthermore, the term "state officers" as
used in Article XXIV, § 12, includes the
"Representative to Congress." That officer, however,
is not an officer of state government at all, but of the
federal government.
FN8. There are occasions, of course, when the
Attorney General may properly represent members
of the legislative or judicial branches in litigation
without violating the doctrine of separation of
powers.

Finally, the specific holding in Hansen was
overturned by a constitutional amendment ratified in
1972 that amended Article VI, § 32 expressly to
authorize the Legislature to employ its own legal
counsel to assist in performing its legislative duties.
[2][3][4] Although the constitutional power of the
Attorney General is to act as "legal adviser" to "state
officers," the text of Section 16 does not permit the
term "state officers" to be read in its most expansive
meaning to include all employees of state government.
In the first place, the office of Attorney General is by
virtue of specific constitutional language an executive
department office. Article VII, § 1. As such, it
naturally follows that its constitutional duties should
be limited to rendering advice to executive department
officials. Furthermore, to interpret the phrase "state
officers" to vest plenary authority in the Attorney
General to act as legal adviser to all state officers and
agencies would effectively nullify the power conferred
by Section 16 on the Legislature to add to and shape
the powers of the Attorney General. The result would
be to undermine the intended flexibility accorded the
Legislature to provide legal counsel to various state
agencies whose functions may require special legal
counsel or whose duties could result in conflicts of
interest. The construction contended for by the
Attorney General would also require the inadmissible
conclusion that the Attorney General is to act as legal
adviser to officials of both the legislative and the
judicial branches of government.
Other provisions in the Constitution also use the term
"state officer," but they do not require a more
expansive definition of that term than is used in
Article VII, § 16. The term "state officers" is used in
a variety of contexts, each for a different purpose and
each requiring a construction in accord with that
purpose. Cf. State v. Yelle, 52 Wash.2d 856, 329
P.2d 841 (1958). Thus, for example, Article VII, § 18
uses the term broadly to provide that compensation
should be paid those executive branch officers
enumerated in Article VII, § 1, as well as "such other
State and District officers as provided for by law ...."
[FN9] The terms "state officers" or "state office" are
used in still another context with a much narrower
meaning in Article VII, § 9, which provides for
interim appointments by the Governor under certain
conditions. The term is also used with a restricted
meaning in Article VII, § 10, which provides for
senatorial confirmation of certain state officers
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appointed by the Governor. In sum, the term "state
officers" has been used in the Constitution to specify
different groups of state officers, and there is no
textual basis for choosing one meaning over another to
resolve the issue in this case.
FN9. Prior to the 1980 revision of Article V, the
pertinent section of Article VI was § 20.
[5] Therefore, in light of the constitutional language,
as well as the nature and history of the office of
Attorney General, see 7A C.J.S. Attorney General § 7
(1980), we conclude that the framers intended to
confer constitutional power on the Attorney General
only with respect to executive department offices.
Thus, the constitutional authority of the Attorney
General is to act as legal adviser to the constitutional
executive officers referred to in Article VII, i.e.,
*1337 the Governor, Lt. Governor, Auditor,
Treasurer, and the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, the departments over which they have
direct supervisory control, and to the other state
executive offices referred to in Article VII, insofar as
the officers of those offices act within the scope of the
duties of such office.
Our conclusion as to the constitutional power of the
Attorney General with respect to state officers is
consistent with precedents from other jurisdictions.
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Yelle, 52
Wash.2d 856, 329 P.2d 841 (1958), in construing a
virtually identical constitutional provision describing
the powers of the Attorney General, has reached a
conclusion similar to the one we reach. See also
Watson v. Caldwell, 158 Fla. 1, 27 So.2d 524 (1946);
Holland v. Watson, 153 Fla. 178, 14 So.2d 200
(1943); Saint v. Allen, 172 La. 350, 134 So. 246
(1931).
In addition to the power conferred by the
Constitution, the Attorney General also enjoys other
broad powers conferred pursuant to Article VII, § 16
by the Legislature. U.C.A., 1953, § 67-5-3 confers
sweeping authority on the Attorney General to
perform "legal services for any agency of state
government." In pertinent part that provision states:
The attorney general may assign his legal assistants
to perform legal services for any agency of state
government.... As used in this act "agency" means
any department, division, agency, commission,
board, council, committee, authority, institution, or

other entity within the state government of Utah.
The Attorney General also has broad litigating
authority. Section 67-5-1 provides:
It is the duty of the attorney general: (1) To ...
prosecute or defend all causes to which the state or
any officer, board or commission thereof in an
official capacity is a party; and he shall have charge
as attorney of all civil legal matters in which the
state is in anywise interested.
However, the broad powers conferred by Section
67-5-3 must be read in juxtaposition with statutes
authorizing certain agencies to employ independent
counsel and the implied limitation provided in Section
67-5-5 which states:
Except where specifically authorized by the Utah
Constitution, or statutes, no agency shall hire legal
counsel, and the attorney general alone shall have
the sole right to hire legal counsel for each such
agency. (Emphasis added.)
[6] In addition to constitutional and statutory
authority, the Utah Attorney General, like attorneys
general of numerous other states, has common law
powers. [FN 10] State v. Jiminez, Utah, 588 P.2d 707
(1978); Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d
177 (1969).
However, those powers are not
constitutionally rooted and therefore do not expand the
power conferred by Article VII, § 16. Meyers v.
Second Judicial District Court, 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d
711 (1945). The source of the common law power
lies in the State's statutory adoption of the common
law which has been in effect, except as modified by
statute, since statehood. 1898 Revised Statutes §
2488; 1907 Compiled Laws of Utah § 2488. The
present provision is found in § 68-3-1. [FN 11] See
also Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360, 88 P. 20
(1907); Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 10 S.Ct. 792, 34 L.Ed. 478 (1890).
FN10. See generally 7A C.J.S. Attorney General §
7 (1980),
FN11. Section 68-3-1 provides:
The common law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or
laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent
with and adapted to the natural and physical
conditions of this state and the necessities of the
people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the
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rule of decision in all courts of this state.
[7] Of course, where a conflict arises between the
common law and a statute or constitutional law, the
common law must yield. Utah Code Ann., 1953, §
68- 3-2; [FN12] Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v.
Salt Lake Investment Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. *1338
586 (1909); In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P.
757 (1906).
The principle has been applied
specifically with respect to the common law powers of
the Attorney General. Florida ex rel. Shevin v.
Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.1976).
FN12. Id.
The exact extent of the Attorney General's common
law powers need not now, however, be decided
because the issues in this case turn on constitutional
and statutory provisions. [FN 13]
Whether the
Attorney General has the power to represent the
defendants in this case depends on whether the
defendants are executive department officials, and if
not, whether the Legislature has authorized defendants
to employ independent counsel.
FN13. For a discussion of some of the common
law powers exercised by the Attorney General, see
Oaks, Trust Doctrines in Church Controversies,
1981 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 805.
n. THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF
DEFENDANTS
A. Utah State Retirement Board and Trust Fund
The Utah State Retirement Office is "administered
under the general direction of the retirement board."
§ 49-9-2. The board consists of six persons to be
appointed on a non-partisan basis and the State
Treasurer as an ex officio member. However, the
Retirement Office is specifically established as an
"independent state agency and not a division within
any other department."
§ 49-9-2. The Board
members "serve as investment trustees of the Utah
state retirement fund" and have general direction over
the Retirement Office. § 49- 9-3.
The Retirement Board administers the 1) Utah State
Retirement Act, § 49-10-1 et seq.; 2) Utah Judges'
Retirement Act, § 49-7a-l et seq.; 3) Utah Firemen's
Retirement Act, § 49-6a-l et seq.; and 4) Utah Public
Safety Retirement Act, § 49-11-1 et seq. Each system

has different retirement standards, contribution rates,
withdrawal rates, and pension benefits. The various
funds are administered as a common trust fund,
known as the Utah State Retirement Fund, solely for
the benefit of the beneficiaries and not for the public
at large. Some 80 percent of the beneficiaries are not
state employees, but employees of municipalities or
counties. Each fund is required by statute to pay its
proportional share of the administrative costs. §
49-9-5. No state funds are appropriated to meet any
administrative costs.
Investments are not subject to control of the Board of
Examiners. § 49-9- 12(2). Section 49-9-4 authorizes
the executive director of the Retirement Board to
employ attorneys to assist in the administration of the
retirement systems. Legal fees and other general
administrative costs are to be paid from the various
funds on a prorated, cost-of-service basis. § 49-9-5.
In a formal opinion, No. 78-007, the Attorney
General has ruled that the Retirement Fund was not a
state fund but a public trust fund and that as such the
fiduciary responsibilities of the Board "would be in
conflict with control exercised by the state auditor or
other public official."
B. Industrial Commission and State Insurance Fund
The Industrial Commission administers the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the Occupational
Disease Disability Law, and the Employment Security
Act, among other responsibilities.- The Commission is
an administrative agency, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 73 Utah 366, 274 P.
139 (1929), with administrative, quasi-judicial, and
quasi-legislative powers. It can sue and be sued in its
own name. § 35-1-2; Industrial Commission v.
Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825 (1918). It is not a
body within the executive branch of government, but
rather an independent agency.
Section 35-1-32 authorizes the Commission to appoint
independent legal counsel to prosecute or defend any
legal action within or concerning its jurisdiction.
Section 35-1-32 states:
The commission may with the approval of the
governor appoint a representative to act as special
prosecutor or to defend *1339 in any suit, action,
proceeding, investigation, hearing or trial relating to
matters within or concerning its jurisdiction. Upon
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the request of the commission, the attorney general
or the county attorney of the county in which any
investigation, hearing or trial had under the
provisions of this title is pending, shall aid therein
and prosecute, under the supervision of the
commission, all necessary actions or proceedings for
the enforcement of this title.
See also § 35-2-49 and § 35-4-20.
Closely associated with the State's workmen's
compensation scheme is the State Insurance Fund.
Section 35-3-1 authorizes the creation of the State
Insurance Fund to provide workmen's compensation
insurance to employers for the protection of their
employees. The Director of the Department of
Administrative Services [FN 14] now administers the
Fund, and the State Treasurer, also an executive
department official, is the custodian of all monies in
the State Insurance Fund, § 35-3-13. The Director is
authorized by statute to hire attorneys and other
professional expens to assist in the administration of
the Fund. § 35-3-1. [FN 15] All administrative costs
of the Fund are borne by the Fund itself, including
attorney's fees.
Id.
The Department of
Administrative Service is an office within the
executive branch of government.
FN 14. Section 35-3-3 states that the Commission
of Finance has the responsibility for administering
the State Insurance Fund. In 1981, however, that
provision was impliedly repealed by an act
reorganizing a part of the executive branch of
government. See 1981 Laws of Utah ch. 257.
The responsibility for administration of the Fund
was transferred to the Director of the Department
of Administrative Services, § 63-1-5 (Supp.1981).
See also § 63-1-10 (Supp.1981).
FN 15. That authority was transferred to the
Director by § 63-1-10.
The Insurance Fund resembles a private insurance
company that collects insurance premiums from
employees and pays out to employees insurance
benefits pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act
and the Occupational Disease Act. See State Tax
Commission v. Department of Finance, Utah, 576
P.2d 1297 (1978); Gronning v. Smart, Utah, 561
P.2d 690 (1977); Chez v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549 (1936). In State Tax
Commission v. Department of Finance, supra, this
Court recognized that the Fund may enter into

contracts and has the legal capacity to sue and be
sued.
The Industrial Commission also administers the
Unemployment Compensation Act for which there is
"a special fund, separate and apart from all public
moneys or funds of this state ...." § 35-4-9(a). The
State Treasurer is the treasurer and custodian of the
Fund and administers the Fund "in accordance with
the directions of the commission ...." § 35-4-9(b).
The Security Administration Fund is essentially a trust
fund.
To assist in the administration of the
Unemployment Compensation Act, the Legislature has
authorized the Commissioner to appoint attorneys.
Section 35-4-11(d) provides:
The commission shall appoint on a nonpartisan merit
basis, fix the compensation, and prescribe the duties
and powers of such officers, accountants, attorneys,
experts, and other personnel as may be necessary in
the performance of its duties.
C. University of Utah and University of Utah
Medical Center
The University of Utah has constitutional status and
is a legal entity with the status of a body corporate.
State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 P. 285 (1909).
Article X, § 4 of the Constitution provides:
The location and establishment by existing laws of
the University of Utah ... are hereby confirmed, and
all the rights, immunities, franchises and
endowments heretofore granted or conferred, are
hereby perpetuated unto said University ....
The University operates the University of Utah
Hospital at die University of Utah Medical Center.
The Medical Center provides educational services to
the University of Utah and receives some State
funding, but it is primarily funded through receipts
from patient care and federal funds.
*1340 A trust fund was established by the University
of Utah, on behalf of the Medical Center, with First
Security Bank of Utah as trustee, to provide selfinsurance for the Medical Center against malpractice
and other casualty claims.
The purpose of
establishing the Fund was to avoid the cost of
commercial malpractice insurance. The Fund is
financed solely from a portion of patient care
revenues. The Medical Center, because it participates
in several federal assistance programs for which it
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receives federal funds, is subject to various federal
rules and regulations, and the trust was established
pursuant to certain of those regulations.
Those
regulations require that the trustee have legal title to
the Fund and that it cannot be related to the health
care provider either through ownership or control.
No State funds are appropriated to the trust.
The trust agreement between the University and the
bank authorizes the bank, as trustee, to employ and
pay from the trust fund, attorneys and others as may
be necessary for the effective administration of the
self-insurance program, consistent with applicable
regulations of pertinent federal agencies and to pay
from the trust fund all costs, expenses, or other
liabilities that may be incurred by the trustee in
connection with the trust.
ffl. AUTHORITY OF DEFENDANTS TO EMPLOY
COUNSEL
[8] None of the defendant agencies as such is an
executive department agency. For various reasons the
Legislature has established the Industrial Commission,
the State Retirement Board and the retirement funds it
administers, and the State Insurance Fund as
independent agencies. Likewise, the University of
Utah, which enjoys a degree of constitutionally rooted
independence, is not an executive department agency.
[FN16]
FN16. In People v. Barrett, 382 111. 321. 46
N.E,2d 951 (1943), the Court addressed an issue
somewhat similar to that with which we are here
confronted:
[Trustees of the university] are not state officers in
the sense that the Attorney General is their legal
advisor or representative, as contended by
respondents in this case ....
In the sense that it is a department or branch of the
state government the University of Illinois is not an
agency or instrumentality of the state. It is a
separate corporate entity, which functions as a
public corporation.
Id. at 346-347, N.E.2d at 964.
As to each defendant, the Legislature has conferred
specific
statutory
authority
authorizing
the
employment of independent counsel. Section 35-1-32
authorizes the Industrial Commission to appoint
counsel, with the approval of the Governor, and §
35-4-11 authorizes the Commission to appoint

attorneys to assist in the administration of the
Unemployment Compensation Act. The Utah State
Insurance Fund is authorized to employ independent
counsel pursuant to § 35-3-1. The Retirement Board
is empowered to hire legal counsel pursuant to §
49-9-4.
Under the authority of § 63-30-28
(Supp.1981), the University of Utah is authorized to
purchase insurance "by establishing a trust account
under the management of an independent private
trustee having authority ... to expend both principal
and earnings of the trust account solely to pay the
costs of investigation, discovery, and other pretrial
and litigation expenses including attorneys' fees."
Thus, the authority for each defendant to hire
independent counsel has a clear statutory foundation.
The statutes providing such authorizations fall within
the exception, see § 67-5-5, to the general authority of
the Attorney General to perform legal services for
"any agency of state government." § 62-5-3.
It is, however, readily apparent that the Director of
the Department of Administrative Services is an
executive department official acting under the general
supervision and control of the Governor, and that the
State Treasurer is a constitutional executive officer.
Thus, they are state officers within the meaning of
Article VII, § 16.
Therefore, as a general
proposition, it is within the constitutional power of the
Attorney General to act as legal adviser to *1341
those officers when they perform executive
department functions. Nevertheless, we do not think
the functions performed by the Director and the
Treasurer with respect to the Insurance Fund and by
the Treasurer with respect to the Retirement Board
and the Unemployment Compensation Fund require us
to hold unconstitutional those statutes authorizing the
employment of independent counsel for the benefit of
those entities.
The State Insurance Fund operates essentially as a
private insurance company; it receives no public
moneys and pays its own administrative expenses
from the premiums received. The moneys paid into
the Fund do not belong to the State but in effect to
contributing employers. Gronning v. Smart, Utah,
561 P,2d 690 (1977). The funds are in effect held as
trust funds for an insurance program which is
designed to protect private persons. The same is true
of the Unemployment Compensation Fund. As for the
Treasurer's participation on the Retirement Board, it
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is clear that the Legislature intended that the agency
be independent from the executive branch. The
Treasurer's participation does not transform that
agency into an executive branch agency. Thus, the
Director and the Treasurer, in performing the
assigned duties, do not perform responsibilities that
properly belong to the executive department. Rather,
they perform duties for essentially independent state
entities. Hence, the Constitution does not require that
the Attorney General act as legal adviser to the
entities in question.
Affirmed. No costs.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, J., concur.
CROCKETT, Retired Justice (concurring with
comments):
I concur with the main opinion. However, in my
view there is a somewhat different rationale, grounded
on fundamental principles, which supports its
conclusion, and which I think is of sufficient
significance and applicability to justify stating
separately.
The first of those principles is that due to the respect
that should be accorded the concept of the separation
of powers in our system of government, the judiciary
should exercise great restraint in intruding into the
legislative prerogative. Consistent with that policy,
there is indulged a strong presumption in favor of
constitutionality, which is overcome only when it is
abundantly clear that the legislative enactment is in
contravention of some constitutional provision. [FN1]
FN1. Lehi City v. Meiling, City Recorder, 87
Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935); Newcomb v.
Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement
Commission, et al., 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941
(1952).
In regard to the authority of the legislature relating to
the enactments in question, it is further important to
bear in mind that the legislature is constitutionally
vested with the power to make the laws for this
sovereign state; and thus has inherently the power to
enact all laws essential to the carrying on of the
purposes of government, except only as expressly
prohibited or limited by constitutional provisions.
[FN2]

FN2. See statement in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d
359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962) and see Kimball v.
Grantsville City, 19 U. 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A.
628 (1899); said in awareness of possible
limitations in Enabling Act, not applicable here,
see Jensen v. Dinehart, Utah, 645 P.2d 32 (1982).
With die above-stated general propositions in mind,
attention is focused upon the challenge to the validity
of the several legislative enactments which authorize
the defendant state agencies to employ adequate staffs,
including attorneys, to carry out their legally imposed
responsibilities.
In support of his challenge, plaintiff cites and relies
on § 16, An. VII of our Constitution, which provides
that:
The Attorney General shall be the legal advisor of
state officers, and shall perform such other duties as
may be provided by law.
He places emphasis on the word " shallM; argues that
it is mandatory; and that therefore the just-quoted
provision gives him the sole and exclusive right and
duty to act as attorney for defendant entities and
*1342 prohibits the legislature from authorizing them
to employ their own attorneys.
In analyzing that contention, it is pertinent to observe
that the term "shall" is a flexible one. This is clearly
revealed by reference to that comprehensive lexicon
of the law. Words and Phrases. It contains several
pages of case references to the word "shall/ a perusal
of which indicates that it is sometimes used in the
mandatory sense and sometimes merely as directory
or permissive, leading to the conclusion that its
meaning is to be determined from the context in which
it is used and the purpose sought to be accomplished.
[FN3]
FN3. To the same effect, see 80 C.J.S. p. 138 and
cases there cited.
Typical of numerous cases therein listed as
supporting that view are In re NorrelTs Estate, 139
NJ.Eq. 550, 52 A.2d 407, 410 (1946), wherein the
court states that the word "shall" in a statute is to be
construed as merely permissive when no public
benefit or private right requires it to be given an
imperative meaning. Our own Court has recognized
the same proposition. In the case of Bird and Jex Co.
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v. Funk, 96 Utah 450, 85 P.2d 831 (1939), it was
held that "shall" as used in a statute relating to the
authority of our Liquor Control Commission to
regulate advertising is merely permissive and not
mandatory.
Applicable to the question as to which meaning is to
be given the word "shall" in the provision under
scrutiny is the rule of statutory construction: that
where there is a choice as to the interpretation and
application of a statute, it should be so construed and
applied as to make it constitutional, in preference to
one which would make it invalid. [FN4] This same
principle of harmomous reconciliation in favor of
validity has reciprocal effect in considering
constitutional provisions in relation to legislative
enactments. It is submitted that if the rules
hereinabove stated are applied to the problem
presented by plaintiffs contention it will be seen that
an entirely reasonable understanding of the provision
of § 16, of Art. VII is that the Attorney General is
simply authorized and given the responsibility of
being legal advisor to state officers;
and more

specifically, of controlling importance on the problem
here: there is nothing in its language which expressly
states or necessarily implies any prohibition upon the
inherent powers of the legislature to provide for the
adequate staffing of state institutions, including
attorneys, where that is essential to the carrying out of
responsibilities imposed upon them.
FN4. Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 2d 42,
504 P.2d 1007, 1012 (1972); Norville v. State
Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937
(1940); Treffry v. Taylor, et al., 67 Wash.2d 487,
408 P.2d 269 (1965).
On the grounds stated in the main opinion, and the
additional grounds stated herein, I join in affirming
the rulings of the district courts: that the legislature
did not transgress its constitutional prerogative in the
enactments under attack herein.
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., do not participate herein.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Fighting Fraud
In Workers' Comp
By Stephen Blakely

A suspicious rash of injury claims by one of Timothy
Jans' commuter-van drivers led to a landmark conviction of the employee for workers' compensation fraud.

The Cost Of Fraud
Property/Casualty Insurers* Losses From Fraudulent Claims,
1985-1994, In Billions Of Dollars

pensation Insurance Group of
imothy Jans, co-owner of
Workers1 Compensation
Glendale, Calif., has a reputaCook-DuPage TransportaAutomobile Liability
tion for aggressiveness in fighttion Co. in Chicago, still
Automobile Damage
ing workers' comp fraud. The
bristles at the memory of
company quickly put the "inthe scam that almost worked.
Homeowners
jured"
driver under video surIn just six months in 1995, one
Multiple-Peril
veillance, and suspicions were
of his commuter-van drivers
Fire
confirmed: The driver was
had four nearly identical rearAll Other
working secretly as a tow-truck
end traffic accidents that reoperator while getting workers'
sulted in very minor damage to
comp payments to stay home
the van but very major insurwith a bad back—a scheme
ance claims, including claims SOURCES: A.M. BEST; CONNING INSURANCE RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS. UTEST DATA AVAILABLE.
for workers' compensation. Each time, the claims. Teople talk, and we picked up that that not only bilked the insurer but also cost
driver complained of a back injury and col- [the suspect driver] wasn't really hurt. So Cook-DuPage sharp increases in its insurlected insurance payments while off the job. we complained to our insurer because our ance premiums.
Jans recalls that "something smelled premiums had been going up," Jans says.
"They caught him on videotape trying to
fishy" about the driver's rash of injury
Cook-DuPage's insurer, Fremont Com- get a tow on a small car that was parallel

T
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Armed unth stronger laws, new
resources, and a tougher attitude,
employers and their insurers are
striking ba^k against this costly
brand of cheating.

parked," recalls Jans. "He goes behind the
car, bends down, and physically shoves it
out of the parking space—by himself. It's
great video.*
That ironclad evidence made workers'
comp history in Illinois. The driver was
convicted and served about a month in jail
for felony insurance fraud. It was the first
time in Chicago that a worker had been
prosecuted and imprisoned under the
state's workers' comp law, according to
Fremont Compensation.
Fremont Compensation, on behalf of
Cook-DuPage, then petitioned the Illinois
workers' comp board to throw out the
claim, allowing the insurer to lower the
company's premium. This marked the
first time an employer got the state board
to purge afraudulentclaimfromits workers' comp accident record immediately.
For Cook-DuPage, a local commuter
service that Jans and his two brothers
founded in 1975, the case "really sent a
message" and paid off in a big way, Jans
says. With 140 vans and 200 drivers, the
company has had no suspicious workers'
comp claims since 1995. It also is paying
$250,000 less in annual workers' comp
premiums than it was three years ago,
largely because the fraudulent claims by
the one driver were erasedfromits record.
As Jans can testify, a single incident of
workers' comp fraud can have serious financial consequences for a small business. But his story also demonstrates that
employers, insurance companies, and
prosecutors—armed with stronger laws,
new resources, and a tougher attitude—
arefightingback successfully.
The crackdown on fraud is a major reason why workers' comp costs have been
falling in recent years. (For details, see "A
Crisis Past," Page 16.) The decline is especially remarkable because fraud in the
workers' comp system is a huge and tangled problem that involves not only workers and employers but also doctors,
lawyers, and others.
"There's no question that we've become
more aggressive" at combating all types
of workers' comp fraud, says Robert

Injuries Covered
In Paid Claims
Under Workers'
Compensation, 1996
M i Location Of Pain

CShaughnessy, a senior fraud investigator for The Hartford Insurance Group in
Hartford, Conn., referring to both his company and the industry as a whole. "Ifs certainly more difficult to get away with
fraud than it used to be."
Hie Ihie Costs Of Fraud
Although insurance fraud is sometimes
called a "victimless" crime, it hurts a lot of
people in many different ways. Honest
workers with legitimate injuries often feel
they are under suspicion by co-workers or
managers just for using the workers' comp
system as it was intended.
Fraud is also expensive. It raises businesses' insurance premiums, can reduce
productivity, and can even threaten a
company's survival. Other employees may
be forced to pick up the slack of a malingering co-worker, jobs may have to go unfilled; pay raises or profit-sharing gains
may suffer as revenue is lost. Insurers and
law-enforcement agencies spend large
sums to detect andfightfraud.
Ultimately, the costs of workers' comp
fraud are passed on through increases in
insurance premiums paid by the companies that must buy the coverage. The result is a huge—if not readily apparent—
economic burden on employers.
For the insurance industry, the cost of

Nature Of Injuries
Sprain Or
— Strain.
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Fracture Or « « n /
Dislocation..! I / 0
Bruise Or 4 1 1 0 /
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.Cut Or Puncture
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Disease Or
Cumulative Injuries
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SOURCE: NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE
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fraud in workers' comp claims is about $5 system that can vary significantly from
billion a year, according to estimates by the state to state. There's no centralized reportNational Insurance Crime Bureau (MCB) ing or collection of data, so it's impossible to
in Palos Hills, EL, an industry-financed monitor the U.S. system as a whole, let
anti-fraud organization, and by the Insur- alone the individuals who may swindle it
ance Information Institute in New York
Also, only 32 of the 50 states have
City, a communications organization
laws that define insurance fraud as
sponsored by the property and caa felony. That leaves more than
sualty insurance industry.
one-third of the states without
In fact, workers' comp in reworkers' comp fraud laws or
cent years has been the largest
with statutes that are either insource of fraud within the propadequate or ineffective for proserty/casualty insurance sector,
ecuting workers' comp fraud,
accounting for more than oneaccording to the Insurance Inforthird of property/casualty fraud
mation Institute.
losses, according to a 1996 analysis by
"I thought welfare was easy to rip
Conning Insurance Research and Publica- off, but nothing is as easy as workers' comp,"
tions in Hartford. (Workers' comp is classi- says Ranney Pageler, Fremont Compensafied as property/casualty insurance—not tion's vice president offraudinvestigations,
health insurance—because it provides com- who helped put Cook-DuPage Transportamercial liability coverage.)
tion's problem driver behind bars. *lt's a
"Fraudulent claims in workers' compen- complicated system."
sation easily outstrip those in other lines of
[the property/casualty] business," says the How Workers'Comp Woite
Conning report. (See the chart on Page 14.) Workers' compensation is a state-manThe FBI estimates there is fraud in 10 dated, no-fault insurance system financed
percent of all insurance claims; the Conning almost exclusively by employers. It pays
study concludes that the fraud level in medical expenses and a portion of lost
workers' comp claims is nearly 25 percent. wages to workers who suffer job-related inWhy is workers' compfraudso pervasive? juries or illnesses.
The short answer is because it's easy to
Workers incur no out-of-pocket expenses,
commit and hard to detect
and benefits are not taxed. By providing
Workers' comp is a unique and complex workers' comp coverage to their employees,

A Crisis Past
In the 1980s, the workers' compensation system in the
United States was drowning in red ink and on the
edge offinancialcollapse.
But costs started coming down in the early 1990s,
and in 1994—after 14 consecutive years of losses—
workers' comp insurers returned to profitability
In the past few years, analysts say,
workers' comp has become the most-improved sector in the insurance industry.
In a report issued late last year, the
National Council on Compensation Insurance, the industry's clearinghouse
in Boca Raton, Fla., stated, "For the
first time since the early 1980s, the
U.S. workers' compensation system is
now financially stable and continues
to improve."
The most dramatic evidence of the
turnaround is that states and insurers
in the past three or four years have been
lowering their workers' comp premiums.
As a result, employers' costs for workers'
comp insurance as a percentage of payroll have declined nearly 16 percent
since 1993.
Observers—while warning that seri^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
ous problems remain in the system—cite SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOTSTATISTICT

employers are shielded by lawfromhaving
to defend themselves against liability lawsuitsfiledby workers injured on the job.
Workers' comp, established in 1908, was
the first form of social insurance in the
United States. Today, every state has its
own program; the federal government covers most of its workers under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Program. The
states receive no federal funding.
Generally, the states require employers to
buy workers' comp insurance or prove they
can afford to pay workers' claims out of
company funds-—known as self-insuring.
Businesses typically buy workers' comp
coveragefromprivate insurers. In six "monopoly" states, however, employers are required to buy policies from die state's own
insurance plan. Thirteen states have both
state-run and private insurance plans.
The premium a company pays for its
workers' comp policy is determined by three
major factors: job classifications, which rate
the risk of a specific job; the number of employees; and thefirm'saccident record.
Companies with high-risk jobs or frequent accidents pay more for workers' comp
coverage than firms with low-risk jobs or
good safety records. (See "Costly Numbers
In Workers' Comp," September 1997.)
Part of what makes workers' comp
unique also makes it easy to scam. In almost all states, the workers' comp system

several factors that contributed to the turnaround.
Among them:
Stronger state laws. Under pressure from the
insurance industry and the business community
over the past decade, 32 states have enacted
laws that classify insurance fraud as a felony,
according to the Insurance Information Institute, an industry group in New York City.
Yet 16 states do not define insurance
fraud as a crime, and at least two others have statutes that are too vague to
be effective, according to the institute.
Stronger enforcement. At the start
of this year, 33 states had special antifraud bureaus or units, and three more
states had new legislation to establish
such units.
At least 20 states require insurers to
forward all suspicious claims to their
state's fraud bureau.
In addition, many states require insurance companies to have their own
anti-fraud departments in order to be licensed to operate.
Prosecutions for insurance fraud have
increased, and the number of insurance
companies' special investigation units
has grown.
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stands apart from the civil- and criminaljustice systems, with its own rules, judicial
proceedings, and regulatory process. And in
most states, workers' comp is administered
by multiple agencies, which may not communicate effectively with one another.
Moreover, as many employers have
painfully discovered, workers' comp systems generally give the claimant the benefit of the doubt. This presumption, reflecting the no-fault nature of workers' comp,
makes it easy for workers to commit fraud.
Insurance-industry observers say this
worker-friendly bias helps explain the popularity of "soft-tissue" claims, such as back
pain, muscle strain, or sprains that are virtually impossible for a doctor to detect or
disprove. (See the chart on Page 15.)
An employer who tries tofighta workers'
comp claim must abide by the system's
unique procedures. Ignorance of workers'
comp can lead to costly mistakes for any
business owner who tries to take on the system. (See "Cooking Up A Workers' Comp
Disaster," Page 18.)

T

here are various types of fraud for
which employers bear the ultimate
cost. Two in particular hurt business
owners directly: claimantfraudand insurer fraud. Two others—premium fraud
and providerfraud—maybe less apparent
but are costly nonetheless.

Insurers'
Fraud Patrol
Membership growth of the
International Association of
Special Investigation Units, a
major organization of insurancefraud investigators.

Claimant Fraud
When a worker fabricates or exaggerates an
injury claim to get paid time off, it's
claimant fraud. Although back injuries and
pulled muscles are popular excuses, some
workers concoct more-imaginative, even
bizarre plots.
A notorious case of claimant fraud occurred in 1994 in Rockford, 111., when a
24-year-old college student staged a robbery at a Kinko's store, where he worked
the late-night shift alone. After violently
ransacking the store, he had an accomplice shoot him through the shoulder to
embellish the hoax. His story later unraveled when a perpetrator tipped off
authorities.
"His intent was to claim a big workers'
comp settlement that would pay for college," says Samantha VanDenburg, the special agent with the NICB who helped prosecute the case. "Hefiledwith the [workers'
comp] industrial commission immediately,
at first for $50,000. He was mostly daiming
pain and suffering."
The student eventually was convicted on
theft charges, and his workers'comp claim
was dropped.
A less dramatic case of claimantfraudoccurred in 1995 at Barr-Miles Trucking Co.,
a Chicago firm with 50 employees. Coowner Larry Barr says an employee tried to
cover up a missed day at work by using

A safer workplace.
The exploding costs of
workers' comp insurance
in the 1980s forced businesses to improve safety.
As a result, workplace fatalities, injuries, and illnesses have declined
sharply.
The average number of
workdays lost to job-related injuries declined by
almost 13 percent in the
four years through 1996—
the latest year for which
figures are available—according to the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics.

Managed care. Workers'
comp has shared in the cost
reductions attributed to the
continuing shift to managed health care in recent
f
f
f
f
v
98 9r9I 93 94 95 9i97
years.
SOURCE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
A similar development
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNITS
specific to workers' comp
has been employers' and
medical providers' aggressive use of case management, in
which individual claims are monitored closely and efforts are

forged physician reports to make a false
claim that he had been hurt on the job.
Simply by following reporting procedures
and demanding medical documentation,
Barr helped insurance investigators expose
the fraud. The worker was fired and
pleaded guilty to forgery charges.
A more difficult workers' comp issue for
Barr and other business owners is malingering, a practice in which a worker who
may have sustained a legitimate injury
stretches out the recovery time to extend or
enlarge disability payments.
Malingering is a widespread problem in
workers' comp. If s often hard to prove, and
sometimes employers simply try to negotiate a financial settlement to close the case
and get the absent worker off the payroll.
"The treachery is that you get a lot of
[workers' comp] cases that aren't outright
fraud but are deceitful and get turned into
something bigger. If s tough to say the guy
isnt hurt," says Barr.
Insurer Fraud
A type of workers' comp fraud that targets
small firms in particular involves the scam
artist who peddles cut-rate but nonexistent
workers' comp policies and later absconds
with the premiums.
The business owner gets a bogus certificate of insurance tofilewith the state but is
left with no coverage once a claim is actually

made to accelerate an injured worker's return to work and prevent disputes.
Insurance analysts warn,
however, that the big savings
from managed care are over
and that workers' comp costs
are likely to track the current
upward turn in medical expenses generally.
Employers'Cost

Premiums
Drop

Public attitudes. Massive advertising and education campaigns by the insurance industry have raised
public awareness about the
impact of fraud: Eightyeight percent of Americans
now recognize insurance
fraud as a major problem
that increases their premiums, according to a 1996
Gallup Poll.
Nonetheless, fraud is still
tolerated by many. More than
one in three Americans believe
it is acceptable to overstate
their insurance claims, according to a survey released in
January by the Insurance Research Council of Wheaton, HI.

For Workers' Comp
Coverage, Per $100 Of Payroll
$2.5

'89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95
SOURCE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SOCIAL INSURANCE
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filed. Such outfits typically vanish when
their obligations come due.
One example of such insurer fraud came
to light in 1995, when the California Department of Insurance took action against a
company accused of selling fraudulent
workers' comp policies to more than 290 employers. Within two days, the agency's
owner had reopened under a different
name. He laterfledto Texas. Eventually he
was caught and convicted of a litany of federal crimes, according to the Coalition
Against Insurance Fraud (CAIF), an insurance-industry group in Washington, D.C.
Premium Fraud
Businesses not only are victims of workers'
compfraud.Sometimes they commit it.

In premium fraud, dishonest business
owners cheat their insurers to save on premiums. They deliberately misclassify their
companies'jobs to hide the true risk of the
work, or they conceal the number of employees on their payroll, or they change the
names of their companies to hide a poor accident record.
While virtually any type of business can
commit premium fraud, investigators say
this problem is most pervasive in construction, trucking, and employee leasing, where
firms act as independent suppliers of labor
to a wide variety of businesses. Such companies may be tempted to try to save money
by lying to their insurers, investigators say,
because of the high premiums involved, the
transient or multistate nature of the jobs,
&&u&4 %*

and the lack of strong regulatory oversight.
The largest case of premium fraud in
Maryland involved the owner of an employee-leasing firm who was convicted of
cheating the state's workers' comp fund out
of $3.6 million by underreporting payroll
and thus underpaying premiums, according
to the CAIF; the firm supplied workers to
roofing and trucking companies.
In some instances, workers' comp underwriters lose as much from premium fraud
committed by employers as they do from
claimant fraud committed by workers.
Provider Fraud
As the term implies, provider fraud is committed by health-care or legal professionals who provide services to injured work-

^

Cooking Up A Workers' Comp Disaster
When disputing workers' compensation claims, some employers
seem to have a sure-fire recipe for disaster. Take it from labor
lawyer Jane Eden, a partner with Eden, Tolins & RafFerty in
Worcester, Mass. She represents injured employees in workers'
comp disputes, and she says a lot of employers cook their own
goose before legal proceedings ever begin.
Eden estimates that in her 14 years of practice, she
has forced more than 2,000 companies and their insurers to pay contested workers' comp claims. Many employers defeat themselves, she says, through simple
carelessness or ignorance about workers' comp.
Under the state-run workers' comp system, workers
are entitled by law to medical and disability payments
for work-related injuries. Employers contesting a claim
as not legitimate or as unrelated to work wind up—in
most states—before an administrative-law judge who
arbitrates workers' comp disputes.
Each side must cover its own legal bills in these proceedings, although the labor lawyer's payment usually
comes out of the workers' comp award.
If you want to lose a workers' comp dispute, says
Eden, just make these mistakes:
Force an injured employee to continue working
despite the injury. Eden says that as soon as the employee's complaint is disregarded, "it's over. You'll get a
claim. And youll lose."
She adds: "What you don't want to do is send the
message, *We don't care about you, and we won't help
you.'All too often, that message is sent on the first day
of injury."

Neglect the basics for warding off disputes. Eden says
employers should report all accidents. Get employees involved in
safety issues, she says. Have a safety plan in place, and be prepared if there's an accident.
If a worker perceives that the employer doesn't care about the

PHOTO cRiCK FRIEDMAN—BLACK STAR

Many employers defeat themselves in workers' compensation disputes
through carelessness or ignorance, says lawyer Jane Eden

Don't give employees any information about workers'
comp. Even worse, Eden says, is lying about their benefits.
With rare exceptions, employees have a legal right to workers'
comp coverage, so don't try to hide itfromthem, she warns.
Harass the person about returning to work. Eden says
that while employers have the right to monitor an injured
worker's medical care, the "fit-for-work" decision is up to a doctor,
not a manager. Most states prohibit employersfrompressuring an
injured employee to return to work.

injury or is trying to cheat the employee, she adds, the worker
has "nowhere else to go but to a lawyer." Most of her clients call
"because they're hurt, they're petrified that no one will help
them, and they're terrified they will lose their jobs."
Eden readily acknowledges that there is fraud in the workers' comp system but insists that "the vast majority" of workers' injury claims are legitimate.
"Remember, these employees are human beings," she says.
"The key to minimizing litigation is to treat the employee with
respect."

Nation's Business April 1998

20
COVER STORY

ers. Like employer fraud, it is expensive
And to improve coordination of
fraud are clearly increasing, inand hard to detect.
the industry's legal efforts
surers are less interested in
Because the health-care system is so big, against fraud, most insurance
criminal prosecution than in
the opportunities for deceptive billing are companies support the NICB.
saving money. In most inalso vast, which makes this the largest It maintains a database of
stances, insurers will declare
source of workers' comp fraud in some more than 350 million records
victory if they simply get a claim
states.
of suspicious property/casualty
dismissed or dropped.
"Our main goal is to not pay
Before California enacted comprehensive claims, and it helps local prosecufraud. If a prosecution happens,
workers' comp reform legislation in 1994, tors with criminal-fraud cases.
hundreds of medical "comp mills" churned
Insurance companies also have been cre- that's a bonus," says Jay S. Williams, vice
out millions of dollars' worth of fraudulent ating special investigation units (SIUs) to president of corporate claims for CNA Inor padded workers' comp bills yearly.
pursue such fraud. A1996 survey by Con- surance in Chicago and a former police
One of the largest such cases drained at ning Insurance Research found that 75 detective. "Our main goal is to get the
least $30 million a year from the state percent of the top 250 property/casualty in- claimant off the [workers' comp disabilworkers' comp system, according to the surers in the United States had estab- ity] dole and back to work."
CAIF. It involved a doctor and
several lawyers in Los AngeI egardless of the type of
les who were accused of sub' :fraud being investimitting fraudulent bills for
I gated, the most impormedical treatments. They al[ tant factor is documenlegedly persuaded clients of
tation. Investigators say that
state unemployment agenwithout a paper trail, which
cies to visit law offices and
starts with the employer, they
medical clinics run by the acquickly reach a dead end.
cused perpetrators, who then
For employers, that means
billed almost every workers'
paying extremely careful atcomp carrier in the state.
tention to the "first report of
injury," the form they are reIn some cases, fraudulent
quired by state law tofilewith
"providers" don't even bother
their insurers when a workto recruit injured workers;
related accident occurs. These
they simply obtain or fabrireports establish the facts of
cate workers' names or Social
an accident and can become
Security numbers and bomthe basis for prosecution if the
bard workers' comp insuremployee's story changes.
ance companies with bills.
Thus, it's crucial for insurHow do insurance sleuths
ancefirmsto have claims audiscover and prove fraud? It
ditors who can detect and
depends on the kind of fraud.
refuse payment of fraudulent
workers' comp bills.
Uncovering Claimant Fraud
Provider fraud can be spotA fabricated claim is freted easily by some small
quently the easiest type of
firms. Wayne Ruggiere, a
workers' comp fraud to prove
partner in the Ohlert-Rugbecause it involves a purgiere Insurance Agency in
ported injury that restricts an
Queens, N.Y., teDs about "the High-tech cameras are among the weapons used by insurance-fraud
employee's physical abilities.
case of the missingfinger,"in- detectives stick as Brian McCauley, but the techniques they employ
If fraud is suspected, as in
can be decidedly mundane.
volving one of his clients.
the case of the Cook-DuPage
An employee cut himself,
driver, the proof often winds
went to a doctor for treatup onfilmor videotape showment, and returned to work the same day lished in-house SIUs to fight fraud.
ing the "injured" worker openly engaging
with a few stitches. But the doctor's bill
One measure of that investment is the in activities that vividly disprove the
later diagnosed the injury as a partial am- 850 percent membership growth since 1990 claim. Says James Feckey, director of the
putation, declared the worker to be dis- of the International Association of Special Minnesota Labor Department's Investigaabled, and charged almost $900 for "recon- Investigation Units. Based in Baltimore, it tive Services Unit: "If a picture is worth a
struction" of the fingertip. "It was [a is the major professional group for insur- thousand words, video is worth a million."
health-care provider] who misrepresented ance-fraud cops. (See the chart on Page 17.)
Workers' comp fraud has been a gold
the injury," Ruggiere says. "It's a perfect ex- "Prior to the formation of SIUs, there was mine for private detectives who are hired
ample of misuse of the system."
no mechanism for insurance companies to by insurance companies to secretly track
combat insurance fraud," says John and record suspects. Their primary tools
n light of the huge losses and the com- McHale, the association's president. "A lot are digital video minicameras and 35-mm
plexity of workers' comp fraud, insurers of companies just paid it and passed it on still cameras fitted with high-powered
lenses, used from inside nondescript vans
have attacked it on several fronts. to their customers."
Among other things, they have been
By industry estimates, each dollar or cars. Such cameras can capture detailed
pushing hard to change state laws and pub- spent on SIUs returns $7 to $10 in sav- imagesfroma block or more away.
lic attitudes to make it easier tofightfraud. ings through deterrence or restitution.
Brian McCauley, owner of Power InvestiThis is the goal of the CAIF.
Although arrests for workers' comp gations in Queens, N.Y., says some tech-
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niques for combating fraud are not elaborate. He cites a case of a restaurant waiter
who fell at work and filed a suspicious $1
million claim for a permanent back injury,
saying he couldn't bend over.
"After [the suspect] left home one day, I
put an empty bottle in his driveway and
threw some change on the ground," McCauley recalls. "He came back, got out of his
car without his cane, and we videotaped
him bending down four orfivetimes to pick
up the things. He could bend forward, and
we proved it." The claim was rejected.
Although video surveillance can raise
privacy concerns and is not always successful, it is a powerful anti-fraud weapon
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when combined with proper documentation, specialists say.
"Virtually no fraud prosecution is successful unless you have surveillance," says
Eugene Mattioni, a lawyer in Philadelphia
who specializes in workers' comp cases. "If
you're going to [prosecute], you have to go
for the jugular.''

Insurers typically uncover such fraud
by using specialized computer-software
programs that detect suspicious characteristics in an insurance application
from an employer or a medical bill from
a provider. Such techniques require
highly trained auditors and claims adjusters and sophisticated computers. A
red flag, insurers say, is the absence of
Premium And Provider Fraud
documentation by a company.
Fraud involving employers or health-care
When investigators suspect a business
providers is usually harder to prove because owner is hiding the true nature of the firm's
such paper crimes cannot be videotaped: jobs or the size of its work force on an inJobs are misclassified, workers are not re- surance application, they turn to other useported, medical bills and treatment records ful sources of information: phone books,
are falsified.
business directories, credit bureaus, news^•ajg^g^^rs^fcVj.

What You Can Do
Business owners can protect themselves against workers' compensation fraud by taking preventive measures, recognizing suspicious cases, and helping insurers combat it, industry specialists
say. Here are tipsfromvarious sources, including Ranney
Pageler, head of fraud investigations for the Fremont Compensation Insurance Group in Glendale, Calif., andfromthe National
Insurance Crime Bureau, an industry-financed
anti-fraud organization based in Palos Hills, DL

• The reported accident occurred just before or after a strike,
job termination, or layoff, or at the end of seasonal work.
• The claimant's description of the accident conflicts with the
facts in the initial report—the form describing the occurrence
that employers are required tofilewith their insurers.
• The employee delays reporting the claim without a reasonable explanation.
• The employee has a history of numerous suspicious or litigated workers' comp claims.
• The diagnosis is inconsistent with treatment, or the injured worker takes more time off
than the injury seems to warrant.
• The claimant refuses a diagnostic procedure to confirm the nature of an injury.
• The claimant is hard to reach at home while
allegedly disabled or has a history of frequently
changing addresses, jobs, or physicians.

Preventing Fraud
• Maintain a safe workplace. Eliminate "accidents waiting to happen." Enlist workers and
your insurance agent to establish and improve
safety procedures.
• Screen job applicants, verify their statements on job applications, and check references.
Fighting Fraud
A person who lies on paper may lie on the job.
Because claimant fraud is an insurance
• Give all new hires a written statement of
crime, prosecuting it is the job of the insurance
your company's workers' comp policies and a
company or law-enforcement authorities. But
separate statement about safety. Inform workthere are ways you can help your underwriter
ers directly and indirectly that the cost of inbuild an airtight case:
juries affects the company's ability to compete.
Display posters on fraud awareness.
Document everything. Have your employ• Be wary of unknown or cut-rate insurers if
ees sign a workers' comp statement acknowlyou're switching to a new carrier. A workers'
edging that false injury or disability claims are
comp polipy that sounds too good to be true
a crime. (This can help rebut any contention
probably is, especially if it is offered by an unfa- Computer data can help uncover that there was no "intent" to defraud.)
miliar underwriter. Ask for references and
ivorkers'compfratid, says RanWhen an injury occurs, employers are recheck with the state insurance department.
ney Pageler of Fremont Comquired to give their insurers a detailed report,
• Be honest with your insurance agent.
pensation Insurance Givup.
generally within 24 hours. Doing so is critical:
Premium fraud by dishonest employers is as
Basic facts, detailed descriptions, witness statemuch an issue as claimant fraud by dishonments, and sketches or photos of accident areas
est workers, some experts say. Don't be part of the problem.
are powerful tools against workers' comp fraud, especially if the
claimant later changes his or her story.
Recognizing Fraud
While the following factors do not prove a case of claimant
Keep your eyes and ears open. Carefully review the facts on
fraud, experts say, the presence of two or more indicates that
claim applications. Review other accident records for similar infraud may be present:
juries. Listen to your workers; they are more likely than employ• The accident occurs late Friday afternoon and isn't reported ers to hear if a co-worker is malingering or lying about a disability.
until Monday morning, or it occurs early Monday morning.
• No one saw the injury occur, the employee's own descripCommunicate regularly with injured workers, physicians,
tion does not logically support the cause of the injury, or the
and your insurer's claims representative. If fraud is involved, close
accident occurred in an area outside the employee's regular
cooperation between employer and insurer is the only way to
work area.
build strong evidence.
PHOTO SSAHT BARTHOLOMEW
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paper or company advertisements, licensing and regulatory agencies, corporate
directories, and, increasingly, online databases and the Internet.
Tbm Corcoran, an investigator with the
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. of Elgin, 111.,
says one business owner failed to disclose
important information on the insurance application but disclosed it on the company's
World Wide Web site.
Efforts For The Future
For the growing army of insurance auditors
and examiners, progress against workers'
comp fraud will depend on several developments now under way.
Foremost is the nation's continuing shift
awayfromtraditional fee-for-service health
insurance to managed-care plans, which
have reduced medical costs by controlling
providers' rates and patient access to medical resources. For those reasons, managed
care is becoming increasingly popular as
the medical-treatment option offered by
workers' comp insurance policies.
But health-care swindles account for the
largest source of economic fraud in the
United States, authorities say, and the shift
to managed care is bringing with it new and
complex types of billing fraud aimed at insurance companies.
In recognition of that problem, Congress
provided the FBI with more than $500 million in the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act tofinancea new
assault on health-care fraud. The statute
created a "federal health-care offense" that
gives prosecutors new legal powers to deal
with the problem.
The FBI is transferring or hiring nearly
500 agents to work for a newly created
Health Care Fraud Unit to focus exclusively
on that sector, the bureau says.
The new FBI presence is likely to help unmask and shut down health-insurance
scams faster. It will also make insurance
fraud in general a far bigger issue with the
public and prosecutors, according to insurance-industry investigators.
Another important development scheduled to occur this year is the creation of a
nationwide, centralized computer database
of all workers' comp insurance claims. The
aim is to allow companies to identify past
perpetrators of fraud quickly and to check
for warning signs such^as aliases or multiple Social Security numbers. This planned
"all-claims" database arose from the 1997
merger of two insurance-claims groups and
the participation of the NICB.
A growing concern among fraud investigators, however, is President Clinton's
proposed health-care "bill of rights,"
which includes a broad right to privacy
regarding medical reports. Insurers are
worried that any legislation in Congress
to revise managed care may create pri-
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vacy laws so restrictive that insurers for signs of fraud, informing employees
would be prevented not only from using about how fraud affects them, and thoran all-claims database but also from oughly documenting every workplace insharing information they currently ex- jury or accident. (See "What You Can Do,"
change.
Page 21.)
And finally, as states have clamped
If you suspect a case of claims fraud, indown on workers' comp fraud with dustry specialists say, call your insurance
tougher laws and as benefit payments company and let its experts handle it. Tell
have dropped, organized labor has been your insurer "what your leads are," says
fighting back out of concern that such Pageler of Fremont Compensation.
! efforts will discourage or deny legitiPageler also says employers should not
1
mate workers' comp claims.
wait for a problem to occur before establish|
Last year, a coalition composed of the ing an employee-education effort and that
1
AFL-CIO and trial attorneys persuaded they should remind workers repeatedly
I Ohio voters in a statewide referendum how they can be hurt by workers' comp
I to overturn a new law approved by the fraud. "If the employer can educate his
J General Assembly to overhaul the work force, his work force will protect him,
j state's workers' comp system. Organiz- because fraud has such an impact on payi ers of the successful $3 million labor roll and it can cost jobs," Pageler says.
j campaign called themselves the ComJans of Cook-DuPage Transportation,
i mittee to Stop Corporate Attacks on In- who worked with Fremont to resolve the
! jured Workers.
company's claimant-fraud problem, agrees.
Employers who believe they have a fraud
iven human nature and the complex- situation, he says, should call their workers'
ity of the system, investigators ac- comp carrier and be persistent until the carknowledge that fraud in workers' rier takes action.
comp probably will never be elimiJans tells other employers that fighting
| nated. But they say it can be controlled.
fraud will pay off, although it isn't easy. "It'll
I "You'll never be able to fight fraud only take a little time, but it will benefit you," he
through criminal prosecution," says Sally says. "If the business owner isn't looking to
Narey general counsel of the National improve the situation, nobody will."
NB
Council on Compensation Insurance in
Boca Raton, Fla., the insurance industry's 7b express your views on workers' comp
centralized rating bureau. "You have to fraud, see Where I Stand, Page 71.
make people realize it's wrong and won't be
tolerated."
7b order a reprint of
Insurance investigators say employers
this story, see Page 58.
can make a big difference by being alert
For a fax copy, see Page 7.
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Fraud Division
The Insurance Fraud Act of 1994 gave rise
to the Insurance Fraud Division, This Division
is charged with the responsibility of conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions of
insurancefraudviolators. These violators
include individuals who defraud insurance
companies as well as dishonest insurance
representatives who steal from or otherwise
defraud the consumer.
The division provides a focal point for
the anti-fraud efforts of insurance company
investigators, other law enforcement agencies
and the public in order to achieve a cooperative
and coordinated investigative and prosecution
approach to insurance fraud. The Fraud
Division has established an excellent relationship with the Attorney Generals' Office and
has an Assistant Attorney General assigned to
its staff on a full-time basis to prosecute
insurance fraud.
The Division is increasing public awareness about insurance fraud and is actively
soliciting the cooperation of the public. The
Insurance Fraud Division receives approximately 15 calls per weekfromthe public
reporting suspected insurancefraud,and when
possible, these complaints are investigated
with the victim insurance company.
The Fraud Division is recognized as an
official law enforcement agency in the State of
Utah and investigators for the Division are
special function law enforcement officers each
having Police Officers Standards and Training
(POST) Certification.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR 1995
During its nine months of operation in 1995, the
Fraud Division had opened 110 cases. Prosecution was initiated in 41 of these cases with the
filing of 69 felony counts and 14 misdemeanor
counts. As of December 31,1995, sentences had
been handed down in 18 of those cases. Recognizing that the Division was fully staffed only
since March 1,1995, these statistics are impressive and provide strong evidence of the Divisions initial impact on insurance fraud.
The Division works a wide variety of insurance
fraud investigations. The following chart reflects the different types of cases investigated by
the Division:
Case Type
Automobile
Property
Medical/health
Life Ins.
Bond Schemes
Liability Fraud
Workers Comp
Agent Schemes
Insurance Co.
Misc.
Total

No. of cases
16
18
10
2
1
4
35
21
1
2
110

percentage
of all cases
15%
17%
9%

2fo I

1%
4%
31%
18%
1%
2%
100%

Table D
1995 Utah Market Share Report
Workers' Compensation
Percent
of Market

Rank Company Name
1

WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH

2

WASATCH CREST MUTUAL INS CO

3

NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS CO OF PITTS

4

INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY CO

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

LIBERTY INS CORP
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INS CO
ZURICH INS CO US BRANCH
MID-CENTURY INS CO
TIG PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY
EMPLOYERS INS OF WAUSAU A MUTUAL CO
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY CO OF THE NW
LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY CO

13

AMERICAN NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE CO

14
15
16

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY

17

CENTURY INDEMNITY CO

18
19
20

EAGLE PACIFIC INS CO

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO OF IL
AMERICAN MOTORISTS WS CO

ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY
CIGNA PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS CO
TOTAL FOR TOP

20

RANKED INSURERS

TOTAL FOR ALL 201 INSURERS WRITING THIS LINE

09-Ocl-96

50

53.81%
6.02%
4.06%
3.32%
2.83%
2.60%
1.74%
1.65%
1.54%
1.32%
1.14%
0.96%
0.86%
0.82%
0.71%
0.70%
0.68%
0.59%
0.58%
0.56%

Direct
Premiums
Written
$146,059,264
$16,337,669
$11,032,629
$9,003,640
$7,680,110
$7,059,633
$4,730,319
$4,480,722
$4,180,419
$3,576,255
$3,100,760
$2,601,858
$2,346,252
$2,216,105
$1,933,927
$1,890,848
$1,859,299
$1,602,289
$1,570,188
$1,509,836

86.49%

$234,772,022

100.00%

$271,435342

